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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 940530-CA 
v. : 
EMER KENT WINWARD, : Priority No. 2 
De f endant/Appe11ant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction by a jury 
of forgery, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-501 (1990) (attached in Addendum A). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) (Supp. 1994). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did a fatal variance exist between the State's 
evidence at trial and the bill of particulars concerning the 
"victim" against whom defendant harbored the requisite "purpose 
to defraud"? Defendant's waiver of this claim below prevents 
appellate review of the merits of this issue. State v. Fulton. 
742 P.2d 1208, 1216 (Utah 1987), cert, denied. 484 U.S. 1044 
(1988). Alternatively, if the merits are considered, the 
question of whether a fatal variance exists is a legal question 
reviewed on appeal without deference to the trial court. See 
generally State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
2. Was there sufficient evidence adduced at trial to 
establish a "purpose to defraud anyone" as is required by Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-501? In reviewing a sufficiency challenge, the 
Court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict, and reverses the conviction only when the evidence and 
the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are "so inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained 
a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crime." State v. 
Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214, 1215-16 (Utah App. 1991) (quotation 
omitted); State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah App. 1990). 
As a sub-issue of this point, must there be a nexus 
between the "purpose to defraud" and the act of forgery? This 
presents a question of statutory interpretation which is reviewed 
on appeal using a correction-of-error standard. State v. 
Stettina, 868 P.2d 108, 109 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Dickev, 
841 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 
(Utah 1993). 
3. Did the trial court properly refuse to instruct the 
jury that they must be unanimous as to the nature of the fraud 
and the identity of the victim since neither constitutes an 
element of the offense of forgery? Because defendant failed to 
raise a timely objection below to the absence of a unanimity 
instruction, this Court must review this issue for manifest 
injustice. Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c); State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 
1201, 1203 (Utah App. 1991). 
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4. Did the trial court properly admit expert testimony 
concerning "purpose to defraud [?]" A trial court's determination 
on the admissibility of expert testimony is reviewed on appeal 
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 
(Utah 1993). Reversal is not warranted "unless the decision 
exceeds the limits of reasonability." Id, 
As a sub-issue of this point, did the trial court 
properly admit evidence regarding defendant's dealings with the 
Bauers and ERA Realty? Defendant's failure to provide any 
meaningful argument prevents appellate review of the merits of 
this issue. State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984). 
5. Did the trial court properly refuse to instruct the 
jury about joint venture or specific intent? Defendant's 
argument violates Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, thereby preventing appellate review of the merits of 
this claim. Alternatively, the issue of whether the trial court 
erroneously failed to give defendant's proposed jury instruction 
is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Squire, 888 P.2d 1102, 1104 (Utah App. 1994) (citations omitted). 
This Court will affirm where the instructions given, taken as a 
whole, "fairly tender the case to the jury[.]" State v. Diaz, 
859 P.2d 19, 24 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting State v. Brooks, 638 
P.2d 537, 542 (Utah 1981)). 
6. Did the trial court exercise appropriate discretion 
in denying defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing on his 
motion to disqualify the prosecutor? Review of a trial court's 
3 
denial of an evidentiary hearing is had for an abuse of 
discretion. United States v. Gines, 964 F.2d 972, 977 (10th Cir. 
1992), cert, denied, 113 S.Ct. 1023 (1993); United States v. 
Peterman, 841 F.2d 1474, 1484 (10th Cir. 1988), cert, denied, 488 
U.S. 1004 (1989); see State v. Gray, 851 P.2d 1217, 1227 (Utah 
App. 1993) (noting that a decision on a motion to disqualify an 
attorney is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, and 
acknowledging that trial courts have broad discretion to control 
the conduct of attorneys in matters before the court). 
7. Did the trial court properly impose a prohibition 
against practicing law as a condition of probation where 
defendant's practice was directly related to the criminal offense 
of which he was convicted? This question has become moot and 
does not warrant appellate review. See Burkett v. Schwendiman, 
773 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 1989); State v. Stromcruist, 639 P.2d 171, 
172 (Utah 1981). Alternatively, in reviewing a trial court's 
probation decision, this Court applies an abuse of discretion 
standard. State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1990); State 
v. Peterson, 869 P.2d 989, 991 (Utah App. 1994); see also Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-1(8) (j) (1990) (granting sentencing court broad 
discretion in imposing probation terms and conditions the court 
considers appropriate). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule 
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on 
appeal is contained in or appended to the body of this brief. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant Emer Kent Winward and his wife Kimberlee 
Winward were charged in the same information with unlawful 
dealing with property by a fiduciary, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513 (1990) and -412 (1990), 
and with forgery, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1990), based on their involvement in a real 
estate transaction which culminated on August 9, 1993 (R. 1-5).x 
Defendant moved for a bill of particulars, to which the State 
responded (R. 16-18, 25-35). The State thereafter amended the 
information to additionally allege theft, a second degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990), as an 
alternative to the unlawful dealing with property charge (R. 36-
38). After a preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over to 
the district court on all counts (R. 55-57, 62). Defendant filed 
a motion to quash the bindover order, a motion to recuse of the 
judge, and a motion to disqualify the prosecutor, together with a 
request for an evidentiary hearing on the latter motion (R. 65-
85, 86-87, 88-90, 131-32). After hearing argument on the 
motions, the district court granted the motion to quash as to all 
but the forgery count, and denied in total the latter two motions 
(R. 181-86, 187-90). 
1
 Although defendant and his wife were represented by the same 
trial counsel and filed several joint pleadings, their cases were 
handled separately below. Defendant was tried first by order of 
the trial court (R. 270; Tr. Vol. II. 1191). 
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Following a two-day trial, a jury convicted defendant 
of forgery, and the court ordered preparation of a presentence 
report and released defendant pending sentencing (R. 257). 
Defendant filed a post-trial motion to arrest judgment and an 
application for certificate of probable cause (R. 290-313) . The 
trial court denied both motions and sentenced defendant to an 
indeterminate term of zero-to-fifteen years in the Utah State 
Prison, stayed execution of the sentence and imposed probation 
for 36 months under six conditions, including the provision that 
defendant not practice law during the probationary period (R. 
340-43, 346-47, 374-75) (a copy of the judgment and sentence is 
attached in Addendum B). 
In ruling on the application for a certificate of 
probable cause, the trial court found that the issues raised by 
defendant did not raise a substantial question of law or fact, 
and that defendant posed no risk of flight or danger to the 
community (R. 346-47). Defendant appealed, and this Court 
reversed the trial court's ruling (R. 368), and issued a 
certificate of probable cause. On remand for determination of 
the conditions of release, the trial court stayed all 
restitution, fines and community service requirements as well as 
the requirement that defendant not practice law (R. 370-72, 382-
84) (attached in Addendum C).2 
2
 A disciplinary hearing was subsequently held on March 7, 
1995. The district court granted the Office of Attorney 
Discipline's motion for interim suspension of defendant, then 
stayed the suspension for 180 days, apparently to permit 
determination of this appeal (a copy of the district court's ruling 
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Defendant now appeals his conviction and sentence, 
attacking the trial court's evidentiary rulings, the jury 
instructions, the probation conditions, the court's refusal to 
grant an evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion to disqualify 
the prosecutor, and the sufficiency of the evidence. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are recited in the light most favorable to 
the jury's verdict. State v. Morgan, 865 P.2d 1377 (Utah App. 
1993); State v. Mickelson, 848 P.2d 677 (Utah App. 1992); see 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993). Because defendant 
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the facts are stated 
in detail. 
In August 1992, George and Ann Marie Bauer listed their 
home at 171 North 800 West in Cedar City for sale with Tom 
Goodman, an agent of ERA Realty, for the purchase price of 
$45,000 (Trial Transcript, Volume I [hereinafter "Tr. Vol. "] 
855-58, 872-73, 884-85). Thereafter, when the home had not sold, 
the Bauers lowered the asking price to $43,500 (R. 873, 885). On 
July 12, 1993, another ERA agent, Kim Winward, defendant's wife, 
received an offer from Nicole Packer, Kim's employee, to purchase 
the Bauer home for $40,000 cash, $500 of which would be in the 
form of earnest money (R. 251; Tr. Vol. I. 856, 859, 885-86, 
889). Two days later, the Bauers accepted the offer, relying on 
the advice of their contracted real estate agent who indicated 
that it was a fair deal, and without knowledge of other 
is attached in Addendum D). 
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transactions concerning the property, including the fact that the 
property would be re-sold on the same day Packer bought it for 
$18,000 more than Packer was paying (Tr. Vol. I. 800-03, 874, 
878, 880, 888). 
Packer was living with the Winwards that summer, and 
Kim had gotten her a job as her assistant at ERA Realty so she 
could earn money to go to college (Tr. Vol. I. 921-22). 
Defendant and his wife approached Packer about participating in a 
plan in which she would be a "straw man" purchaser of real 
property for and on behalf of defendant and his wife (Tr. Vol. I. 
923-28; Vol. II. 1059, 1061-62). Packer did not have the $40,000 
purchase price for the Bauers' home but agreed to participate in 
the Winwards' idea to buy property and immediately sell it at a 
higher price to someone who would put up the money for the 
initial purchase, then split the profits in thirds (Tr. Vol. I. 
925-28, 960). After making this arrangement with the Winwards, 
Packer made the offer on the Bauers' home, under the Winwards' 
direction (Tr. Vol. I. 927). 
Packer bought the property for $4 0,000 and closed the 
sale on August 6, 1994 (Tr. Vol. I. 796, 799, 815). The same 
day, Vicki R. Bassett purchased the property for $58,000 (Tr. 
Vol. I. 800-803, 806) . 
Bassett worked in a beauty salon, was a client of 
defendant at the time, and was in the process of fighting a 
custody battle over two of her children (Tr. Vol. I. 894; Vol. 
II. 1101). Defendant told her that she needed to secure a home 
8 
to appear stable and to help her position in the custody battle 
(Tr. Vol. I. 915-16). She explained that she did not have money 
for a down payment, and defendant said he had located a home 
which she could purchase without any money down (Tr. Vol. I. 895-
96; Vol. II. 1065, 1069). Bassett agreed with defendant to 
purchase the property for $58,000 by means of a $55,000 note at 
11% interest (Tr. Vol. I. 896). Defendant said he would take 
care of the remaining $3,000, which represented the down payment 
being asked on the property, and that Bassett could repay the 
$3,000 by providing hair and nail services to himself, his wife, 
Packer, and another person (Tr. Vol. I. 900-01, 905). However, 
defendant never contributed any money in this transaction (Tr. 
Vol I. 906). Neither did he tell Bassett that Packer bought the 
house for $40,000 the same day Bassett bought it for $58,000 (Tr. 
Vol. I. 800-03, 806, 878, 888, 897, 909). 
On July 15, 1993, one day after the Bauers accepted 
Packer's $40,000 offer, a second ERA earnest money agreement on 
the Bauer property was drafted reflecting the offer from Bassett 
to Packer for $58,000 (R. 251; Tr. Vol. I. 802). The agreement 
provided that Bassett would execute a thirty year note for 
$55,000 at 13% interest (R. 251; Tr. Vol. I. 802).3 
Through her work at ERA Realty, Kim Winward was privy 
to the fact that Patricia Williams had money to invest in a real 
3
 Although Bassett agreed to 11% interest, the paperwork at 
closing reflected 13% interest (Tr. Vol. I. 915-16). When the 
witness asked defendant about it, he told her that she didn't have 
to complete the deal then stressed to her how much more stable she 
would appear in the custody matter if she had a home (id.). 
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estate transaction (Tr. Vol. II. 1067). The Winwards contacted 
Williams, who agreed to purchase Bassett's $55,000 note for 
$45,000 to finance the Bassett purchase (R. 251; Tr. Vol. I. 971; 
Vol. II. 1067, 1097). Defendant never told Williams that he, his 
wife and Packer would receive profit from Williams' investment 
(Tr. Vol. II. 1100, 1107). 
Both transactions on the same property closed on August 
6, 1993, at Cedar Land Title (Tr. Vol. I. 793, 815). All 
participants came in separately to sign the documents (Tr. Vol. 
II. 810). However, defendant appeared with both Packer and 
Bassett as their legal representative (Tr. Vol. I. 847, 851-52, 
930-31, 935, 966). During the course of the day, two warranty 
deeds were signed: the first from Bauer to Packer and the second 
from Packer to Bassett (R. 251; Tr. Vol. I. 799, 810, 879). A 
trust deed and a trust deed note were signed from Bassett to 
Packer and, within hours, an assignment was prepared from Packer 
to Williams (R. 251; Tr. Vol. I. 806-07, 814-15). 
Williams supplied the financing to cover the costs of 
both transactions through a wire received by Cedar Land Title (R. 
251; Tr. Vol. I. 916, 971; Vol. II. 1078-79). No money was 
contributed by defendant, his wife, or Nicole Packer to the 
assignment of the note to Williams (R. 251; Tr. Vol. II. 1107-
08). The $5,000 difference between the original purchase price 
of $40,000 and the $45,000 wired by Williams was disbursed as 
follows: 
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$4,697.50 Check issued to Nicole Packer by title co. 
+110.00 Closing costs for Packer (Bauer/Packer deal) 
+692.50 Closing costs for Bassett (Packer/Bassett 
deal) 
-500 . 00 Earnest money (Bauer/Packer) 
$5,000.00 
(R. 251; Tr. Vol. I. 836-38; Vol. II. 1022). 
Once the transactions were completed, Cedar Land title 
issued a check for $4,697.50 made payable to Nicole Packer and 
gave it to defendant in the belief he was Packer's legal 
representative (R. 251; Tr. Vol. I. 777, 817; Vol II. 1079). 
Defendant stipulated that he knowingly and intentionally signed 
Packer's name to the check and deposited it into his wife's 
account at Mountain America Credit Union near his home (Tr. Vol. 
I. 777; Vol II. 1079-80, 1086). Thereafter, Packer received a 
check from the defendant for $1,160.00, $1,000 of which defendant 
represented was her share of the profits from the real estate 
transaction and $160 of which was earned by her in a manner 
unrelated to these transactions (Tr. Vol. I. 937; Vol II. 994, 
1081). Defendant did not tell Packer about the existence of the 
check from the credit union or its amount, nor did he ever tell 
her what the true profits of the transactions had been (Tr. Vol. 
I. 940, 965-66). It was not until three and a half months later, 
while talking with Vicki Bassett, that Packer learned that she 
had received less than one-third of the profits (Tr. Vol I. 937, 
961-62; Vol II. 982). Upon checking the documents at the real 
estate company, Packer discovered the existence of the check and 
defendant's unauthorized endorsement (Tr. Vol. I. 938, 940-44) . 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I: Defendant's failure to seek a continuance 
upon discovery of an allegedly fatal variance between the State's 
evidence at trial and the bill of particulars prevents appellate 
review of his claim of error. Alternatively, no fatal variance 
existed where the evidence conformed with the information, the 
bill of particulars and the elements of the offense. 
POINT II: The State adduced sufficient evidence at 
trial from which the jury could have found that defendant 
harbored a "purpose to defraud anyone" as is required under the 
forgery statute. 
POINT III; A jury must be unanimous on all elements of 
a criminal charge for the conviction to stand. Defendant was not 
entitled to an instruction on unanimity regarding matters which 
were not elements of the charged offense. 
POINT IV: The trial court properly admitted expert 
testimony regarding the "purpose to defraud" element of forgery 
under Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence, especially where 
defendant first introduced the evidence. Further, any alleged 
prejudice was adequately mitigated by the trial court's 
admonition to the jury before admitting the expert opinion and by 
defendant's own cross-examination of the witness. No review is 
warranted where defendant's argument regarding admission of 
evidence relating to his interaction with the Bauers and ERA 
Realty violates Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
12 
POINT V: Appellate review of defendant's claim of 
error in refusing to give instructions relating to joint venture 
is not warranted because defendant's argument violates the Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. Further, defendant's proposed 
instructions were incomplete statements of the law, and there was 
no reasonable basis in the evidence to justify them. Finally, 
the absence of an instruction on specific intent was not error 
under the circumstances of this case; the instructions, taken 
together, clearly and accurately tendered the case to the jury. 
POINT VI: The trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing on his 
motion to disqualify the prosecutor. The court had sufficient 
information before it upon which to render its decision, and 
defendant has not established his entitlement to such a hearing 
in this jurisdiction. 
POINT VII: The question of the propriety of a 
probation condition which temporarily prohibits defendant from 
practicing law has been rendered moot by defendant's subsequent 
interim suspension. Alternatively, such a probation condition is 
appropriate as it relates to and punishes defendant's criminal 





DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS CLAIM OF VARIANCE BY FAILING TO 
REQUEST A CONTINUANCE; ALTERNATIVELY, NO FATAL VARIANCE 
EXISTS BETWEEN THE STATE'S EVIDENCE AND THE PLEADINGS 
Defendant argues that there was a fatal variance 
between the proof adduced at trial and the bill of particulars 
where the State allegedly presented evidence beyond the scope of 
the bill of particulars in violation of the Utah Constitution, 
article I, section 12. Br. of App. at 11. Specifically, he 
claims that even though the bill of particulars identifies Nicole 
Packer as the person against whom the defendant harbored a 
purpose to defraud, the trial court permitted the State to offer 
alternative theories that defendant's fraudulent intent 
encompassed a "field of alleged victims[,]" including not only 
Packer, but the Bauers, the Bassetts, ERA Realty, and Mountain 
America Credit Union. Id. at 11-14. He claims that he was 
prejudiced because he was prepared only to defend against the 
theory that Packer was defendant's intended victim; accordingly, 
defendant centered his testimony around his relationship with 
Packer, their discussions and their agreements. Id. at 16-17. 
A. Defendant's Claim is not Properly Before this Court and 
Should Not be Reached 
Under Rule 4(3), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, a 
defendant may move for a bill of particulars to supplement the 
information ,f[w]hen facts not set out in an information or 
indictment are required to inform a defendant of the nature and 
cause of the offense charged, so as to enable him to prepare his 
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.defense." State v. Allen. 839 P.2d 291, 298 (Utah 1992); State 
v. Strand, 720 P.2d 425, 427 (Utah 1986); State v. Mvers, 302 
P.2d 276, 279 (Utah 1956). The variance rule, grounded in 
article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution, prohibits the 
State from proving at trial material matters beyond the scope of 
the information and the bill of particulars. State v. Bell, 770 
P.2d 100, 103 n.4 (Utah 1988); Myers. 302 P.2d at 280. 
When the trial evidence varies from the information and 
the bill of particulars, defendant has a right to seek a 
continuance. State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208, 1215 (Utah 1987), 
cert, denied, 484 U.S. 1044 (1988) . Where defendant fails to 
seek a continuance, he is no longer able to claim surprise and 
waives his claim of variance. Id., at 1215-16. Because 
defendant in this case failed to request a continuance, despite 
the repeated discussions between the court and counsel concerning 
the alleged variance from the bill of particulars (R. 209-90; Tr. 
Vol. I. 752-56, 821-25; Vol. II. 1035-51, 1104, 1148-49), his 
variance claim is not properly before this Court and should not 
be reached. Fulton, 742 P.2d at 1216. 
B. Alternatively, No Fatal Variance Existed Between the State's 
Evidence at Trial and the Pleadings 
In the event this Court reaches defendant's variance 
claim, it should reject the claim because defendant has failed to 
establish any constitutionally fatal variance between the charges 
identified in the information, the bill of particulars and the 
State's evidence at trial. 
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Where a bill of particulars is provided, that document 
together with the information provides the detail of the charges 
against which defendant must defend at trial. See Bell, 770 P.2d 
at 104; Fulton, 742 P.2d at 1214; Mvers, 302 P.2d at 279. 
However, the State is not compelled to disclose all of the 
evidence it intends to introduce at trial in a bill of 
particulars. Allen, 839 P.2d at 298; State v. Mitchell, 571 P.2d 
1351, 1353 (Utah 1977). Nor must the State disclose the exact 
theory on which it intends to proceed at trial. Allen, 839 P.2d 
at 298; State v. Butler, 560 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Utah 1977). 
Defendant is only constitutionally entitled to receive notice of 
the "particulars of the alleged wrongful conduct" so as to 
adequately prepare a defense. Allen, 839 P.2d at 298; Bell, 770 
P.2d at 103-04. 
Defendant's claim that he is entitled to a declaration 
of the "field of alleged victims[,]" his claim is without merit 
as the identity of the party defendant intended to defraud is not 
an element of the crime. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1990) 
(requiring that the accused harbor a "purpose to defraud 
anyone"). Moreover, the participants whom he claims should have 
been identified were all intimately involved in the underlying 
real estate transactions, and their involvement in the trial 
could come as no surprise to defendant as they were necessary to 
the factual development of the case. 
Defendant's assertion of a right to the State's theory 
behind the "purpose to defraud" element of the crime must also 
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fail. First, defendant is not entitled to the State's exact 
theory in response to a motion for a bill of particulars. Allen, 
839 P.2d at 298. Second, at the time he sought the bill of 
particulars, defendant was well aware of the statute under which 
the State had charged him and of the State's belief that 
defendant's fraudulent intent extended to the other participants 
involved in the real estate transactions (R. 1-5) (copies of the 
information and the probable cause statement are attached in 
Addendum E). 
Additionally, there was no variance as defendant was 
provided ample notice, by means of the original information, the 
bill of particulars, and the preliminary hearing, of the evidence 
the State later adduced at trial. Addendum E. The forgery count 
in the information echoes the language of section 76-6-501, 
although it does not identify the specifics of the fraudulent 
acts. Addendum E. The two-page, single-spaced probable cause 
statement attached to the information, however, outlines in 
detail the real estate transactions, the identities of the 
participants involved, and defendant's part in the entire deal 
(attached in Addendum E). The statement makes clear that the 
State believed that defendant had defrauded each of the 
participants named in the probable cause statement in a 
premeditated manner. Id. It is also clear from the probable 
cause statement that the money represented by the final check 
defendant forged was derived from a series of transactions, all 
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of which were necessary to the "success" of defendant's plan and 
proof of which would be required at trial. Id. 
Further, defendant's motion for a bill of particulars 
specifically asked for the identity of the person believed by the 
State to have been defrauded by defendant's endorsement of the 
check identified in Count 3 of the information. Defendant's 
motion sought, in part: 
3. With respect to [the forgery count]: 
a. The identity of the person and/or entity that 
Defendant Emer Kent Winward sought to defraud; and 
b. the nature and identity of the fraud which said 
defendant was facilitating. 
(R. 17) .4 Addendum E. The motion did not ask for the identity 
of all participants against whom the State believed defendant 
harbored the "purpose to defraud" required under the statute. 
Defendant cannot limit the State's case by submitting a narrowly 
drawn request for a bill of particulars but must also take into 
account the contents of the information and the probable cause 
4
 The State's response provided: 
RESPONSE 3. With respect to [the forgery count]: 
(a) The identity of the person that Defendant EMER KENT 
WINWARD sought to defraud is Nicole Packer. 
(b) The nature and identity of the fraud that Defendant was 
facilitating was taking a check made payable to Nicole Packer, 
forging her name without her knowledge, and depositing the 
monies in his wife's account so he and his wife, not Ms. 
Packer, could use and spend the monies. Specifically, the 
State alleges that the act occurred without her authority and 
that the Defendant not only forged her signature but took 
substantial steps in trying to obtain the actual monies after 
the check was deposited. 
(R. 26) . Addendum E. The response also listed all participants in 
the transactions as witnesses to be called to explain their 
involvement and knowledge of the transactions as well as what they 
were not told by defendant (R. 34-31). Addendum E. 
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statement attached thereto. See generally Bell, 770 P.2d at 104; 
Myers, 3 02 P.2d at 279 (the charges are delineated by both the 
information and the bill of particulars). 
Even if a variance existed, it was not constitutionally 
fatal where defendant was neither surprised by the variance nor 
prevented from presenting a proper defense to it. As previously 
established, defendant knew before trial of the State's position 
regarding defendant's treatment of all the participants involved 
in the real estate transactions (R. 1-5, 25-35, 55-57). 
Defendant provided detailed testimony concerning the entirety of 
the transactions in support of his defense that he not only 
believed he had authority for endorsing Packer's name on the 
check and depositing it in his wife's bank account, but that at 
every stage of the transactions which culminated in the check he 
acted responsibly and according to accepted practice in dealing 
with each of the other participants involved (Tr. Vol. II. 1059-
1113) . As the record reflects that defendant was neither 
reasonably surprised nor hindered in the preparation of his 
defense, he is not entitled to reversal of his conviction. 
POINT II 
THE STATE ADDUCED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FROM WHICH THE JURY 
COULD HAVE FOUND THAT DEFENDANT HARBORED A "PURPOSE TO 
DEFRAUD ANYONE" 
Defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence 
to establish the element of "purpose to defraud" against Packer 
or any of the other participants identified by the State at 
trial. First, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to 
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establish that defendant intended to defraud Packer. Br. of App. 
at 17-21. He then challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as 
it relates to the Bauers, Vicki Bassett, ERA Realty, and Mtn. 
America Credit Union. Id. at 21-30. Included in the latter 
point is the argument that the evidence relating to these four 
participants could not support a forgery conviction because it 
did not establish any legal nexus between defendant's endorsement 
of the check and any purpose to defraud them. Id. at 21-26. 
The fault with defendant's arguments is the fact that 
the victim(s) of defendant's "purpose to defraud" need not be 
identified in order to obtain a forgery conviction; so long as 
there was sufficient evidence to establish that he had such an 
intent toward someone, the State's burden is met. See Point III, 
infra, on Jury Unanimity. The State need only prove a purpose to 
defraud anyone in order to establish this element of the offense. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501. "Purpose to defraud" has been defined 
by this Court as "'a purpose to use a false writing as if it were 
genuine in order to gain some advantage[.]'"5 State v. 
Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting State v. 
May, 93 Idaho 343, 461 P.2d 126, 128 (1969) (citations omitted)) 
5
 Defendant's reliance on statutory definitions of "intent to 
defraud" from other jurisdictions is misplaced because those 
jurisdictions add additional requirements to the "forgery offense" 
in those jurisdictions. See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3110(9) 
(including in the statutory definition of "intent to defraud" that 
the accused intend that another rely upon a deception and "assume, 
create, transfer, alter or terminate a right, obligation or power 
with reference to property"). Thus, defendant's reliance on State 
v. Rios, 246 Kan. 517, 792 P.2d 1065 (1990), is not persuasive 
because that case rests on Kansas' statutory definition. Br. of 
App. at 24-26. 
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(a copy is attached in Addendum F). That the purpose to defraud 
must coincide, at least in part, with the forgery is settled in 
this jurisdiction. State v. Collins, 597 P.2d 1317, 1318 (Utah 
1979) . 
The mere act of endorsing Packer's name to the check 
without authority was sufficient to imply the purpose to defraud 
and meet the State's burden of proof on this element of forgery. 
Gonzalez, 822 P.2d at 1216. Defendant argues that he had implied 
authority to sign Packer's name or, alternatively, that the end 
justified the means--Packer got what she agreed to despite the 
forged endorsement. Br. of App. at 18-20. While the question of 
whether defendant acted with implied authority was a 
consideration for the jury, the jury was well within its bounds 
to reject this argument, as well as his contention that she 
essentially ratified the act. Id., at 21. Instead, the jury 
could reasonably infer a purpose to defraud from defendant's 
secrecy about the check's existence, its full amount, the fact of 
the endorsement, and the final amount of the profits.6 
Further, the jury was justified in believing Packer's 
testimony that, although she agreed to accept $1,000 for her part 
6
 Defendant's assertion that Packer's access to the account 
somehow mitigates the evidence that defendant intended to defraud 
her when he deposited her check into the account is no more 
persuasive now than it was at trial. Br. of App. at 19 n.7. There 
was no evidence below to suggest that Packer had any reason to know 
that the Winwards' account balance had been increased beyond the 
$5.00 at which it stood when defendant deposited Packer's check 
(Tr. Vol. I. 779; Vol. II. 1113). Nor was there any evidence that 
Packer ever accessed the account without direction from the 
Winwards (Tr. Vol II. 1005-06, 1024-25). 
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in the transactions, she did so only because defendant led her to 
believe that $1,000 was one-third of the expected profits (Tr. 
Vol. I. 937). She never received an accounting or was told the 
amount of the profit (Tr. Vol. I. 965-66; Vol. II. 990-91, 1008, 
1017, 1019). Further, Packer's receipt of $1000 of the money 
represented by the check does not mitigate the fact that, as sole 
payee, she was legally entitled to the entire amount represented 
by the check. It was only after she learned that the profit had 
been more than the $3,000 she had assumed that she discovered she 
had received less than the share she had agreed to.7 
In addition, the jury had defendant's admission that he 
endorsed the check without Packer's express authority, together 
with evidence that he never disclosed the check's existence, its 
amount, or his endorsement of it Packer or to Mtn. America, the 
two most easily identifiable targets of the endorsement itself. 
The jury may well have found, based on this evidence, that 
defendant gained the intended advantage of keeping more than the 
two-thirds amount of the profit to which he and his wife were 
entitled, and additionally was able to forestall any unwanted 
inquiries into the underlying realty transactions. Consequently, 
7
 Defendant argues that Packer knew the check was coming and 
would be payable to her and that, by failing to challenge it or the 
endorsement for several months, she waived any claim to any of the 
rest of the money. Br. of App. at 21. However, Packer testified 
that she did not know the check existed until more than three 
months after it had been issued (Tr. Vol. I. 940; Vol. II. 1009). 
It was only after she discovered from Vicki Bassett that the profit 
had exceeded $3,000 that she looked into the transactions, 
discovered at the title company that a check had been issued to 
her, and decided that there would have been only one check and that 
it would have been made payable to her (Tr. Vol. II. 1010-13). 
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the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that defendant 
forged the endorsement on the check with a purpose to defraud 
Packer. 
Moreover, by endorsing Packer's name to the check and 
directing its deposit into a personal account to which Packer was 
not a signatory, defendant led Mtn. America to believe it had 
authority to give him $4,167,50, when in fact no such authority 
existed. Defendant argues that the endorsement merely created a 
"potential for loss" to the credit union. Br. of App. at 29-30. 
However, the proper focus of the inquiry is on the advantage 
defendant intends to garner, not the actuality of a loss to 
another party. Gonzalez, 822 P.2d at 1216 (defendant was 
apprehended before any loss had been suffered, but the forgery 
conviction was affirmed where the State established the advantage 
defendant had intended to gain from the forgery). By creating 
and offering the forged endorsement to the credit union, 
defendant led the credit union into honoring the endorsement, 
thereby receiving the advantage of more money than he was 
entitled to under his agreement with Packer and leaving the 
credit union open to liability upon discovery of the forgery and 
the bank's part in honoring the forged endorsement. 
Based upon either of these scenarios, there was 
sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably have 
concluded that defendant had "a purpose to use a false writing as 
if it were genuine in order to gain some advantage", thereby 
possessing a "purpose to defraud anyone[.]" Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 
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at 1216 (quoting May* 461 P.2d at 128). Consequently, 
defendant's allegation of error is without merit, and his 
challenge to the evidence as it relates to the Bauers, Vicki 
Bassett and ERA Realty would not affect his conviction and need 
not be addressed by this Court. State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208, 
1213 (Utah 1987), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 1044 (1988). 
In any event, the claim against the remaining 
participants would fail on its merits. The forgery statute does 
not require that the forged document be made "with the intention 
of inducing another person to act in reliance thereon [,]" Br. of 
App. at 23, although in this case defendant in fact intended that 
Mtn. America act in reliance on the false endorsement. Instead, 
defendant must have intended to use the writing to gain an 
advantage. Gonzalez, 822 P.2d at 1216. The evidence permitted 
the jury to determine that defendant endorsed and deposited the 
check without disclosing its existence to anyone in order to 
complete the on-going fraud against the Bauers, Vicki Bassett and 
ERA Realty and to keep the profits of the transactions. The 
fraud, born with defendant's idea to engage in the real estate 
transactions, did not end until the proceeds of the check--the 
advantage (profit) toward which defendant's efforts were aimed--
were in defendant's account and Packer had been given $1,000. 
Only at that point was the advantage envisioned by defendant 
fully realized and the profits at his disposal. In this type of 
situation, the endorsement was not done to cover up a fraud which 
had already occurred. It was, instead, one of the final acts 
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upon which the completion of the fraud depended. Accordingly, 
the jury was able to determine that defendant harbored a "purpose 
to defraud" one or more of the participants to the realty 
transactions at the time he forged Packer's name to the check. 
POINT III 
THE ABSENCE OF A JURY INSTRUCTION REGARDING UNANIMITY 
DOES NOT WARRANT REVERSAL BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGE 
DOES NOT RELATE TO THE ELEMENTS OF THE FORGERY CHARGE 
Defendant argues that reversal is warranted because the 
trial court did not require unanimity by the jurors concerning 
the nature of the fraud (Br. of App. at 30-32, Point IIIA) and 
the identity of the victim (id., at 32-33, Point IIIB). First, 
he claims that the State relied on alternative "wrongs" to prove 
the offense of forgery or to prove the "purpose to defraud" 
element of forgery, and that the absence of any assurance of 
unanimity on the "wrongs" runs afoul of the Utah Supreme Court's 
unanimity decision in State v. Tillman 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 
1987).8 Br. of App. at 31-32. Then he argues that the jury was 
erroneously permitted to consider whether the Bauers or ERA 
Realty were "victims" despite the lower court's determination 
that neither party was a viable victim.9 Id. at 32-33. 
However, both of these arguments necessarily fail for a single 
8
 Defendant's claim of "alternative wrongs" appears to mean 
that whatever fraud defendant intended for one "victim" was 
necessarily different from that intended for any other victim, and 
the jury was permitted to convict him not only based on more than 
one victim, but also on more than one method of fraud. 
9
 Defendant concedes that he does not challenge the specific 
intent of the statute, i.e., the purpose to defraud. Br. of App. 
at 31. 
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reason: the nature of the fraud and the identity of the victim 
are not elements of the offense of forgery, rendering jury 
unanimity unnecessary. See State v. Russell, 733 P.2d 162, 165-
67 (Utah 1987). 
Moreover, defendant failed to raise a timely objection 
below to the absence of the instruction. Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c) 
(defendant must object before the jury is instructed and state 
"distinctly the matter to which he objects and the ground of his 
objection."); State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah App. 
1991). His assertion of the issue in support of his post-trial 
motion to arrest judgment and application for certificate of 
probable cause was not timely (R. 290-309). At trial defendant 
did not request such an instruction, and the objections he stated 
to the court did not put the court on notice that he was putting 
unanimity at issue (Tr. Vol. I. 1148-49). Addendum G. 
Consequently, appellate review may be had only to avoid manifest 
injustice. Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c); Perdue, 813 P.2d at 1203. 
Defendant has not argued manifest injustice, and none occurred in 
this case where unanimity is not required. 
A jury must be unanimous on all elements of a criminal 
charge for the conviction to stand. State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 
1150, 1159 (Utah 1991); Tillman, 750 P.2d at 585-88 (Durham, J., 
concurring & dissenting); id. at 591 (Zimmerman, J., concurring & 
dissenting); id. at 577-80 (Stewart, J., concurring in the 
result). Therefore, if the State's case is "premised on more 
than one factual or legal theory of the elements of the crime and 
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any one of those theories is flawed or lacks the requisite 
evidentiary foundation [,]" the conviction must fall. Johnson, 
821 P.2d at 1159. 
The State's forgery case was clearly based only on 
defendant's endorsement of the Packer check without her authority 
(Tr. Vol. I. 764-65; Vol. II. 1165-66). Part of the State's 
burden was to prove that defendant acted with a "purpose to 
defraud anyone". Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1) (1990). The jury 
was appropriately instructed that a "purpose to defraud" is 
"simply a purpose to use a false writing as if it were genuine in 
order to gain some advantage" (R. 24 0; Jury Instruction No. 14-C, 
attached in Addendum G). State v. Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214, 1216 
(Utah App. 1991). The plain language of both the statute and the 
instruction make clear that the jury need not identify either the 
particular fraud or the specific victim in order to decide 
whether defendant acted with a "purpose to defraud". The 
requisite purpose may be inferred from "the mere creation of an 
instrument that is false [,]" Gonzalez, 822 P.2d at 1216, and a 
defendant may be convicted of forgery even where no fraud has 
been perpetrated. See id. (conviction upheld even though 
defendant was apprehended before anyone was victimized or any 
fraud was completed). Consequently, even if the jurors found 
that defendant intended to defraud different people or to do so 
in different ways, all of which culminated in the forged check, 
they were justified in convicting defendant of forgery so long as 
they found that he acted with a "purpose to defraud anyone". 
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Defendant's reliance on Johnson and Tillman is misplaced, and his 
claim must fail. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO ESTABLISH ERROR IN THE DISTRICT 
COURT'S ADMISSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY; FURTHER, HIS 
CHALLENGE TO THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE SURROUNDING HIS 
DEALINGS WITH THE BAUERS AND ERA REALTY VIOLATES RULE 
24(A) (9), UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, AND DOES 
NOT WARRANT REVIEW 
A. The District Court Properly Admitted Expert Testimony 
Concerning "Purpose to Defraud" 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing 
the State's rebuttal witness, Hans Q. Chamberlain, an attorney 
with extensive credentials and experience in public and private 
practice, to offer expert opinion testimony concerning whether 
certain hypotheticals presented evidence of a "purpose to 
defraud". Br. of App. at 33-39. This issue requires a review of 
how the testimony came out at trial. 
Mr. Chamberlain's testimony was originally admitted as 
rebuttal testimony for the purpose of aiding the jury in 
determining whether defendant's professional position justified 
his endorsement of Packer's check. The trial court held: 
Counsel, I see Mr. Chamberlain's role as that of 
an expert witness and, as an expert witness, opining as 
to what in his experience attorneys do or do not do. I 
can see that his testimony under Rule 401 may have a 
tendency to make the existence of any fact[,] that is 
the role of an attorney in a real estate transaction[,] 
either more or less probable than it would be without 
the testimony of an expert witness. (Tr. Vol. II. 
1118-19) . 
(A copy of the trial court's ruling and the entirety of the 
witness' testimony is attached in Addendum H.) The court went on 
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to find that under rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence, the 
testimony was appropriate because it helped the jury to 
understand the role of an attorney in the transactions, an issue 
arising from defendant's testimony (Tr. Vol. II. 1052-1113). The 
court reiterated its decision that under Rule 401, Utah Rules of 
Evidence, the evidence "has a tendency to make the existence of a 
fact more or less probable" (Tr. Vol. II. 1121), and added that 
there was no problem under Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(prejudice v. probative value) (Sealed Hearing, July 14, 1994, 
[hereinafter "Hng."] at 1122). 
On direct examination of the rebuttal witness, the 
prosecutor appropriately established the witness' legal 
background and experience (Tr. Vol. II. 1123-27), then, pursuant 
to the trial court's order, obtained the witness' opinion as to 
whether a lawyer could endorse a check made payable to someone 
else without that person's knowledge or consent (Tr. Vol. II. 
1128-29). Addendum H. Defendant does not challenge this opinion 
on appeal. 
On cross-examination, defendant expressly established 
that the witness was on the stand to give his opinion (Tr. Vol. 
II. 1130-31). Addendum H. Defense counsel then expanded 
questioning to include the definition of a partnership or joint 
venture (Tr. Vol. II. 1131-32), the standard practice at the 
witness' office for depositing checks (Tr. Vol. II. 1132-35), 
and, through use of a series of hypotheticals, whether the 
witness could determine whether an intent to defraud exists given 
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certain actions done within the guise of a partnership (Tr. Vol. 
II. 1135-36). Addendum H. None of the opinions obtained during 
cross-examination are challenged on appeal. 
Despite having initiated the questioning about intent, 
defendant now complains of the remaining opinions given by Mr. 
Chamberlain on the issue. On re-direct examination, the 
prosecutor posed a hypothetical closely in line with the State's 
view of the facts of this case and obtained the witness' opinion 
that the actions outlined by the prosecutor showed evidence of 
intent to defraud (Tr. Vol. II. 1138). Addendum H. Over 
defendant's objection that the question takes the matter "far 
beyond [the witness'] field of expertise[,]" the court admitted 
the response with the following cautionary instruction to the 
jury: 
Members of the jury, I'm going to allow Mr. 
Chamberlain to answer the question, but I'm going to 
instruct you that the testimony of an expert witness 
should be viewed by you as the testimony of any other 
witness when it comes time to make your determination 
in the jury room as to the innocence or guilt of the 
defendant. This testimony should be viewed by you in 
the same fashion as you do all the other witnesses 
under the instructions given by the Court. (Tr. Vol. 
II. 1138). Addendum H. 
On re-cross examination, defense counsel expanded in 
detail on the hypothetical from his view of the evidence (Tr. 
Vol. II. 1138-41)#10 then was allowed to ask, over the State's 
objection, whether the hypothetical "present[s] a jury question 
as to whether or not that person who made the endorsement on 
10
 Because of the length of the hypothetical, it is reproduced 
in Appendix H instead of in the body of the brief. 
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behalf of the partner intended to defraud that partner" (Tr. Vol. 
II. 1141-42). Addendum H. The witness answered that the jury 
was to decide whether the partner acted with that intent as well 
as whether the relationship gave rise to some kind of authority 
(Tr. Vol. II. 1142). Addendum H. Counsel expressly established 
that "by telling this jury, that in your opinion . . . that under 
[the prosecutor's] hypothetical that that may be evidence of 
fraud, you were not telling this jury that you have made any 
judgment about this case" (Tr. Vol. II. 1142-43). Addendum H. 
The prosecutor then asked the following question: 
Taking all of those assumptions that you can 
recall [from the defendant's hypothetical] and add to 
that, now, Mr. Chamberlain, that the partner whose name 
was signed did not give authority[,] and add the 
assumption that the partner whose name was signed 
didn't even know about the check[,] and add that to the 
assumption that these partners agreed to to [sic] a 
one-third split and the partner whose name was signed 
had no idea of the amount of that check, do you have an 
opinion as to whether or not that that would show 
purpose to defraud?" (Tr. Vol. II. 1143). Addendum H. 
Defendant objected because "we are going so far afield here" and 
because the opinion was " [i]rrelevant, immaterial and in 
violation of rule 403" (Tr. Vol. II. 1143-44). Addendum H. The 
trial court permitted the opinion: 
. . . And I appreciate your specificity, Counsel. 
Weighing this matter, coupled with the Court's 
cautionary instruction, overruled." (Tr. Vol. II. 
1144). Addendum H. 
The witness responded by saying that the hypothetical showed 
"strong evidence of intent to defraud" (Tr. Vol. II. 1144). 
Addendum H. Defendant now objects to the opinions given during 
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the prosecutor's re-direct examinations of the witness based on 
Rules 403, 702, and 704(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. 
1. Rule 403 
Rule 4 03 deals with the exclusion of otherwise relevant 
evidence due to prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. By 
asserting a rule 4 03 violation, defendant appears to concede the 
relevance of Chamberlain's testimony. However, he provides no 
argument as to how the probative value of the evidence "is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury". Neither does 
he directly challenge the trial court's determination that there 
was no problem with the testimony under Rule 403 (Tr. Vol. II. 
1122, 1144). Addendum H. Accordingly, there is no meaningful 
argument to which the State can respond, and defendant's claim of 
error under Rule 403 should fail. State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 
1341, 1344 (Utah 1984) ("Since the defendant fails to support 
[his] argument by any legal analysis or authority, we decline to 
rule on it."); State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 249-50 (Utah App. 
1992); State v. Steraer. 808 P.2d 122, 125 n.2 (Utah App. 1991) 
(refusing to reach a claim containing no supporting citation or 
meaningful analysis). 
2. Rule 702 
Defendant appears to argue that the opinions violate 
Rule 702 because they were not helpful to the jury. Br. of App. 
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at 35-36.X1 To the contrary, the opinions, initiated by 
defendant during his initial cross-examination, aided the jury in 
understanding the evidence and determining a fact in issue. 
Rule 702 provides: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand 
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form 
of an opinion or otherwise. 
The trial court found that the witness possessed 
specialized knowledge that would assist the jury to better 
understand the possible source of the authority defendant claimed 
he possessed to sign the Packer check (Tr. Vol. II 1120-21). 
Defendant went on to establish the witness' experience and 
background relative to partnership arrangements and endorsements 
of partnership checks (Tr. Vol. II. 1131-36). Both parties then 
went on to use the witness' expertise to aid the jury in 
understanding that more than the mere existence of a 
relationship, partnership or otherwise, factors into the 
determination of the propriety of a person's actions, and that an 
endorsement and deposit by one partner may or may not be 
appropriate within the relationship, depending on the remaining 
facts to be considered, including the knowledge of the 
11
 Defendant fails to provide a supporting argument as to why 
the "admission of [Chamberlain's] opinion clearly violated U.R.E. 
702[.]fl Br. of App. at 36. Consequently, this Court should not 
reach this claim of error. State v. Day, 815 P.2d 1345, 1351 (Utah 
App. 1991) (refusing to reach an issue unsupported by record 
citation or legal authority). 
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individuals involved (Tr. Vol. II. 1132-33). Clearly, the 
challenged opinions did not purport to tell the jury what result 
to reach. Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1230 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). Because Chamberlain's 
testimony assisted the jury on an issue first introduced by 
defendant, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
permitting the expert opinions generated in the re-direct 
examination of the witness. See State v. Gordon, 886 P.2d 112, 
117 (Utah App. 1994) (defendant is not entitled to appellate 
relief for error he invited); State v. Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287, 
1292-93 (Utah App. 1994), cert, denied, 892 P.2d 13 (Utah 
1995) .12 
3. Rule 704(b) 
Despite the fact that the majority of defendant's 
argument on appeal centers on rule 704(b), defendant waived this 
challenge by failing to object to the witness' opinions regarding 
intent to defraud on the basis that the opinions went to an 
ultimate issue to be decided by the jury. State v. Ranael, 866 
P.2d 607, 611 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 360 
(Utah App. 1993) (failure to make a specific objection waives 
12
 Moreover, any error which may have arisen from Chamberlain's 
testimony was adequately mitigated by the court's cautionary 
instruction to the jury regarding the appropriate consideration to 
be given Chamberlain's testimony as well as by defendant's cross-
examination, which made it abundantly clear that the witness' 
testimony consisted of his own opinion, that the existence of an 
intent to defraud in this case was a jury question, and that the 
witness did not mean to tell the jury what outcome to reach or to 
take from the jury its ultimate decision as to intent or guilt (Tr. 
Vol. II. 1130-31, 1138, 1142-43). 
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appellate review). Moreover, Rule 704 was not used by the trial 
court as a basis for admitting Chamberlain's testimony. Absent 
an objection or a claim of plain error or exceptional 
circumstances on appeal, this challenge is not properly before 
this Court. State v. Pilling, 875 P.2d 604, 606 (Utah App. 
1994) . 
Should this Court reach the Rule 704 argument, it will 
find the argument to be without merit. Expert testimony does not 
violate Rule 704 merely because it embraces an ultimate issue to 
be decided by the jury. Utah R. Evid. 704; State v. Larsen, 865 
P.2d 1355, 1362 (Utah 1993). The question is whether the opinion 
embraces a factual issue or constitutes an unadorned legal 
conclusion. Id. 
In this case, the witness' opinions that the 
hypotheticals did or did not suggest an intent to defraud were 
fact-oriented. The term "intent to defraud" was used in the 
factual sense of whether the hypothetical actions conformed with 
ordinary practice. The witness' opinions properly went to the 
factual question before the jury of whether any of the challenged 
acts occurred in conjunction with a purpose to defraud anyone. 
See Jury Instruction No. 14-A (attached in Addendum G). 
Accordingly, the opinions were properly admitted as they were not 
simply legal conclusions. See United States v. Logan, 641 F.2d 
860, 863 (10th Cir. 1981) (citing Rule 704, court upheld the 
admission of expert testimony that funds were improperly taken 
from a private corporation); Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361-62 (citing 
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Rules 702 and 704, court upheld the admission of expert testimony 
concerning the materiality of information where "materiality" was 
used in the factual, not legal, sense). 
4. Other Arguments 
Defendant also challenges Chamberlain's "expertise in 
weighing evidence[.]" Br. of App. at 38. However, Chamberlain 
was not asked to weigh the evidence. The prosecutor asked his 
opinion as to whether the hypothetical situation "would show 
purpose to defraud" (Tr. Vol. II. 1143). Addendum H. 
Chamberlain responded that it showed "strong evidence of intent 
to defraud" (Tr. Vol. II. 1144). Addendum H. His use of the 
qualifier "strong" was not sought by the prosecutor's question, 
nor was it objected to by defendant. See State v. 
Christofferson, 793 P.2d 944, 948 (Utah App. 1990) (where 
prosecutor's question produced unexpected testimony, defendant's 
failure to mitigate its impact precluded his claim of error on 
appeal). Further, any prejudice which may have arisen from its 
use was minimal and was adequately mitigated by the trial court's 
admonition to the jury about how to consider the expert testimony 
and by defendant's own questioning of the witness, which 
reiterated that the witness' testimony was only his opinion, was 
not meant to tell the jury what to decide, and was not meant to 
take from the jury the ultimate decision as to intent or guilty 
(Tr. Vol. II. 1130-31, 1138, 1142-43). 
Defendant also challenges the prosecutor's final 
hypothetical question as being inadequate. However, the question 
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consisted of the entirety of defense counsel's own hypothetical 
with the addition of three additional hypothetical facts from the 
State's view of the evidence. Defendant had the opportunity to 
add any other "exculpatory facts and circumstances" he deemed to 
be important, as he previously had done in his cross examinations 
of the witness, but failed to do so. Further, not only did 
defendant fail to challenge the "adequacy" of the hypothetical 
below, but he fails to provide any legal argument or authority on 
appeal to establish what "facts" were missing from the 
prosecutor's hypothetical and how the absence of those "facts" 
rendered the question inadequate. Accordingly, the claim does 
not warrant review. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); see Amicone, 689 
P.2d at 1344 ("Since the defendant fails to support [his] 
argument by any legal analysis or authority, we decline to rule 
on it."); Sterger, 808 P.2d at 125 n.2 (declining to reach a 
claim which contained no supporting citation or meaningful 
analysis). 
B. Defendant's Failure to Provide a Meaningful Argument 
Regarding the Admission of Evidence of Defendant's Dealings with 
the Bauers and ERA Realty Prevents Appellate Review 
Defendant contends that the trial court erroneously 
admitted evidence that the Bauers and ERA Realty were victimized 
by the forgery.13 He claims that the evidence was irrelevant 
because the trial court ultimately concluded that neither party 
13
 Defendant also includes the Bassetts in the first sentence 
of his argument, but omits them from the remainder of his claim. 
Accordingly, they are not included in the State's argument. 
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was victimized by the forgery.14 Br. of App. at 40. 
Alternatively, defendant argues that the evidence was 
inadmissible under Rule 4 03, Utah Rules of Evidence, because it 
was prejudicial, confusing and misleading, all of which "clearly 
outweighed its relevance." Id. 
Review of a trial court's rulings on the admissibility 
of evidence is had under an abuse of discretion standard. State 
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994); Stevenson, 884 P.2d at 
1290; but see State v. Gonzales, 822 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah App. 
1991) (standard of review for relevancy issues is correction of 
error standard). In determining whether there was an abuse of 
discretion, the appellate court "will presume that the discretion 
of the trial court was properly exercised unless the record 
clearly shows the contrary." Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 
534-35 (Utah 1984) (quoting State ex rel. Road Commission v. 
General Oil Co., 448 P.2d 718, 719 (Utah 1968)). Even where an 
abuse of discretion is found, reversal is not warranted absent a 
finding of prejudice, that is, a "reasonable likelihood that the 
error affected the outcome of the proceedings." State v. O'Neil, 
848 P.2d 694, 699 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 
1993); see also State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992). 
14
 Defendant does not make an argument that the evidence was 
conditionally admitted under Rule 104(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. 
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Defendant's argument suffers from a significant 
deficiency: he fails to identify either the evidence he claims 
should not have been admitted or the rulings which he claims were 
error. He directs attention to one ruling by the lower court 
sustaining his Rule 4 03 objection to a question concerning ERA 
Realty, but he does not challenge that ruling. Br. of App. at 
40. He essentially claims that in pre-trial and during the 
trial, the trial court was asked to rule on the admissibility of 
evidence relating to the Bauers and ERA realty and, over 
defendant's objection, improperly admitted the evidence on an 
unspecified but erroneous basis. Explanation of the involvement 
of the Bauers and ERA Realty in the real estate transactions was 
essential to both parties in order to present the facts giving 
rise to the Packer check.15 Defendant's lack of specificity 
requires that the State and this Court review the entire record 
and all references to the Bauers and ERA, determine which 
testimony defendant would characterize as establishing his 
"wrongful conduct" toward these parties, and create an 
appropriate response. However, defendant has the burden of 
providing a meaningful argument with support, both legal and 
factual, for his allegations of error. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); 
15
 The evidence was also admissible under Rule 404(b), Utah 
Rules of Evidence, to establish "motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identify, or absence of mistake or 
accident[.]" Such evidence, including what defendant disclosed or 
failed to disclose to the participants and how he orchestrated both 
closings, shed light on defendant's intent, motive and plan, 
helping to illustrate his goal of generating as much profit for 
himself as possible, even at the expense of one of his own clients. 
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see Amicone, 689 P.2d at 1344; Sterqer. 808 P.2d at 125 n.2. His 
failure to identify the allegedly irrelevant evidence renders his 
argument so ambiguous as to prevent any meaningful response by 
the State.16 Accordingly, this Court should decline to reach 
the issue. Sterqer, 808 P.2d at 125 n.2. 
Defendant closes his argument by challenging the lower 
court's failure to strike the unspecified evidence or to instruct 
the jury that it did not provide an appropriate basis upon which 
to base their verdict. Br. of App. at 40. However, in addition 
to the ambiguity surrounding the evidence to which defendant 
refers, he also fails to provide any legal authority to support 
his position that the lower court was required to act without 
objection, and he fails to acknowledge that he did not ask the 
trial court for either course of action. Accordingly, this 
argument does not merit this Court's review. See State v. Yates, 
834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Caver, 814 P.2d 604, 
613 (Utah App. 1991). 
16
 For example, Sally Melling, the employee at Cedar Land Title 
who handled the closings, testified that despite the fact that the 
closing documents listed ERA as receiving $100 earnest money, 
defendant told her that ERA did not get the money (Tr. Vol. I. 
852) . This testimony may be part of the evidence defendant 
intended to challenge as it suggests that defendant "committed 
wrongs" against ERA. Br. of App. at 40. However, the evidence was 
necessary to an understanding of the overall transaction and why 
the witness acted as she did. Moreover, defendant did not object 
to this testimony below. 
Similarly, Mr. Bauer testified that he was never told that the 
property would be resold to anyone immediately following Packer's 
closing (Tr. Vol. I. 879-80), suggesting nondisclosure on 
defendant's part. Defendant made no objection to this statement. 
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POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY 
ON JOINT VENTURE OR SPECIFIC INTENT WHERE DEFENDANT 
FAILED TO ESTABLISH HIS ENTITLEMENT TO THE PROPOSED 
INSTRUCTIONS, AND THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN, TAKEN 
TOGETHER, PROPERLY TENDERED THE CASE TO THE JURY 
A. Defendant's Claim of Error in Failing to Instruct the Jury on 
Joint Venture Should Not be Reached by this Court; Alternatively, 
the Claim is Without Merit 
Defendant claims that the trial court committed 
prejudicial error by refusing to give two of his proposed jury 
instructions. He contends that the court's failure to include 
instructions defining "joint venture" and explaining that each 
member of a joint venture is an agent of the others was error 
because the evidence supported such instructions and they were 
central to defendant's theory (a copy of the instructions is 
attached in Addendum I). Br. of App. at 43. 
1. Defendant's Argument Does Not Warrant Review Because it 
Violates the Rules of Appellate Procedure 
This Court should not address defendant's claim because 
his argument violates Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. While defendant summarily claims that the evidence 
supported his proposed instructions, he fails to identify the 
evidence or provide any record citations to support his bald 
statement. Absent any meaningful attempt to establish his claim, 
the claim does not warrant this Court's review. State v. Yates, 
834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992). 
Additionally, defendant's claim that the trial court 
failed to instruct the jury on "implied authority" should not be 
addressed because the proposed instructions did not include such 
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a reference. While the proposed instructions defined joint 
venture and mentioned the agency relationship between the 
members, neither instruction uses the term "implied authority." 
Not only was the issue not addressed below, but defendant asserts 
no plain error or exceptional circumstances argument on appeal. 
Consequently, this issue is not properly before this Court on 
appeal. See State v. Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287, 1291-92 & n.8 
(Utah App. 1994), cert, denied, 892 P.2d 13 (Utah 1995); State v. 
Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 918 (Utah App. 1992). 
2. The Trial Court Properly Refused to Give the Proposed 
Instructions Where There was no Reasonable Basis in the 
Evidence to Justify the Instructions, and Thev were 
Incomplete Statements of the Law 
In ruling on defendant's objection to the exclusion of 
instructions numbers 4 and 5, the trial court said: 
. . . I find that while you [defense counsel] may 
argue joint venture and have presented sufficient 
evidence to argue joint venture, that it is 
inappropriate for the Court to instruct on that matter 
because I'm not sure that the facts and the evidence 
before the Court at this juncture support instructions 
on joint venture. (Tr. Vol. II. 1155). Addendum I. 
Defendant recognizes that he is entitled to have the 
jury instructed on the law applicable to his theory of the case 
where "there is any reasonable basis in the evidence to justify 
it". State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1980); State v. 
Aly, 782 P.2d 549, 550 (Utah App. 1989). However, he fails to 
make any effort to establish the evidence which formed the 
claimed "reasonable basis" here. Defense counsel questioned 
Packer about the nature of the partnership or enterprise in which 
she and defendant were engaged, but Packer clearly did not 
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understand the term "joint venture" or the repercussions of such 
an arrangement (Tr. Vol. II. 996-97). She agreed that she and 
the Winwards had a business arrangement in which they divided the 
duties and shared the profits (Tr. Vol. I. 996-97), but she 
denied believing that she had given defendant any form of 
authority to endorse the check (Tr. Vol. I. 942-43). On the 
other hand, defendant testified that they had a partnership or a 
business venture and that it would not be unusual for a partner 
to deposit partnership proceeds into a partnership account (Tr. 
Vol. II. 1110). He also said that he signed Packer's name to the 
earnest money agreement because he believed their arrangement 
gave him authority, but that he signed the check later in part 
because he had already done so on the earnest money agreement 
(Tr. Vol. II. 1088-90). Finally, despite defendant's assertion 
that "joint venture" was "never defined in the context of the 
evidence [,]" Br. of App. at 42-43, defendant had Hans Chamberlain 
define joint venture in essentially the same terms as were 
involved in the proposed instructions (Tr. Vol. II. 1131-32). 
Chamberlain further testified that the mere existence of a joint 
venture or partnership does not determine the propriety of 
endorsements by individual partners (Tr. Vol. II. 1139-42), and 
that the parties' understanding of the agreement and 
responsibilities played a part in whether their actions were 
justified on the basis of joint venture (Tr. Vol. II. 1132-36, 
1139-42). See Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-15 & 16 (1994) (outlining 
the rights and duties of partners). This testimony does not 
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present a sufficient basis upon which to justify the proposed 
instructions, especially where defendant failed to argue to the 
jury any theory regarding joint venture or implied authority, 
despite the trial court's express allowance of such an argument 
(Tr. Vol. II. 1155). This suggests that the joint venture theory 
was one on which defendant had chosen not to rely.17 Instead, 
he argued in closing that defendant's actions throughout the real 
estate transactions were rationally explained and reasonable 
given the nature of the dealings and his responsibilities to 
those involved, that there was no evidence that defendant 
attempted to conceal information from anyone, and that there was 
no evidence that defendant lied to anyone (Tr. Vol. II. 1172-75). 
Accordingly, defendant was not entitled to his proposed 
instructions, and the trial court did not err in refusing to give 
them. 
Moreover, merely defining "joint venture" and 
explaining that it is accompanied by an agency relationship among 
the partners does not inform the jury how to relate the 
information to the existence or nonexistence of authority for the 
endorsement in question. Under both Utah law and Chamberlain's 
testimony, the mere existence of a joint venture or partnership 
does not necessarily give rise to implied authority to sign an 
individual's name, as opposed to the partnership's name, to a 
17
 Defendant concedes on appeal that "the sum and substance of 
the defense in this case" was the theory that defendant never 
possessed a purpose to defraud, as is required for conviction. Br. 
of App. at 45. 
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negotiable instrument without disclosing the instrument's 
existence, amount, or location. Utah's law on partnerships and 
joint ventures permits execution of instruments in the 
partnership name for the purpose of carrying on the business but 
does not provide for signing the individual name of one partner 
to a negotiable document. See Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-6 (1994). 
Hans Chamberlain established the basic information contained in 
defendant's proposed instructions using the same language (Tr. 
Vol. II. 1131-32), then opined that forgery is still possible in 
a joint venture situation if one party possesses the requisite 
intent to defraud or if the other party lacks knowledge of the 
document or the details of the endorsement or does not know of 
the legal repercussions of the arrangement (Tr. Vol. II. 1132-36, 
1139-42). Addendum H. Clearly, the proposed instructions fell 
short of providing the jury with sufficient information with 
which to make a reasoned determination of the relationship 
between joint venture and the propriety of defendant's 
endorsement of Packer's check. Because the instructions were 
incomplete statements of the law, the court did not err in 
refusing to use them. First Interstate Bank v. Kesler, 702 P.2d 
86, 96 (Utah 1985) (proposed instruction which was incomplete 
statement of law was properly refused). 
Regardless of whether the instructions should have been 
given, defendant suffered no prejudice from the court's refusal 
to do so. The jury had the same information before it through 
defendant's cross-examination of Chamberlain and, because 
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defendant chose not to argue the theory in his closing argument, 
the jurors were fully able to utilize the information in their 
deliberations regardless of whether they received it from the 
court or from an expert witness. 
B. No Specific Intent Instruction was Warranted Where the 
Instructions Given, Taken Together and in Context, Clearly and 
Accurately Tendered the Case to the Jury 
Defendant argues that forgery is a specific intent 
crime that requires instruction as to specific intent before the 
jury is able to convict. Br. of App. at 44-45. He claims that 
the specific intent required is "the purpose to defraud" (Tr. 
Vol. I. 1152), and that it is not enough for the jury to find the 
existence of a "purpose to defraud", but that the jurors must be 
aware that this element is, in fact, a specific, not a general, 
intent before they may convict defendant of the offense. Br. of 
App. at 44-45. 
In support of his claim, defendant cites the concurring 
opinion in State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 81 (Utah 1981) . 
However, Potter is distinguishable because of the fact that "the 
jury [was] faced with several criminal charges requiring both 
general and specific intent instructions." Id., at 79 n.3. This 
required special care on the part of the court to keep the 
instructions distinct and clear. Id., at 78. However, the trial 
court's confusing instructions on both general and specific 
intent may well have misled the jury into believing that they 
should automatically infer the specific intent required for some 
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of the charged offenses once they found defendant had committed 
the necessary act for each offense. Id. 
This case does not present the difficult situation 
faced by the trial court in Potter. Defendant was charged with a 
single crime which required that he act "knowingly and 
intentionally" and with a purpose to defraud. The jury 
instructions clearly set forth these requirements (Jury 
Instruction No. 14-A), separately defined each (Jury Instructions 
Nos. 14-B, 14-C), and fully appraised the jury that it must find 
each of these elements, together with the remaining elements of 
the offense, beyond a reasonable doubt (Jury Instruction No. 14-
A). Addendum G. In order to reach a guilty verdict, the jury 
was not required to differentiate between specific and general 
intent; it need only follow the instructions and definitions 
given by the court. Moreover, to require the court to contrast 
such terms of art in this case would have injected a possibility 
for confusion in a case where the elements, the intent, and the 
definitions are otherwise clear, concise and understandable. 
Furthermore, defendant's proposed instruction would 
have added nothing to the instructions given the jury. Defendant 
proposed the following instruction: 
The crime charged in this case is a serious crime which 
requires proof of specific intent before the defendant 
can be convicted. Specific intent as the term 
[implies] means more than the general intent to commit 
the act. To establish specific intent, the prosecution 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant 
knowingly did an act which the law forbids, purposely 
intending to violate the law. Such intent may be 
determined from all the facts and circumstances 
47 
surrounding the case (R. 229; Tr. Vol. II. 1152). 
Addendum J. 
This instruction is meaningless as the jury had already been 
clearly informed that it must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that the defendant "acted knowingly and intentionally" and with a 
purpose to defraud (R. 243; Jury Instruction No. 14-A). The 
definition given for "purpose to defraud" echoed the language 
used by this Court in State v. Gonzales, 822 P.2d 1214, 1216 
(Utah App. 1991). Far from "eliminat[ing] this element of the 
offense", Br. of App. at 45, the court's instructions (Jury 
Instruction Nos. 14-C & 14-A), reinforced the jury's 
responsibility to find a "purpose to defraud" before it could 
convict. Because the instructions, taken together in the context 
of this case, clearly and accurately presented the jury with the 
elements of the offense and their responsibility, the trial court 
properly refused to give defendant's proposed "specific intent" 
instruction. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT EXERCISED APPROPRIATE DISCRETION IN 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
ON HIS MOTION TO DISQUALIFY THE PROSECUTOR 
Defendant contends that the lower court erred when it 
denied his motion for an evidentiary hearing aimed at 
disqualifying the prosecutor. He summarily asserts that the 
district court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing "to 
test the truthfulness of the allegations" he made against the 
prosecutor. Br. of App. at 48. 
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In support, defendant sets out what he claims are 
examples of the prosecutor's "vindictiveness" at trial. Id. at 
46-48. He then closes his argument by asserting that "the 
alleged conduct in fact disqualifies the prosecutor[.]" Id. at 
48. To the extent he means that the "vindictive" conduct argued 
in his brief disqualifies the prosecutor, he has not met his 
burden of proving his allegations. He does not demonstrate that 
these examples constitute misconduct which "affected a 
substantial right of the defendant." State v. Gray, 851 P.2d 
1217, 1228 (Utah App.) (quotation omitted), cert, denied, 8860 
P.2d 943 (Utah 1993). Further, none of the examples was before 
the lower court at the time it ruled on defendant's pre-trial 
request for a hearing. Consequently, these examples have no 
bearing on whether the trial court's denial of defendant's motion 
was erroneous. 
To the extent he claims that the pre-trial conduct 
alleged below in support of his motion for an evidentiary hearing 
automatically disqualifies the prosecutor, he did not establish 
the claim below and fails to make any attempt to establish it in 
his appellate brief; he makes no argument concerning why an 
evidentiary hearing was required given the allegations and 
arguments before the lower court at the time of its ruling. 
Accordingly, this Court should reject his claim of error. Utah 
R. App. P. 24(a)(9); see State v. Sterqer, 808 P.2d 122, 125 n.2 
(Utah App. 1991) . 
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Defendant moved to disqualify the prosecutor shortly 
after the preliminary hearing, alleging that the prosecutor had 
committed perjury in the statement of probable cause, "accosted" 
defense counsel in the courthouse during a preliminary hearing 
recess to solicit a "physical altercation", made false 
accusations and called defense counsel names, made unethical and 
inappropriate comments to the press, and harbored "an irrational 
and unjustifiable animus" toward defendant (R. 88-90). After the 
State filed its response to the disqualification motion, 
defendant sought an evidentiary hearing because "the State's 
response to Defendant's motion raises several factual issues 
relating to [the prosecutor's] good faith or lack thereof" which 
defendant felt could only be resolved in an evidentiary hearing 
(R. 132) . 
At a hearing on defendant's motion, the district court 
listened to both sides, asked defense counsel for Utah authority 
for removing the prosecutor (Hng. at 37),18 then denied the 
motion for an evidentiary hearing, providing the following 
"reasoning": 
I do not appreciate attorneys dealing with one another 
in less than professional settings. It is unseemly for 
attorneys to shout at one another, for attorneys to be 
in close contact such as they are quoted to be in each 
other's face. I don't like to see it. I don't like to 
see it operating in my courtroom. I don't like to see 
it operating in litigation over which I am presiding. 
It is the specific order of the Court to both 
counsel, and entered in the minutes of this case, that 
18
 To which defense counsel replied, "Only the Canon of Ethics, 
Your Honor" (Hng. at 37). 
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both counsel will deal with one another without voices 
raised, that they shall not approach each other any 
closer than one yard, 36 inches. That their voices 
shall not be audible more than 3 0 feet away from any 
conversation that they have. As I have indicated, I'm 
not going to put up with sandbox squabbles. We've got 
a lawsuit here that has serious implications for the 
State of Utah and for these defendants, and we're going 
to treat it as the kind of serious lawsuit that it is. 
(Hng. at 44-45) .19 
Defendant relies on a single case to support his right 
to have an evidentiary hearing. In State v. Marcotte, 229 La. 
539, 86 So.2d 186, 188 (1956), the Louisiana Supreme Court held 
that the trial court should have heard evidence on defendant's 
motion to recuse the district attorney. However, the decision 
was based on a local rule of criminal procedure "providing the 
causes for recusation of a district attorney" and upon a single 
prior Louisiana case with which the author of the opinion and the 
dissenting justice disagreed. See State v. Tate, 185 La. 1006, 
171 So. 108 (1936). A third justice was absent and did not take 
part in the decision. 
Utah has no equivalent rule or precedent. There is no 
basis upon which defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing 
on his allegations. The prosecutor provided to the trial court 
all the information on which he based the challenged assertions 
in the probable cause statement (R. 93-122) (attached in Addendum 
K). A review of that information establishes that the prosecutor 
presented it in good faith and to the best of his ability based 
on the information available to him at the time. Defendant's 
19
 Because the trial court sealed the record of the hearing, 
the State has not appended copies of the transcript to this brief. 
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allegations reflect only ethical questions more appropriately 
addressed through the state bar--a method recognized by defendant 
but ultimately rejected by him (Hng. at 41-42). 
The trial court had before it sufficient information 
from both sides to determine that an evidentiary hearing was not 
appropriate and that the case could proceed without a change of 
prosecutors. Defendant's bald assertion on appeal that the 
conduct he alleged against the prosecutor "in fact disqualifies 
the prosecutor" does nothing to establish his right either to an 
evidentiary hearing or to disqualification of the prosecutor. 
Accordingly, defendant's allegation of error is without merit. 
POINT VII 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT ADDRESS DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGE TO 
HIS PROBATION CONDITION AS THE ISSUE HAS BEEN RENDERED 
MOOT BY THE INTERIM SUSPENSION ORDERED SUBSEQUENT TO 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION AND SENTENCE; ALTERNATIVELY, 
PROHIBITION FROM PRACTICING LAW IS AN APPROPRIATE 
PROBATION CONDITION AS IT RELATES TO AND PUNISHES 
DEFENDANT'S CRIMINAL ACTIVITY 
A. Introduction: 
The trial court sentenced defendant to the statutory 
indeterminate term of imprisonment, then stayed the sentence and 
imposed probation under several conditions, one of which was the 
temporary prohibition against practicing law (R. 362-66). 
Addendum B. Defendant contends that the district court erred by 
suspending him from practicing law as a condition of probation. 
Br. of App. at 48-49. He argues that the Rules of Lawyer 
Discipline and Disability provide the only means by which he can 
be suspended from practicing law, and that suspension in the 
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context of sentencing following a conviction is beyond the 
authority of the district court. Id. 
B. This Court Should Not Address This Claim as it has Become 
Moot 
The question of whether the temporary prohibition 
constitutes a valid or invalid probation condition has been 
rendered moot by the ruling in a disciplinary action brought by 
the Utah State Bar against defendant subsequent to his conviction 
and sentence. On March 24, 1995, the district court granted the 
interim suspension sought by the Office of Attorney Discipline 
and stayed the suspension for 180 days pending this appeal. 
Addendum D. Should this Court affirm defendant's conviction, the 
suspension will take effect regardless of the conditions to which 
defendant's probation may be subject. Accordingly, a decision on 
this issue will be without practical effect, and, under Rule 37, 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, it should not be addressed. 
Burkett v. Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 1989); State v. 
Stromquist, 639 P.2d 171, 172 (Utah 1981) (an appellate court 
will not reach a moot issue or render advisory opinions). 
C. Alternatively, Temporary Suspension from the Practice of Law 
as a Probation Condition is an Appropriate Punishment for 
Violation of State Criminal Laws Where the Professional License 
Relates Directly to the Criminal Conduct 
The Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability provide 
the method by which civil disciplinary proceedings are conducted 
"so as to achieve substantial justice and fairness in 
disciplinary matters[.]" Rules of Lawyer Discipline and 
Disability 1(c) (attached in Addendum L). However, the temporary 
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suspension in this case was not civil in nature or designed as 
disciplinary redress for an ethical violation, as are the 
proceedings under the rules. See id., Rules 1, 9, 19. Addendum 
L. Even under Rule 19, by which an attorney's conviction may 
become grounds for formal disciplinary proceedings, the rule 
specifies that the conviction must be for "a crime which reflects 
adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as 
a lawyer in other respects [.]" Id., Rule 19(a). Addendum L. In 
other words, as defendant notes, disciplinary action under the 
rules deals with investigating and disposing of ethical problems 
within the profession, not necessarily the punishment or 
rehabilitation of criminal activity by those in the profession. 
By contrast, the district court did not undertake to 
discipline defendant for any ethical violations he may have made 
vis-a-vis his professional position by imposing the temporary 
prohibition as a condition of probation. Instead, the trial 
court imposed sentence upon defendant as a penalty or punishment 
for his violation of the criminal laws of this state, and the 
probation condition was part of the agreement by which defendant 
had an opportunity to avoid imprisonment while still being 
penalized for his criminal conduct. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-
1(2) (1990) (upon conviction of any crime, the trial court has 
authority to "suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and 
place the defendant on probation"); Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-
1(8) (j) (1990) (when placing a defendant on probation, the court 
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has broad discretion to impose the terms and conditions it deems 
appropriate to the defendant and the case). 
Moreover, the probation condition is inherently 
reasonable based on its relationship to the offense of which 
defendant was convicted. The evidence indicated that defendant's 
profession played a large part in his ability to generate a 
profit from the real estate transactions and to obtain physical 
possession of a check made out to someone else. The temporary 
prohibition against practicing law directly relates to the 
circumstances and conditions surrounding the criminal offense 
and, therefore, is a valid factor for the sentencing judge to 
address in developing appropriate probation conditions. See, 
e.g., Hoffa v. Saxbe, 378 F.Supp. 1221, 1237-38 & cases cited in 
n.60 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (affirming imposition of a probation 
condition that defendant temporarily refrain from participating 
in the management of union activities where defendant's 
conviction was directly related to his participation in union 
activities); Whaley v. United States, 324 F.2d 356, 359 (9th Cir. 
1963), cert, denied, 376 U.S. 911 (1964) (upholding probation 
condition that defendant not engage in repossession business 
following his conviction for impersonating an FBI agent in 
connection with his repossession activities); Yarbrouah v. State, 
166 S.E.2d 35, 36-37 (Ga. App. 1969) (upholding as probation 
condition one year prohibition of practicing law against lawyer 
convicted of forging deed). 
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Even if the temporary prohibition was not appropriately 
imposed as a probation condition, it would affect neither the 
conviction nor the sentence in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully 
requests that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and 
sentence. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION 
Should this Court reach the merits of defendant's 
arguments, the detailed facts and the numerous issues prompt the 
State to request that oral argument be scheduled in this case and 
that a published opinion be issued. , 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this <^y day of May, 1995. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attori^ ey Gen^^^l 
n 
\1S C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellee was mailed by first class mail, 
postage prepaid, to Gary W. Pendleton, attorney for appellant, 





Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1990) 
76-6-501 CRIMINAL CODE 
not. State v. Pacheco, 636 P.2d 489 (Utah Owner of the stolen property was allowed to 
1981). give his opinion as to the value of such prop-
Evidence held sufficient to establish at least erty. State v. Ballenberger, 652 P.2d 927 (Utah 
$250 embezzled by theater manager. State v, 1982). 
Patterson, 700 P.2d 1104 (Utah 1985). Because an owner is presumed to be familiar 
To prove market value in a different city, the
 w , t h t h e v a i u e o f h i s possessions, an owner is 
cities must be sufficiently close geographically competent
 to testify on the present market 
and similar in population to be considered com-
 y a , u e o f h i s ^ r t y > S t a t e v . P u r c e l l > 7 1 1 R 2 d 
parable for purposes of valuing the property.
 9 4 « /iw0u IQOE* 
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985). * l U L a n i y ° ° ' ' 
—Testimony of owner . C i t e d i n S t a t e v- Slowe, 728 P.2d 110 (Utah 
Owner is competent to testify to the value of 1985); State v. Parkin, 742 P.2d 715 (Utah Ct. 
stolen property where the owner's opinion of App. 1987); State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 
the value is based on comparable prices for (Utah 1987); State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187 
similar property. State v. Limb, 581 P.2d 142 (Utah 1987); State v. Barber, 747 P.2d 436 
(Utah 1978). (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 50 Am. Jur . 2d Larceny C.J.S. — 52A C.J.S. Larceny % 60(1). 
I 44. Key Numbers. — Larceny *» 23. 
PART 5 
FRAUD 
76-6-501- Forgery — "Writing" defined, 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) Alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any 
such altered writing; or 
(b) Makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, pub-
lishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, comple-
tion, execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or ut-
terance purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent 
or nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a time or place or in 
a numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an 
original when no such original existed. 
(2) As used in this section "writing" includes printing or any other method 
of recording information, checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, 
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or iden-
tification. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second degree if the writing is or purports to 
be: 
(a) A security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing is-
sued by a government, or any agency thereof; or 
(b) A check with a face amount of $100 or more, an issue of stocks, 
bonds, or any other instrument or writing representing an interest in or 
claim against property. or(a pecuniary interest in or claim against any 
person or enterprise. ) 
(4) Forgery is a felony of the third degree if the writing is or purports to be 
a check with a face amount of less than $100; all other forgery is a class A 
misdemeanor. 
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OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY 76-6-501 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-601, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-601; 1974, ch. 32, ft 19; 
1975, ch. 52, 5 1. 
ANALYSIS 
Attempted forgery. 
Attempt to utter. 
Attorney signing client's name. 




Elements of offense. 







False pretenses distinguished* 
Fictitious name. 
Indictment or information. 
Intent. 




—Authority to sign another*! name. 





The crime of attempted forgery involves the 
same culpability and dishonesty as does the 
crime of forgery itself. State v. Ross, 782 P.2d 
529 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Attempt to utter. 
Where information charging offense of forg-
ery contained one count for forgery and an-
other for uttering, attempt to utter could be 
shown, for it was immaterial that attempt to 
utter was unsuccessful; it was fact of uttering 
or attempting to utter that was of evidentiary 
value. State v. Green, 89 Utah 437,67 P.2d 750 
(1936). 
Attorney signing client's name. 
Section 78-51-32, which authorizes an attor-
ney to execute documents in the name of a cli-
ent, does not authorize an attorney to forge a 
client's name to a negotiable instrument such 
as a settlement check and does not preclude 
the attorney's conviction for forgery as a mat-
ter of law when he does so; however, when an 
attorney acts pursuant to the general author-
ity granted by § 78-51-32 he may not later be 
Cross-References. — Checks, burden of 
proof as to sending by telegraph, § 69-1-3. 
Expert testimony, Rule 15, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. 
convicted of forgery. State v. Musselman, 667 
P.2d 1061 (Utah 1983). 
Authority to use forged signature. 
Where defendant forged his accomplice's 
name on checks which accomplice owned but 
had reported stolen, then cashed the checks 
and split the proceeds with the accomplice, de-
fendant committed forgery as defined under 
Subsection (1Kb), notwithstanding that the ac-
complice authorized defendant to sign his 




Insanity, if sufficiently established, would 
constitute defense to a charge of forgery State 
v. Brown, 36 Utah 46, 102 P. 641, 24 L It.A. 
(N.S.) 545 (1909). 
—Postdated check. 
In prosecution for forgery, fact that forged 
check was postdated did not help defendant, 
who had attempted to pass it. State v. Green, 
89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750 (1936). 
Elements of offense. 
—Making and passing. 
Crime of forgery could consist of making of 
forged instrument or of passing of instrument 
known to be false, or of both making and pass-
ing such instrument. State v. Gorham, 93 Utah 
274, 72 P.2d 656 (1937); State v. Jensen, 103 
Utah 478, 136 P.2d 949 (1943). 
—Passing. 
Even though proof failed to show that defen-
dant had personally forged instrument, show-
ing that defendant passed instrument knowing 
it to be false or forged would prove crime of 
forgery. State v. Gorham, 93 Utah 274,72 P.2d 
656 (1937); State v. Jensen, 103 Utah 478,136 
P.2d 949 (1943). 
—Signature. 
To convict one of uttering and passing forged 
draft, it was not essential that he should have 
personally affixed forged name to draft. State 
v. Gorham, 93 Utah 274, 72 P.2d 656 (1937); 




In prosecution for issuing two fictitious 
checks, defendant's demand that prosecution 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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ADDENDUM B 
Judgement, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, 
Order of Probation, and Commitment 
Trial Transcript, pp. 1258-62 
SCOTT M. BURNS (#4283) 
Iron County Attorney 
97 North Main, Suite #1 
P.O. Box 428 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-6694 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EMER KENT WINWARD, 
Defendant. 
) JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, STAY 
OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE, 
) ORDER OF PROBATION, AND 
COMMITMENT 
) Criminal No. 941500056 
) Judge James L. Shumate 
The Defendant, EMER KENT WINWARD, having been convicted of the offense of 
FORGERY, a Second-Degree Felony, pursuant to a jury trial and jury verdict on July 28, 1994, 
and the Court having entered said verdict and thereafter having ordered the preparation of a 
presentence investigation report, and after said report was prepared and presented to the Court, 
the Court having called the above-entitled matter on for sentencing on September 12, 1994, in 
Parowan, Utah, and the above-named Defendant, EMER KENT WINWARD, having appeared 
before the Court in person together with his attorney of record, Gary W. Pendleton, and the State 
of Utah having appeared by and through Iron County Attorney Scott M. Burns, and the Court 
having reviewed the presentence investigation report and having further reviewed the file in detail 
and thereafter having heard statements from the Defendant, his attorney, and the Iron County 
^Lto 
Attorney, and the Court being fully advised in the premises now makes and enters the following 
Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, Order of Probation, and Commitment, to wit: 
JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, EMER 
KENT WINWARD, has been convicted after a jury trial and jury verdict of the offense of 
FORGERY, a Second Degree Felony, and the Court having asked whether the Defendant had 
anything to say in regard to why judgment should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to 
the contrary being shown or appearing to the Court, it is adjudged that the Defendant is guilty 
as charged and convicted. 
SENTENCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, EMER KENT WINWARD, and pursuant 
to his conviction of FORGERY, a Second-Degree Felony, is hereby sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment in the Utah State Prison for a period of one (1) year and not to exceed fifteen (15) 
years, and the Defendant is hereby placed in the custody of the Utah State Department of 
Corrections. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no fine be imposed. 
STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the execution of the term of imprisonment imposed and 
the fine imposed in this case are hereby stayed, pending the Defendant's strict adherence to and 
compliance with the following terms and conditions of probation. 
-2-
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ORDER OF PROBATION 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, EMER 
KENT WINWARD, is hereby placed on probation for a period of thirty-six (36) months under 
the supervision of the Utah Department of Adult Probation and Parole, strictly within the 
following terms, provisions, and conditions: 
1. The Defendant shall forthwith make and execute a formal agreement provided by 
the Utah Department of Adult Probation and Parole, and during the period of probation set forth 
herein, shall strictly conform with all the terms, provisions, and conditions, and the same are 
hereby made a part of this Order by means of incorporation. 
2. That the Defendant shall report as ordered and required by this Court and the 
Department of Adult Probation and Parole during the period of this probation. 
3. That the Defendant shall commit no law violations during the period of this 
probation. 
4. That the Defendant shall serve a term of incarceration in the Iron County Jail for 
a period of ninety (90) days, commencing at 6:00 p.m. on Friday, September 16, 1994, and 
continuing for ninety (90) days thereafter at which time the Defendant shall be released (at 
6:00 p.m. following the 90-day commitment). 
5. That the Defendant shall undergo a psychological evaluation by Dr. Richard 
Moody, said evaluation to take place within the next thirty (30) days, with the Court to review 
the case upon completion of said psychological evaluation on October 11, 1994, at 3:00 p.m. in 
Cedar City, Utah. 
-3-
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6. That the Defendant shall pay restitution, to be determined at a later date and after 
an evidentiary hearing, to Mountain America Credit Union of Cedar City, Utah. 
7. That the Defendant shall pay a fine in the amount of one thousand dollars 
($1,000), together with an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge, for a total fine and surcharge in 
the amount of one thousand eight hundred fifty dollars ($1,850). 
8. That the Defendant shall complete two hundred (200) hours of community service 
in a Mnon law,f area of service. 
9. That the Defendant, as a specific term and condition of probation, shall not engage 
in the practice of law during the period of this probation. 
COMMITMENT 
TO THE SHERIFF OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH: 
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to take the Defendant, EMER KENT WINWARD, 
and deliver him to the Iron CountyAJtah State Correctional Facility, there to be held under the 
provisions of the foregoing Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, Order of 
Probation, and Commitment. 
DATED this day of September, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
JMfl^pgHUMATE 




STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF IRON ) 
I, LINDA WILLIAMSON, Clerk of the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron 
County, State of Utah, hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and exact copy of the 
original Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, Order of Probation, and 
Commitment in the case entitled State of Utah vs. Emer Kent Win ward. Criminal No. 941500056, 
now on file and of record in my office. 
WITNESS my hand and the seal of said office in Cedar City, County of Iron, State of 
1^& October 
Utah, this O day of September, 1994. 
1R3DA WSLltAteeON 
LINDA WILLIAMSON 
District Court Clerk 
:^JUu^ &M\J^ By 




M of a person is to be able to deal with the stress and the 
2
 J realities, not to forget about it, not to try to put it 
3
 » away, 
4
 When you were licensed to practice law, you swore 
5
 I an oath. When I assumed the responsibilities of this bench, 
I swore a similar oath. And let me tell you, it's with a 
7
 heavy heart that I adhere to the responsibilities of that 
8
 I oath at this time. 
It is the sentence of this Court that you be 
committed to the Utah State Prison for a period of time not 
less than one year or more than 15 years. I'm going to stay 
the execution of that sentence and place you on probation 
for a period of 36 months. First term of your probation is 
that you will serve 90 days in the Iron County Jail. During 
the period of this jail sentence, you will be as soon as 
possible evaluated by Dr. Richard Moody, who, I believe, 
still has a contract with Adult Probation and Parole, for a 
psychological evaluation. That evaluation will be completed 
and submitted to the Court within the next 30 days and the 
Court will schedule a review of this portion of the sentence 
within that period of time. 
The agency recommendation recommends that 
restitution in the amount of $3,097.00 be paid to Nicole 
Packer, whom the report characterizes as the victim. This 
Court has heard the evidence and specifically finds that 
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN. JR. \ ^ L 3 O 








































1 I Nicole Packer is not a victim. In all likelihood, Nicole 
2
 i Packer, who strikes this Court as being an extremely bright 
young woman, was a co-participant in these activities and to 
characterize her as a victim and a recipient of restitution 
is unreasonable. Restitution will be ordered at a time, 
later to be determined, but the Court specifically fixes the 
7
 I victim as Mountain America Credit Union. Mountain America 
Credit Union is the holder of this instrument which has been 
dishonored. Mountain America Credit Union, as I recall from 
the testimony at trial, recovered from the accounts a 
certain portion of the $4,600.00, but there is a balance due 
that needs to be fixed. 
With respect to fines and surcharges, I'll impose 
a $1,000.00 fine, plus an 85% surcharge, for a total fine 
and surcharge of $1,850.00. Now, as a term of your 
probation, you are ordered to complete 200 hours of 
community service in a non-law-related field. This may be 
unusual. This Court is not made aware of any proceedings 
from the State Bar, but seeing a concern that the Court has, 
it is the further order of the Court that during the term of 
this probation, you do not, as a condition of probation, 
practice law from this day forward. And the Court is well 
concerned that such a provision may beyond the jurisdiction 
of this Court. The Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
determines who is licensed, but I think the Court has the 
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 power to suspend the practice of law as a condition of 
2
 I probation. 
You are to sign the form of an agreement as 
prepared by Adult Probation and Parole and abide by all of 
its terms and conditions, including those terms and 
conditions set forth by the Court. I intend to review this 
case with the psychological report on October 11, 1994, 3:00 
p.m. I don't want it to go any later than that. Mr. 
Pendleton, do you know if that's a problem with your 
schedule? 
MR. PENDLETON: I can clear my calendar. 
THE COURT: All right. If you don't have any 
pressing engagements elsewhere, we might kick it back to 
October the 10th. Mr. Burns, you or your office can cover 
that review, is that reasonable? 
MR. BURNS: Yes, sir. We'll be here. 
THE COURT: Anything else as a term of probation 
recommended by the State, Mr. Burns? 
MR. BURNS: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Mr. Pendleton, anything else that you 
would recommend? 
MR. PENDLETON: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Winward, I'm going to 
do one other thing. I'm going to order that you report to 
the Iron County Jail Friday evening at 6:00 p.m. Your 
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN. JR. V^Jie?^^ 
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family is here and you need them, at least between now and 
then. 
Mr. Pendleton, we have a pending motion before the 
Court* I111 give you the opportunity to argue it. 
MR. PENDLETON: Your Honor, I, for the record, 
would file a notice of appeal with the clerk, if I may 
approach. 
THE COURT: I certainly believe that the rules 
allow you to do so even though the final judgment has not 
been executed, Counsel. 
MR. PENDLETON: You can in criminal cases. 
THE COURT: I think you can and should. Thank 
you, Counsel. The notice of appeal is ordered filed. 
It will be file stamped once we get back to Cedar City, 
Counsel, but the record will reflect that it is filed on the 
12th of September, 1994, at 11:38 a.m. 
MR. PENDLETON: Your Honor, we have a motion 
before the Court to — for issuance of the certificate of 
probable cause. The State has responded by two memoranda 
that they have filed. This Court, when it released Mr. 
Winward following the verdict, specifically made a finding 
that the Court did not believe that he is a threat to the 
community or to any individual member of this community and 
I think that notwithstanding what I considered to be an 
unfavorable pre-sentence report, I believe that that's 
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN. JR. \ < ^ V O \ 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORT** ( 8 0 1 ) 6 7 3 - 5 1 0 0 3 0 
basically the conclusion that Mr. Carroll reached also. He 
referred to this incident as situational and didn't think 
there was any likelihood of the defendant re-offending in 
this manner. 
THE COURT: I still make that finding, Counsel. 
The Court is not concerned about Mr. Winward as a threat to 
the community whatsoever. I am more convinced of that than 
I was prior to reading the pre-sentence report and the 
supporting letters. 
MR. PENDLETON: Your Honor, the only issue, then, 
as to whether or not the orders of this Court should be 
stayed, particularly the sentence, pending the appeal and an 
opportunity for this defendant to have that reviewed by the 
appellate court, is whether or not and this is as I under-
stand 77-20-10, and rule — the new Rule 27. Basically, as 
I understand it, the question now before the Court is 
whether or not we have presented or have identified issues 
that we intend to present on appeal which present 
substantial questions of either law or fact and which would 
indicate a reasonable likelihood, I think thatfs the 
language of the rule, reasonable likelihood that a new 
trial would be ordered or the case or the conviction 
reversed. The Court in hearing our motion to arrest the 
judgment was asked to address a motion made on a much higher 
level. That is whether or not the Court concluded that the 
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN, JR. 
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ADDENDUM C 
Minute Entry, Motion Hearing, October 11, 1994 
(on remand from the Court of Appeals) 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MINUTE ENTRY 
October 11# 1994 
State of Utah 
vs 
Emer Kent Winvard 
Criminal #941500056 
Type of Hearing: Motion Hearing 
Present: Defendant Judge James L. Shumate 
Atd Gary W. Pendleton 
Atp Scott M. Burns Clerk Lori Jones 
Don Carroll (AP&P) 
Tape #Parowan 150001 Beginning ct. 920 to ct. 3334 
ct 920) The Court welcomes those present, stating there are 
two matters to be addressed today. The first being the Order 
issued by the Court of Appeals, the second matter, a Motion made 
by the defense concerning restitution and funds. 
Atp Burns opens discussion, addressing the 'Motion to 
Establish Restitution and Direct Distribution of Funds Presently 
Held by Iron County Attorney's Office', stating the County 
Attorneys Office is not holding any funds as indicated in the 
motion. 
Atd Pendleton further argues that he feels the funds are 
either in the Co. Atty's possession or possibly with State Bank. 
ct 993) The Court informs counsel that to his recollection 
the funds were frozen at Mountain America. 
ct 1050) Secondly, as to restitution, the Court relies on 
AP&P to identify the victims. It has been determined that Nicole 
Packer is not a victim. In any case he feels the motion is 
premature and not timely to rule upon, that the case is still on 
appeal. 
ct 1115) The Court addresses the Remand Order from the Court 
of Appeals, and cites rule 77-20-10. 
ct 1206) Atd Pendleton provides argument as to why the 
defendant should be allowed to practice law while case is on 
appeal. 
ct 2466) Atp Burns provides argument, stating rule 77-20-10 
is at issue here and that the Court should enfore this rule. 
Counsel argue the matter. 
ct 2721) The Court rules upon the conditions of release as 
ordered by the Court of Appeals, terms: 
3^7! 
1. The defendant shall enter into a formal agreement with 
AP&P and sign that agreement today. 
2. The defendant shall committ no further law violations. 
3. The defendant shall complete a psychological evaluation 
with Dr. Moody, the results shall be provided to the Court in 
earnera. 
4. The issues of restitution are ordered stayed. 
5. The issues of fines are ordered stayed. 
6. The issues of community service are ordered stayed. 
7. The issues of practicing law are ordered stayed. 
ct 3030) Atp Burns informs the Court that the bar counsel 
will be informed of todays hearing and asked to take action. 
ct 3074) Atd Pendleton asks for an order to transcribe the 
hearing which took place on 7/14/94. The Court allows request, 
stating the reporter will make the transcript and deliver it to 
the Court of Appeals in camera, copies will be provided to 
counsel with orders the copies are not to be seen by anyone other 
than counsel. 
Counsel discuss the in camera packed submitted to the Court 
earlier. The Court determines that Atd Pendleton may view the 
packet under orders not to share information with his client 
pending further order of the Court. If Atd Pendleton feels his 




Ruling on Motion for Interim Suspension 
FILED 
Fourth Judical D:smct Cou<t 
of Utah County, Siatfe ;>* uryn 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF 
THE DISCIPLINE OF: 
EMER KENT WINWARD, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant 
Ruling on Motion for Interim 
Suspension 
CASE NO. 940400526 
JUDGE: LYNN W.DAVIS 
This matter came before the court for hearing on March 7, 1995. The Office of 
Attorney Discipline was represented by P. Gary Ferrero, Esq. Mr. Winward was represented 
by Gary W. Pendleton, Esq. The issue before the court was the interim suspension of Mr. 
Winward, an attorney who was convicted of a felony in the Fifth Judicial District Court. Iron 
County. 
The court, after carefully considering the facts, memoranda, and oral arguments of 




1. Emer Kent Winward Esq. is charged with unprofessional conduct by the Office 
of Attorney Discipline of the Utah State Bar. 
2. Mr. Winward was found guilty by a jury of forgery, a second degree felony on 
July 28, 1994. 
3. Winward was sentenced on September 12, 1994, 
4. An act of forgery is a criminal act that reflects adversely on his honesty, 
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer. 
5. The conviction is on appeal before the Utah Court of Appeals and a certificate of 
probable cause has issued. 
n 
Discussion and Procedure 
The Office of Attorney Discipline is authorized to seek and interim suspension of 
lawyers who have committed a crime. (Rule 19 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and 
Disability). 
Rule 19(c) of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and disability provides: 
Imposition. The district court shall place a respondent on interim suspension upon 
proof that the respondent has been convicted of c crime which reflects adversely on the 
respondent's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness a s a lawyer in other respects, regardless of the 
pendency of appeal. 
Paragraph HP references a reinstatement upon reversal of conviction. But there is 
no reference or guidance where a certificate of probable cause has issued The committee 
either overlooked this probability, or did not intend that a certificate of probable cause would 
deter the OAD!s ability to seek an interim sanction.The imposition of sanctions should not be 
considered without some discussion of the current law surrounding the granting or denial of a 
certificate of probable cause, 
A judge has already considered whether defendant was entitled to a certificate of 
probable cause pursuant to Rule 27 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure which states in 
relevant part, 
(f) No certificate of probable cause shall issue and the defendant shall be detained 
unless the appropriate court finds that the appeal: 
(1) is not being taken for the purpose of delay; and 
(2) raises substantial issue of law or fact reasonably likely to 
result in reversal, an order for a new trial or a sentence that does 
not include a term of incarceration in jail or prison. 
U.R.Cr.P.27 was amended effective May 1,1993. The amendment substantially changed the 
wording of Rule 27. There is no Utah case of which this court is aware that addresses the 
rule in its present state. However, there are a number of cases which generally discuss factors 
to be considered in determining whether to issue a certificate of probable cause. 
The case of Stste v. Neelev. 707 P.2d 647 (Utah 1985) established a two part test 
for courts to follow in determining whether an issue to be appealed it substantial and supports 
a request for a certificate of probable cause. "There are two prongs to the test for 
determining whether issues raised are 'substantial1. First, the question raised must be either 
(1) novel, i.e., there is no Utah Precedent that governs, e n (2) fairly debatable." Neelev 707 
P.2d at 649 (emphasis added). The Neelev test has been cited on a number of occasions by 
Utah courts. Most recently, the Utah Court of Appeals cited Neelev in its opinion on State 
v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358, 362 (Utah App. 1993). The Bnum decision was written after the 
amendment to UJLCr.P. 27 went into effect, but apparently relied on the previous version of 
the rule. The Neelev test is also cited in the "NOTES TO DECISIONS" appearing directly 
after UJtCrP. 27. 
The plain language of the relevant part of U.R.CrJP. 27 and the Neelev test for 
determining tffubgtantialityw are not harmonious. U.HCr.Pt 27(f), as presently drafted, 
essentially requires the trial judge to admit clear error and invite reversal in order to justify 
issuing a certificate of probable cause. If a trial judge must admit error and determine that 
his/her decision is reasonably likely to result in a reversal, the proper remedy should be 
granting a new trial; this would avoid unnecessary, prolonged delay attendant with allowing 
the probable cause certificate case to go the to the Court of Appeals or Utah Supreme Court 
with the trial judge's recommendation and •'blessing- that it be remanded for a new trial. The 
Neelev test, which includes a consideration of the "novelty" of the issue to be appealed and 
whether there is precedent esse law on point, malces more sense to this court The practicality 
of the rule, as it is now drafted, escapes this court. 
The amended Rule 27 was adopted by the Utah Supreme Court after the Neelev 
decision. A clear reading suggests that a trial court judge has determined that the appeal 
"raises substantial issues of law or fact reasonably likely to result in a reversal, etc. 
Decision 
The movant is entitled to have this court grant its motion for interim suspension 
under Rule 19. Accordingly, the motion is hereby granted. But because of the above 
discussion on Rule 27 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, it seems obvious that the 
appeal in the criminal conviction is "reasonably likely to result in a reversal.11 I do not 
believe the committee or the court considered this unique circumstance. 
The law dictates an interim suspension, but justice would suggest that the interim 
suspension be stayed fbr some reasonable period of time until the appellate issues can be 
addressed. 
The motion is granted, but the interim suspension is stayed for a period of ISO 
days. 
Counsel for Office of Attorney Discipline is instructed to prepare an Order 
consistent with this ruling. 
Dated this ^ / d a y of March, 1995, 
BY me COURT 
'XYNN W. DAVIS, JUDGE 
cc: Gaiy Ferrero, Esq. 
Gary W. Pendleton, Esq. 
ADDENDUM E 
Original Information 
Probable Cause Statement 
Motion for Bill of Particulars 
State's Response to Defendants' Request for Discovery 
and Motion for Bill of Particulars 
IF F F^ ^ F* 
SCOTT M. BURNS (#4283) 
Iron County Attorney JAN 1 41994 
97 North Main, Suite #1
 N Ar t Ctx». 
P.O. Box 428 T^r DEPUT> 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-6694 
Telecopier: (801) 586-2737 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EMER KENT WINWARD, 
d.o.b. 03/13/63, 




r . . IN #RlS0005k and 
Cnmmal No. j^q^^QQ^ 
Judge James L. Shumate 
The undersigned complainant, Scott M. Burns, Iron County Attorney, states on 
information and belief that the above-named Defendants, EMER KENT WINWARD and 
KIMBERLEE H. WINWARD, committed the following crimes, to wit: 
COUNT I: UNLAWFUL DEALING WITH PROPERTY BY A 
FIDUCIARY, a Second-Degree Felony, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 6, Section 513, and Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 412, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that said EMER KENT 
WINWARD on or about August 9, 1993, in Iron County, State of 
Utah, did knowingly and intentionally deal with property that had 
been entrusted to him as a fiduciary in a manner which he knew 
was a violation of his duty and which involved substantial risk of 
loss to the owner or to a person for whose benefit the property was 
entrusted, said property having a value in excess of $1,000. 
COUNT II: UNLAWFUL DEALING WITH PROPERTY BY A 
FIDUCIARY, a Second-Degree Felony, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 6, Section 513, and Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 412, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that said KIMBERLEE H. 
WINWARD on or about August 9, 1993, in Iron County, State of 
Utah, did knowingly and intentionally deal with property that had 
been entrusted to her as a fiduciary in a manner which he knew 
was a violation of her duty and which involved substantial risk of 
loss to the owner or to a person for whose benefit the property was 
entrusted, said property having a value in excess of $1,000. 
COUNT III: FORGERY, a Second-Degree Felony, in violation of 
Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 501, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended, in that said EMER KENT WINWARD, on or about 
August 9, 1993, in Iron County, State of Utah, did knowingly and 
intentionally, with a purpose to defraud anyone, or with knowledge 
that he was facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, did 
alter any writing of another without her authority or utter any such 
altered writing; or did make, complete, execute, authenticate, issue, 
transfer, publish, or utter any writing so that the writing or the 
making, completion, execution, authentication, issuance, 
transference, publication or utterance purports to be the act of 
another, whether the person is existent or non-existent or purports 
to have been executed at a time or place or any numbered sequence 
other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an original when 
no such original existed, said writing being a check with a base 
amount of $100 or more. 
COUNT IV: FORGERY, a Second-Degree Felony, in violation of 
Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 501, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended, in that said KIMBERLEE H. WINWARD, on or about 
August 9, 1993, in Iron County, State of Utah, did knowingly and 
intentionally, with a purpose to defraud anyone, or with knowledge 
that he was facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, did 
alter any writing of another without her authority or utter any such 
altered writing; or did make, complete, execute, authenticate, issue, 
transfer, publish, or utter any writing so that the writing or the 
making, completion, execution, authentication, issuance, 
transference, publication or utterance purports to be the act of 
another, whether the person is existent or non-existent or purports 
to have been executed at a time or place or any numbered sequence 
other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an original when 
no such original existed, said writing being a check with a base 
amount of $100 or more. 
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PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT 
On or about December 10, 1993, Cedar City Police Detective Kelvin Orton received a 
complaint from one Nicole Packer relating to an alleged forgery of a check made out to her. 
After interviewing Ms. Packer, Detective Orton also conducted interviews with George and Ann 
Bauer, Garry Goodsell, Mitchell Schoppmann, Defendant Emer Kent Winward, and other persons 
at Cedar Land and Title in Cedar City, Utah, and Detective Orton asserts that his investigation 
reveals the following, to wit: 
1. That during the year 1993, George and Ann Bauer listed their property for sale (a 
residence located in Cedar City, Utah) with ERA Realty and the listing agents were Tom and 
Melba Goodman; however, Defendant Kimberlee H. Winward became the selling agent and 
originally advised the Bauers to list the property for sale in the amount of $45,000. Thereafter, 
Kimberlee H. Winward advised Mr. and Mrs. Bauer to accept a cash offer in the amount of 
$40,000 from one Nicole Packer. When Mr. and Mrs. Bauer inquired as to where the buyer was 
obtaining her money, Kimberlee H. Winward informed them that "Nicole Packer's parents are 
wiring her the money." In fact, Cedar Land and Tile officials and specifically Mitchell 
Schoppmann, advised Detective Kelvin Orton that on August 9,1993, $45,000 cash was received 
from Southern Utah Title for the purchase of the Bauer property. 
2. Nicole Packer was requested by Kimberlee H. Winward and Emer Kent Winward to 
(a) act as a purchaser, (b) sign various documents (which she states she really didn't understand 
what they meant) at a closing and (c) they would give her 1/3 of any profits they received from 
the sale. Nicole Packer agreed to act in that capacity and was involved in the closing of the 
Bauer property. After a real estate fee and other expenses were deducted from the $40,000 
purchase price, Mr. and Mrs. George Bauer received approximately $36,000. It should be noted 
that the actual purchase price ($45,000) was never revealed to George or Ann Bauer and they 
were "shocked" when they learned that Co-defendants Emer Kent Winward and Kimberlee H. 
Winward had received more than the $40,000 purchase price. 
3. Pursuant to the closing, purported purchaser Nicole Packer was issued a check in the 
amount of $4,697.50 by Cedar Land and Title Company. However, Nicole Packer was never 
informed of the amount of the check, and never saw the check, as it was taken by Defendants 
Emer Kent Winward and Kimberlee H. Winward, at which time Defendant Emer Kent Winward 
"forged the name of Nicole Packer to the check" and deposited it in the account of Kimberlee 
H. Winward. It should be noted that during an interview with Detective Kelvin Orton on January 
5,1994, Defendant Emer Kent Winward acknowledged that he forged the name of Nicole Packer 
without her knowledge and deposited it into his wife's account and that his wife had full 
knowledge of said action and consented, agreed and assisted in that taking place. Nicole Packer, 
thereafter, received a check in the amount of $1000 (her purported 1/3 share of any profits that 
were made) and did not complain until she learned at a later date that her name had been forged 
to a check in the amount of $4,697.50 as she believed that she was perhaps entitled to the greater 
amount of monies. 
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4. It should be noted that immediately after the closing, Nicole Packer assigned any 
interest she had in the property to a Pat B. Williams of Las Vegas, Nevada. The money from 
Southern Utah Title Company came from Mrs. Williams and the agreement between her, Emer 
Kent Winward, and Kimberlee H. Winward, was that they would find a buyer who would sign 
a promissory note for the purchase of said property in the amount of $58,.000. One Vickie 
Carter Bassett of Cedar City, Utah, closed on the George Bauer property immediately after the 
Bauer/Packer/Winward transaction of August 9, 1993, and purchased the residence for $58,000 
at 13% interest, with no down payment. 
5. Based upon the foregoing, your affiant asserts there is probable cause to believe that 
Defendants Emer Kent Winward and Kimberlee H. Winward have committed the offense of 
unlawful dealing of property by a fiduciary, a second-degree felony as they were the real estate 
agent and attorney representing the interests of George and Ann Bauer and (a) induced them to 
sell their property for $40,000 cash, (b) did not inform them that the actual purchase price was 
approximately $45,000, (c) provided them with false information with respect to who the buyer 
was and where the purchase monies were coming from, and (d) actually received $45,000 for the 
residence and did not transfer those monies to Mr. and Mrs. Bauer, nor informed them of the 
inflated purchase price. By engaging in such acts, your affiant asserts there is probable cause to 
believe that the theft of said monies was committed knowingly and intentionally. 
6. Moreover, your affiant asserts that based upon the interviews conducted by Detective 
Kelvin Orton, as well as an affidavit of forgery submitted by Nicole Packer, and the confession 
of Defendant Emer Kent Winward, there is probable case to believe that on August 9, 1993, 
Defendant Emer Kent Winward forged the name of Nicole Packer to a check made payable to 
her, by Cedar Land and Tile Company, in the amount of $4,697.50, and without her knowledge 
or consent, did negotiate said check and deposit it into the account of his wife, Co-defendant 
Kimberlee H. Winward. Moreover, your affiant asserts that Co-defendant Kimberlee H. Winward 
aided, abetted, assisted, encouraged and participated with full knowledge in the forgery of the 
name of Nicole Packer and the deposit of said sum in her account. Based upon the foregoing, 
your affiant asserts there is probable cause to believe that both Defendants committed the offense 
of forgery, a second-degree felony. 
7. Based upon the foregoing, your affiant asserts that there is probable cause to believe 
that the Defendants have committed the offenses set forth in the information herein, and a warrant 
for each Defendant's arrest is respectfully requested. 
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This Information is based on evidence provided by Cedar City Police Detective Kelvin 
Orton, Nicole Packer, Mitchell Schoppmann, Garry Goodsell, Patricia Williams, George Bauer, 
Ann Bauer, Thomas Goodman, and officials at Mountain America Credit Union and State Bank 
of Southern Utah. 
DATED this day of January, 1994. 
>ltl/2 
SCOTT-ttkBURNS 
Iron County Attorney 
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GARY W. PENDLETON (2564) PILED 
Attorney for Defendants FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
150 North 200 East, Suite 202 ,.., _,
 o m u i« 
St. George, Utah 84770 '94 JHN 21 PH H 18 
Ph: (801) 628-4411
 1R0N COUNTY 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR* 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EMER KENT WINWARD and 
KIMBERLEE H. WINWARD, 
Defendant 
MOTION FOR BILL OF 
PARTICULARS 
Case No. 941500056/57 
Defendants, by and through their attorney, Gary W. Pendleton, and hereby 
move the Court for an order requiring the prosecutor to provide a bill of particulars. To 
inform Defendants and their attorney of the nature and cause of the offenses charged and 
to enable Defendants to prepare for preliminary hearing, request is made for the production 
of the following information within ten (10) days: 
1. With respect to Count I: 
a. The identity of the person and/or entity to whom Defendant Emer 
Kent Winward owed a fiduciary duty; 
b. The facts underlying the creation of that duty; 
c. The property entrusted to said defendant; and 
1 
d. The nature and identity of the risk of loss. 
2. With respect to Count II: 
a. The identity of the person and/or entity to whom Defendant 
Kimberlee H. Winward owed a fiduciary duty, 
b. The facts underlying the creation of the duty, 
c. The property entrusted to said defendant; and 
d. The nature and identity of the risk of loss. 
3. With respect to Count HE: 
a. The identity of the person and/or entity that Defendant Emer Kent 
Winward sought to defraud; and 
b. The nature and identity of the fraud which said defendant was 
facilitating. 
4. With respect to Count IV: 
a. The identity of the person and/or entity Defendant Kimberlee H. 
Winward sought to defraud; and 
b. The nature and identity of the fraud which said defendant was 
facilitating. 
?o 
DATED this day of January. 1994. s~~^ 
Gaiy W. Pendleton 
Attorney for Defendants 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that on this 2/rTiav of Januaiy, 1994,1 did personally mail 
a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document to Scott M. Burns, Iron 




SCOTT M. BURNS (#4283) 
Iron County Attorney 
97 North Main, Suite #1 
P.O. Box 428 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-6694 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EMER KENT WINWARD, 
KIMBERLEE H. WINWARD, 
Defendants. 
) STATES RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY AND 
) MOTION FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS 
) 
) Criminal Nos. 941500056 
941500057 
) 
Judge Robert T. Braithwaite 
COMES NOW the State of Utah, by and through Iron County Attorney Scott M. Burns, 
and respectfully responds to Defendant's Request for Discovery and Motion for Bill of Particulars 
as follows, to wit: 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
1. All written, recorded, or oral statements of Defendant given to investigating officers 
or witnesses during the investigation of the alleged criminal violation in the above-entitled case. 
RESPONSE 1: Copies of documents presently in the possession of the Iron County 
Attorney's Office (and to the County Attorney's knowledge, in possession of law enforcement) 
that relate to written, recorded, or oral statements of the Defendants have been copied and 
delivered to the Defendants' attorney. 
>s-
2. The criminal record of the Defendant, if any. 
RESPONSE 2: The State of Utah is not aware of any criminal record, as relating to either 
Defendant, and does not intend to use the Defendants' criminal records for purposes of 
impeachment. However, and in the event the State learns that either Defendant has a criminal 
record, the State will provide a copy of the same to the Defendants' attorney. 
3. A list of all physical evidence seized by investigating officers involving the alleged 
criminal violation and arrest of the Defendant. 
RESPONSE 3: The only evidence seized by investigating officers, or obtained for that 
matter, consists of documents provided by Defendant EMER KENT WINWARD or received 
from various title companies and real estate offices in Cedar City, Utah. The State has not 
"seized" any physical evidence directly from either of the Defendants. 
4. A list of the names and addresses of all witnesses and a synopsis of their proposed 
testimony. 
RESPONSE 4: At the time of the preliminary hearing, the State of Utah intends to call 
the following witnesses, to wit: 
(a) Nicole Packer of Cedar City, Utah, who can be reached through her 
attorney of record, Andrea Nuffer of Salt Lake City, Utah; 
(b) George and Marie Bauer, 223 West Atlantic Avenue, Henderson, Nevada 
89015; 
(c) Tom Goodman, ERA Realty, Cedar City, Utah; 
(d) Vickie R. Bassett, 171 North 800 West, Cedar City, Utah; 
(e) Jayma Dennett, Cedar Land & Title, Cedar City, Utah; 
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(f) Mitch Schoppmann, Cedar Land & Title, Cedar City, Utah; 
(g) Sally Melling, Cedar Land & Title, Cedar City, Utah; 
(h) Detective Kelvin Orton, Cedar City Police Department, Cedar City, Utah; 
(i) Patricia B. Williams, 4340 Rippling Brook Drive, North Las Vegas, Nevada 
89030; 
(j) Thomas M. Higbee, Attorney at Law, Cedar City, Utah; and 
(k) perhaps a real estate agent or broker in Cedar City, Utah, said person's 
identity not yet known. 
Nicole Packer will testify, in sum and substance, that Defendant EMER KENT 
WINWARD forged her name on a check and deposited the same in the account of Defendant 
KIMBERLEE H. WINWARD. She will further testify that her signature was a forgery and said 
actions took place without her knowledge or consent. Finally, Ms. Packer will testify with 
respect to everything she knows relating to the Bauer-to-Packer real estate sale and subsequent 
transfer from Packer to Williams so the property could be sold to the Bassetts. 
George and Marie Bauer will testify that Defendant KIMBERLEE H. WINWARD was 
their real estate agent, that she owed a fiduciary duty to them, that they trusted her knowledge 
and expertise in the real estate field, and that based upon her representations, they agreed to sell 
their house for $40,000. The Bauers will also testify that they had no idea that the actual sales 
price $45,000, or even $58,000, and that had they known that, they would not have sold their 
home. They will also testify that neither Defendant KIMBERLEE H. WINWARD or EMER 
KENT WINWARD ever disclosed to them that the property would be resold or that the property 
had any value in excess of $40,000. 
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Tom Goodman of ERA Realty in Cedar City, Utah, will testify with respect to all 
knowledge he has relating to the listing of the Bauer property and the transactions that occurred. 
Mr. Goodman will also testify with respect to common practices in the real estate industry in 
Cedar City, Utah, as well as the establishment of a fiduciary duty, relationship of trust, and what 
must be disclosed to clients in the real estate industry. 
Vickie R. Bassett will testify with respect to all of her knowledge relating to the real 
estate transactions, including the fact that she had no idea that the home originally sold for 
$40,000, or thereafter $45,000, and that Defendant KIMBERLEE H. WINWARD and/or 
Defendant EMER KENT WINWARD represented to her that the home was worth $58,000 and 
that she should purchase the home at that price. 
Jayma Dennett is the records manager at Cedar Land & Title. Ms. Dennett will verify 
that various documents introduced into evidence are true and accurate copies of records of 
documents on file at Cedar Land & Title. 
Patricia B. Williams will testify with respect to her knowledge relating to all of the 
transactions, including her purchase of the George and Marie Bauer property for approximately 
$45,000 and her subsequent sale of the property to Vickie R. Bassett for $58,000, pursuant to a 
trust deed and note with interest at the rate of 13%. 
Mitch Schoppmann and/or Sally Melling of Cedar Land & Title Company will testify with 
respect to their knowledge of the Bauer-to-Packer sale, Packer-to-Williams transfer, and 
Williams-to-Bassett sale. Moreover, Mr. Schoppmann and/or Mrs. Melling will testify with 
respect to various documents that had been obtained from Cedar Land & Title Company. 
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Detective Kelvin Orton of the Cedar City Police Department will testify with respect to 
his investigation as well as certain statements and documents received from Defendant EMER 
KENT WINWARD. 
Thomas M. Higbee will testify, as a lawyer licensed to practice law in the state of Utah, 
that he has done substantial work as an attorney in the real estate field and that a fiduciary duty 
is owed to certain clients and/or persons when real estate is purchased and sold; he will testify 
with respect to what he believes that duty is and, based upon hypothetical, what he believes 
would be a breach of that fiduciary duty. Moreover, he will testify with respect to whether or 
not it is a custom or practice to "sign or forge" certain persons' names in real estate actions, as 
an attorney, without said persons' knowledge or consent. 
Realtor/broker, yet to be identified, will testify with respect to common practices, fiduciary 
duties, obligations, and respond to a possible hypothetical in the event the Defendants object to 
Mr. Tom Goodman providing that information as Mr. Goodman is associated with ERA Realty 
and Defendants KIMBERLEE H WINWARD and EMER KENT WINWARD. 
Please be advised that the State specifically asserts that it may identify additional 
witnesses prior to the preliminary hearing. In the event said witnesses are to testify, the State 
would not object to any delay or continuance in order for the Defendants to prepare for said 
testimony. Stated another way, if additional witnesses are identified, the Iron County Attorney's 
Office will advise the Defendant's attorney as quickly as possible and provide relevant 
information with respect to said persons' testimony. 
5. Any written, recorded, or oral statements made by witnesses or Defendant that the 
Prosecutor intends to use at trial in this case. 
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RESPONSE 5: Copies of all documents that the Iron County Attorney's Office possesses 
at this time, including communications from Defendant EMER KENT WINWARD and references 
to Mr. Winward's statements to law enforcement officers, are attached hereto and incorporated 
herein by this reference. The State has not received any information regarding statements made 
by Defendant KIMBERLEE H. WINWARD to law enforcement officers. 
6. A list of all physical evidence obtained by the State during the course of the 
investigation relating to the Defendant, whether or not said evidence is to be used at trial. 
RESPONSE 6: See Response 3 above. 
7. The results of any tests, analysis, or examinations of physical evidence made by 
private or law enforcement agencies that the prosecution intends to use at trial in the above-
entitled matter. 
RESPONSE 7: The State of Utah is not in possession, at this time, of any tests, analyses, 
or examinations of physical evidence made by private or law enforcement agencies that the 
prosecution intends to use at trial at this time. In the event either of the Defendants deny making 
certain writings, and in the event the State deems that proof of said writings' origin is necessary, 
the State will employ certain questioned documents experts to examine said writings prior to trial. 
8. Copies of any and all warrants of arrest or warrants to search and any and all 
documents, affidavits, tape recordings or other evidence supporting the issuance of said warrants 
obtained by law enforcement agencies in the above-entitled case. 
RESPONSE 8: Copies of all warrants of arrest, original Information/Probable Cause 
Statement, Amended Information, and all other documents presently in the Iron County Attorney's 
possession are attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference. 
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9. Copies of all tape recordings, including, but not limited to, taped statements of 
informants and any other evidence supporting probable cause to arrest and search persons, 
vehicles, or premises. 
RESPONSE 9: The State of Utah is not in possession of any tape recordings or taped 
statements received from informants or other persons that related to the arrest of the Defendants. 
10. Please produce material or information in possession of the State with respect to any 
evidence known to the Prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the Defendant, mitigate the 
guilt of the Defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense for reduced punishment. 
RESPONSE 10: The State is not in possession of any evidence that tends to negate the 
guilt of the Defendants, mitigate the guilt of the Defendants, or mitigate the degree of the offense 
for reduced punishment. 
11. Please list the names of any other peace officers involved in this matter who are not 
already listed as witnesses. 
RESPONSE 11: The State is not aware of any peace officers who were involved in this 
investigation at this time, other than Detective Kelvin Orton of the Cedar City Police Department. 
12. Please attach copies of all police reports, diagrams, statements and photographs, and 
any other information provided by investigating officers, which have not previously been 
provided. 
RESPONSE 12: Copies of all police reports, statements, and all other documentation 
presently possessed by the Iron County Attorney's Office are attached hereto and incorporated 
herein by this reference. 
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D 
RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS 
1. With respect to Count I: 
(a) The identity of the person and/or entity to whom Defendant EMER KENT 
WINWARD owed a fiduciary duty; 
(b) The facts underlying the creation of that duty; 
(c) The property entrusted to said Defendant; and 
(d) The nature and identity of the risk of loss. 
RESPONSE 1: With respect to Count I: 
(a) The identity of the person to whom Defendant EMER KENT WINWARD 
owed a fiduciary duty was George and Marie Bauer. 
(b) The facts underlying the creation of that duty were that (1) Defendant 
EMER KENT WINWARD is an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Utah, and 
(2) Defendant EMER KENT WINWARD aided, abetted, and encouraged his wife, a realtor 
licensed to practice in the state of Utah, to knowingly and intentionally misrepresent the sales 
price to George and Marie Bauer and, thus, criminally appropriate the monies belonging to Mr. 
and Mrs. Bauer. 
(c) The property entrusted to said Defendants was their home located in Cedar 
City, Utah. 
(d) The risk of loss relates to the monies for Mr. and Mrs. Bauer's home. 
Specifically, the home was worth at least $45,000 (the actual sales price that was not disclosed 
to Mr. and Mrs. Bauer) and possibly worth as much as $58,000, as that was the ultimate purchase 
price agreed upon by Vickie Bassett. 
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2. With respect to Count II: 
(a) The identity of the person and/or entity to whom Defendant KIMBERLEE 
H. WINWARD owed a fiduciary duty; 
(b) The facts underlying the creation of that duty; 
(c) The property entrusted to said Defendant; and 
(d) The nature and identity of the risk of loss. 
RESPONSE 2: With respect to Count II: 
(a) See Response 1(a) above. 
(b) See Response 1(b) above. 
(c) See Response 1(c) above. 
(d) See Response 1(d) above. 
The State has also alleged, and in the alternative to Counts I and II, that Defendant EMER 
KENT WINWARD and Defendant KIMBERLEE H. WINWARD committed the offense of Theft. 
Specifically, the State asserts that the Defendants acted knowingly and intentionally on August 9, 
1993, in failing to disclose to Mr. and Mrs. Bauer the actual value of their home and, after failing 
to disclose that, unlawfully sold the home for $5,000 more than the Bauers were told, using a 
"straw man" by the name of Nicole Packer in order to effectuate the theft and, thereafter, assisted 
in selling the property again from the "straw man", Nicole Packer, to a Patricia B. Williams who 
thereafter sold the property to Vickie R. Bassett. The State alleges that the Defendants exercised 
or obtained unauthorized control over the property (monies) of George and Marie Bauer. 
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3. With respect to Count III: 
(a) The identity of the person and/or entity that Defendant EMER KENT 
WINWARD sought to defraud; and 
(b) The nature and identity of the fraud which said Defendant was facilitating. 
RESPONSE 3: With respect to Count III: 
(a) The identity of the person that Defendant EMER KENT WINWARD sought 
to defraud is Nicole Packer. 
(b) The nature and identity of the fraud that Defendant was facilitating was 
taking a check made payable to Nicole Packer, forging her name without her knowledge, and 
depositing the monies in his wife's account so he and his wife, not Ms. Packer, could use and 
spend the monies. Specifically, the State alleges that the act occurred without her authority and 
that the Defendant not only forged her signature but took substantial steps in trying to obtain the 
actual monies after the check was deposited. 
4. With respect to Count IV: 
(a) The identity of the person and/or entity that Defendant KIMBERLEE H. 
WINWARD sought to defraud; and 
(b) The nature and identity of the fraud which said Defendant was facilitating. 
RESPONSE 4: With respect to Count IV: 
(a) See Response 3(a) above. 
(b) See Response 3(b) above. Specifically, the State alleges that Defendant 
KIMBERLEE H. WINWARD aided, abetted, encouraged, and assisted in the forgery by assisting 
in the real estate transactions and thereafter having the check, forged by her husband, deposited 
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in her account. Moreover, the State alleges that Defendant KIMBERLEE H. WINWARD had 
"knowledge that he was facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, did alter any writing, 
etc." 
DATED this day of February, 1994. 
SCOTT M. BURNS 
Iron County Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true, and correct copy of the within and 
foregoing STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY AND 
MOTION FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS to Mr. Gary W. Pendleton, Attorney for Defendants, 
150 North 200 East, Suite 202, St. George, Utah 84770, by first-class mail, postage fully prepaid, 
on this day of February, 1994. 
flhnh 
Secretary 
- 1 1 -
ADDENDUM F 
State v. Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214 (Utah App. 1991) 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Ana Lllla GONZALEZ, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 900552-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Dec 4, 1991. 
Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, J. Dennis 
Frederick, J., of forgery. Defendant ap-
pealed. The Court of Appeals, Russon, J., 
held that: (1) sufficient evidence supported 
conviction; (2) court properly admitted en-
tire checkbook from which defendant wrote 
check in question; and (3) reasonable doubt 
instruction was proper.. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law *»U44.13(2, 5), 1159.2(7) 
On sufficiency of evidence challenge, 
Court of Appeals reviews evidence in light 
most favorable to jury's verdict; it re-
verses conviction only when evidence and 
its inferences are so inconclusive or inher-
ently improbable that reasonable minds 
must have entertained reasonable doubt 
that defendant committed crime of which 
she was convicted. 
2. Forgery * M 4 
Sufficient evidence supported forgery 
conviction; by filling in check, signing vic-
tim's name and presenting victim's VISA 
check guarantee and check-cashing cards, 
defendant completed writing of check while 
purporting to be victim, and defendant did 
this without any authority from victim. 
U.C.A.1963, 76-6-501. 
3. Forgery *»20 
In forgery prosecution, it did not mat-
ter that defendant thought she had authori-
ty from third-person, as defendant did not 
have authority from person whose name 
was signed. U.C.A.1953, 76-6-501. 
4. Forgery «=»35 
For purposes of forgery prosecution, 
defendant's act of completing check implied 
purpose to defraud; defendant proffered 
check as if it were genuine, would have 
gained extra cash beyond purchase price if 
she had not been apprehended, and others 
shopping with defendant would have gain 
advantage of purchase as result of defen-
dant's act U.C.A.1953, 76-6-501. 
& Criminal Law *»U34(3> 
Whether certain evidence is relevant, 
and therefore admissible, is question of 
law, which Court of Appeals reviews under 
correction-of-error standard. 
6. Forgery *»43 
In forgery prosecution, testimony that 
witness heard third person, from whom 
defendant obtained checks, boast that her 
sister allowed third person to use sister's 
checkbook on loan-type basis, was irrele-
vant; third person could not confer valid 
authority to defendant to sign name of true 
owner of check, and thus, excluded testimo-
ny had no probative value as to defendant's 
authority to use true owner's checkbook. 
7. Forgery *»37, 38 
In forgery prosecution arising from de-
fendant's writing of single check, rest of 
checkbook was relevant as indirect evi-
dence explaining circumstances surround-
ing crime, and was probative of defen-
dant's intent to defraud. U.C.A.1953, 76-
6-501. 
8. Criminal Law *-1134(3) 
Appeal challenging refusal of jury in-
struction presents question of law only; 
thus, Court of Appeals shows no particular 
deference to trial court's ruling. 
9. Criminal Law *»789(4) 
Reasonable doubt instruction which 
had presumption of innocence clause, man-
dated acquittal if State failed to meet its 
burden of proof, required doubt to be rea-
sonable, and did not require proof to abso-
lute certainty, was proper. 
STATE v. GONZALEZ 
OtmrnttM FJd 1214 (VfkApp. 1991) 
Remal and Ronald S. Fujino (ar- loaned O'Neill "a couple of bucks' 
uuui i ^ i o 
Lisa J. 
gued), Salt Lake City, for defendant and 
appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam, State Atty. Gen., and 
Kenneth A. Bronston, Asst Atty. Gen. (ar-
gued), Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and ap-
pellee. 
Before BILLINGS, ORME and RUSSON, 
JJ. 
AMENDED OPINION « 
RUSSON, Judge: 
Ana Lilia Gonzalez appeals her convic-
tion of forgery, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 
(1990). We affirm. 
FACTS 
On January 21,1991, Gonzalez went to a 
Smith's Food and Drug Center in Salt Lake 
City with four other people. Although 
Gonzalez did not select anything for her-
self, the group filled a shopping cart with 
make-up, body building vitamins, and other 
expensive items totaling $268.28. Gonzalez 
wrote and presented a check for $300, writ-
ing in the amount, "Smith's" as the payee, 
and the signature of Christie Cotner, the 
name on the check. Gonzalez also present-
ed a Smith's check-cashing card and a 
VISA check guarantee card, both bearing 
Cotner's name. Because of the large 
amount of the check and the nature of the 
items, the assistant manager was called to 
verify the check. He called the phone num-
ber listed on the check, and reaching Coi-
ner's residence, was told that the check-
book had been stolen the day before when 
Cotner was shopping in West Valley City. 
The assistant manager called the police, 
and upon arrival, an officer interviewed 
and arrested Gonzalez, charging her with 
forgery, a second degree felony. 
At trial, Gonzalez testified as follows: At 
a party on January 20, she heard Shannon 
(or Sherry) O'Neill boast that her sister 
allowed O'Neill to use her checkbook on a 
loan-type basis. At that party, Gonzalez 
1. This opinion replaces the opinion of the same 
name issued October 18, 1991 (172 Utah Adv. 
With the 
intention of returning the next day for the 
money. The next day O'Neill, who did not 
have enough cash to repay Gonzalez, asked 
Gonzalez to buy her some groceries and 
write the check to cover the cost of the 
groceries, plus the amount owed. Gonza-
lez thought nothing of using another's 
checkbook because she had, with permis-
sion, used her mother's in the past In 
addition to Cotner's checkbook, O'Neill 
gave Cotner's VISA check guarantee card 
and Smith's check-cashing card to Gonza-
lez. Gonzalez then went with four of 
O'Neill's friends to Smith's. 
Additionally at trial, the court received, 
over Gonzalez's objection, the entire check-
book offered by the State as evidence of 
Gonzalez's culpable state of mind. The 
trial court also sustained the State's objec-
tion to testimony offered to corroborate 
Gonzalez's testimony as to O'Neill's state-
ment about purporting to have her sister's 
authority to use the checkbook. Gonzalez 
was subsequently tried and convicted of 
forgery. 
ISSUES 
Gonzalez appeals that conviction, raising 
the following issues: (1) Was the evidence 
at trial sufficient to show that she acted 
with purpose to defraud? (2) Did the trial 
court abuse its discretion in prohibiting tes-
timony corroborative of her testimony of 
her lack of intent to defraud? (3) Did the 
trial court abuse its discretion in admitting 
the entire checkbook from which she wrote 
the check? (4) Did the trial court err in 
refusing her proposed jury instruction on 
reasonable doubt? 
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
f 1] Gonzalez first asserts that the State 
did not present sufficient evidence to con-
vict her of forgery because it failed to 
prove her purpose to defraud. We review 
the evidence in a light most favorable to 
the jury's verdict State v. Johnson, 784 
Rep. 22). 
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P.2d 1135,1138 (Utah 1989). We reverse a 
conviction only when "the evidence and its 
inferences are so inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed the crime of 
which [she] was convicted." State v. 
Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah App.1989) 
(quotation omitted). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1990) reads, 
in pertinent part 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, 
with purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud 
be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(b) Makes, completes, executes, au-
thenticates, issues, transfers, pub-
lishes, or utters any writing so that the 
writing or the making, completion, exe-
cution, authentication, issuance, trans-
ference, publication or utterance pur-
ports to be the act of another 
In accordance with the said statute, the 
Utah Supreme Court has stated that in 
order to prove forgery, "the state must 
show that the defendant not only used the 
name of another, but must also show that 
[she] did so without any authority to do 
so." State v. Collins, 697 P.2d 1317, 1317 
(Utah 1979). 
Utah courts have yet to define the term 
"purpose to defraud," but the Idaho Su-
preme Court has stated that "'intent to 
defraud' . . . is simply a purpose to use a 
false writing as if it were genuine in order 
to gain some advantage^]" State v. May, 
93 Idaho 343, 461 P.2d 126, 128 (1969) 
(citations omitted). That court went on to 
state that "a false writing has such an 
obvious tendency to accomplish fraud that 
the jury is warranted in inferring such an 
intent from the mere creation of an instru-
ment that is false." Id (citation omitted). 
[2,3] Viewed in the light most favor-
able to the jury's verdict, the evidence was 
not so inconclusive that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
as to Gonzalez's guilt Indeed, Gonzalez's 
actions meet all of the requirements of 
forgery. By filling in the check, signing 
Coiner's name, and presenting Cotner's 
VISA check guarantee and Smith's check-
cashing cards, Gonzalez completed the 
writing of the check while purporting to be 
Cotner. Gonzalez did this without any au-
thority from Cotner. It does not matter 
that Gonzalez thought that she had author-
ity from O'Neill. It is well established that 
one needs the authority of the person 
whose name is signed. See State v. Jones, 
81 Utah 503, 20 P.2d 614, 617 (1933). It 
follows, therefore, that O'Neill could not 
confer valid authority to Gonzalez to sign 
Cotner's name. 
[4] Moreover, we hold that the act of 
completing the check implies a purpose to 
defraud. See May, 461 P.2d at 128. Gon-
zalez proffered the check to Smith's as if it 
were genuine and would have gained the 
extra cash beyond the purchase price if she 
had not been apprehended. Furthermore, 
the others shopping with Gonzalez would 
have gained the advantage of the purchase 
as a result of Gonzalez's act Accordingly, 
we conclude that there was sufficient evi-
dence to find Gonzalez guilty of forgery. 
II. EXCLUSION OF TESTIMONY 
[5] Gonzalez next contends that the tri-
al court erred by prohibiting testimony cor-
roborative of her own testimony of her lack 
of intent to defraud. Specifically, Gonzalez 
sought to present testimony that another 
person heard O'Neill boast that her sister 
allowed O'Neill to use her checkbook on a 
loan-type basis. Whether certain evidence 
is relevant, and therefore admissible, is a 
question of law, which we review under a 
correction-of-error standard. See State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 n. 8 (Utah 
1991). 
[6] In support of her argument that 
such testimony should have been admitted, 
Gonzalez relies on a case from the Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit which ap-
proved the admission of hearsay evidence 
to establish a defendant's reliance on the 
advice of counsel. United State* v. Eisen-
stein, 731 F.2d 1540 (11th Cir.1984). In 
Eisenstein, the trial court excluded the tes-
timony of the defendants' attorney, offered 
STATE V. UUN4ALUCU4 
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to prove that the defendants had given full 
disclosure to the attorney and relied on the 
subsequent advice. The court of appeals 
reversed, narrowly holding that such exclu-
sion was improper because "it was neces-
sarily relevant for the lawyer to tell the 
jury the nature of the enterprise presented 
to him by [defendants] and upon which he 
gave his advice." Id, at 1546 (emphasis in 
original). 
Here, the evidence which Gonzalez 
sought to present is wholly irrelevant to 
the disposition of the case. Thus, Eisen-
stein is inapplicable to the case at bar. 
The sole purpose of the excluded testimony 
was that another person who attended the 
party had heard O'Neill's statement about 
her own use of the checkbook. Since 
O'Neill could not confer valid authority to 
Gonzalez to sign Cotner's name, the exclud-
ed testimony had no probative value as to 
Gonzalez's authority to use Cotner's check-
book. Accordingly, we conclude that the 
trial court did not err in prohibiting the 
said testimony. 
III. ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE 
[7] Over Gonzalez's objection, the trial 
court admitted the entire checkbook from 
which Gonzalez wrote the check in ques-
tion. Gonzalez argues that the checkbook 
is irrelevant, and thus, this admission was 
reversible error, under Utah Rule of Evi-
dence 402, which states that "evidence 
which is not relevant is not admissible at 
trial." Again, we review the trial court's 
ruling as to admissibility of evidence under 
a correctness standard. State v. Ramirez, 
817 P.2d 774, 781 n. 3 (Utah 1991). 
This court has previously held that 
" 'where evidence [is] shown to have sup-
ported only conjectural inferences which 
had little probative value' . . . reversal may 
be appropriate on 'grounds that the improp-
erly admitted evidence could only have 
served to confuse and mislead the jury or 
prejudice the outcome of the case.'" State 
v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194, 199 (Utah App. 
1987) (quoting Pearce v. Wistisen, 701 P.2d 
489, 491-92 (Utah 1985)). Gonzalez con-
tends that because she was not charged 
with any offense other than forgery of the 
single check, the rest of the checkbook has 
no probative value and only served to con-
fuse and mislead the jury. We disagree. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that 
"if the evidence has relevancy to explain 
the circumstances surrounding the instant 
crime, it is admissible for that purpose." 
State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah 
1978). The court has also held that intent 
"may be inferred from the actions of the 
defendant or from surrounding circum-
stances." State v. Murphy, 674 P.2d 1220, 
1223 (Utah 1983) (citations omitted). 
In the case at bar, Gonzalez's claim that 
admission of the checkbook only served to 
mislead or confuse the jury is insupporta-
ble because the prosecution made it clear in 
closing argument that Gonzalez was only 
being charged with the one act of forgery. 
Secondly, the checkbook is relevant to the 
single count of forgery as indirect evidence 
explaining the circumstances surrounding 
the crime. Thirdly, it is probative of Gon-
zalez's intent to defraud. Therefore, we 
hold that the trial court did not err in 
admitting the entire checkbook. 
IV. REASONABLE DOUBT 
INSTRUCTION 
[8] Lastly, Gonzalez claims that the tri-
al court erred by refusing her proposed 
jury instruction on reasonable doubt "An 
appeal challenging the refusal to give a 
jury instruction presents a question of law 
only. Therefore, . . . [we show] no particu-
lar deference to the trial court's ruling." 
State v. Pedersen, 802 P.2d 1328, 1331 
(Utah App.1990), cert denied, 815 P.2d 241 
(1991). 
This court has recently considered the 
very instruction given by the trial court, 
and determined that it was an appropriate 
definition of reasonable doubt See Peder-
sen, 802 P.2d at 1331-32. Gonzalez, how-
ever, argues that the recent United States 
Supreme Court decision in Cage v. Louisi-
ana, 498 U.S. , 111 S.Ct 328, 112 
L.Ed.2d 339 (1990) (per curiam) invalidates 
our prior ruling because of the similarities 
in the two instructions in question. We 
disagree. 
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In Cage, the Court acknowledged that 
the "reasonable doubt standard 'plays a 
vital role in the American scheme of crimi-
nal procedure/ Among other things, 'it is 
a prime instrument for reducing the risk of 
convictions resting on factual error.'" Id., 
498 U i . at , 111 S.Ct at 329 (quoting 
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363, 90 S.Ct 
1068,1072, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)). Accord-
ingly, the Supreme Court reasoned that in 
"construing the [reasonable doubt] instruc-
tion, we consider how reasonable jurors 
could have understood the charge as a 
whole." Id., 498 U.S. at , 111 S.Ct at 
329 (citing Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 
307, 316, 105 S.Ct 1965, 1972, 85 L.Eo\2d 
344 (1985)). 
[9] Comparing Cage to the present 
case, we determine that the instruction in 
question is sufficiently different from the 
one rejected in Cage, and therefore it re-
mains an adequate definition of reasonable 
doubt In Cage, the Supreme Court ques-
tioned the phrases "substantial doubt," 
"grave uncertainty," and "moral certainty" 
contained in the reasonable doubt instruc-
tion. The Court ruled that these phrases 
could allow "a reasonable juror [to inter-
pret] the instruction to allow a finding of 
guilt based on a degree of proof below that 
required by the Due Process Clause." Id., 
498 U.S. at , 111 S.Ct at 330. The 
instruction in the case at bar has no such 
language. Any similarities* between the 
two instructions were not questioned by 
the Supreme Court Thus, Cage has no 
applicability to the instruction in Pedersen, 
nor to the instruction given here. There-
fore, we "need not consider whether [Gon-
zalez's] proposed instruction might also 
have been proper or even preferable." 
Pedersen, 802 P.2d at 1331-32. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we hold that (1) the evi-
dence at trial was sufficient to show that 
Gonzalez acted with purpose to defraud; 
(2) the trial court did not abuse its discre-
2. Gonzalez argues that the Cage instruction and 
the Pedersen instruction are similar because 
both have a presumption of innocence clause, 
both mandate acquittal if the State fails to meet 
its burden of proof, both require doubt to be 
tion in prohibiting testimony corroborative 
of Gonzalez's testimony of her lack of in-
tent to defraud, nor in admitting the entire 
checkbook from which Gonzalez wrote the 
check; and (3) the trial court properly re-
fused Gonzalez's jury instruction on rea-
sonable doubt Accordingly, we affirm. 
BILLINGS and ORME, JJ., concur. 
(o f tmumSTsYSTiM^ 
STATE of Utah, In the Interest 
of J.W.F., * person under 
18 years of age. 
Petition of Winfleld D. SCHOOLCRAFT. 
No. 910163-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Dec. 27, 1091. 
Man who was legally married to child's 
mother at time of child's birth petitioned 
for custody of child after child had been 
determined to have been abandoned by his 
natural mother. The Second District Juve-
nile Court, Weber County, determined that 
legal stepfather was not biological father 
and did not have standing to seek custody. 
Legal stepfather appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, 763 P.2d 1217, affirmed. Stepfa-
ther appealed. The Supreme Court, 799 
P.2d 710, reversed and remanded for deter-
mination of what would be in child's best 
interest On remand, the Juvenile Court, 
Stephen A. VanDyke, J., determined that it 
would be in child's best interest to be in 
custody of foster parents in whose care he 
had been since shortly after birth. Stepfa-
ther appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Bench, P J., held that determination that it 
was in best interest of child to live with 
reasonable, and neither requires proof to an 
absolute certainty. However, these similarities 
are not questioned by the Supreme Court, and 
are wholly appropriate for a reasonable doubt 
instruction. See Pedersen, 802 P.2d at 1331-32. 
STATE IN INTEREST OF J.W.F. 
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foster parents, rather than legal stepfather 
was not abuse of discretion, even though 
legal stepfather had been determined to be 
fit prospective parent 
Infants «»222 
Parent and Child *=»14 
Awarding custody of child to foster 
parents, rather than to presumed father 
who was legally married to mother at time 
of child's birth on grounds that it was in 
best interest of child was not abuse of 
discretion, even though juvenile court 
found that legal stepfather was fit prospec-
tive parent; child had been with foster 
parents since shortly after birth when he 
was determined to have been abandoned by 
his natural mother, and status as legal 
stepfather gave rise to no presumption of 
custody. 
Winfield D. Schoolcraft, pro se. 
Robert K. Hunt (argued), Findley P. 
Gridley, Gridley, Echard & Ward, Ogden, 
for J.W.F.'s Foster Parents. 
Jan Arrington (argued), Ogden, guardian 
ad litem, for J.W.F. 
Carol L.C. Verdoia (argued), Human Ser-
vices Div., Salt Lake City, for State of 
Utah. 
Before BENCH, PJ., and GARFF and 
JACKSON, JJ. 
BENCH, Presiding Judge: 
This case is before us following a remand 
by the Utah Supreme Court to the juvenile 
court for a determination of whether it 
would be in the child's best interests for 
appellant Schoolcraft to have custody of 
J.W.F. See In re J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710 
(Utah 1990). Schoolcraft appeals the juve-
nile court's decision that it would not be in 
1. Schoolcraft argues that the juvenile court, this 
court, and the supreme court, have all erred 
because the biological father has never been 
produced or legally proven to exist. This argu-
ment misses the point upon which this case now 
rests. In the initial trial proceeding, the juve-
nile court found that appellant was not the 
Utah Rap. 620-628 P.2d-6 
the child's best interests for him to have 
custody. We affirm. 
Inasmuch as the facts of this case have 
been adequately and fully discussed in the 
previous opinions of this court and the su-
preme court, we give but a brief factual 
background. J.W.F. was born to School-
craft's wife, Linda Schoolcraft, while they 
were separated. They had been separated 
for a year prior to the birth. Schoolcraft 
became aware of J. W.F.'s existence approx-
imately one year after the birth when he 
learned that the State had filed a neglect 
and abandonment petition against Linda 
Schoolcraft and Michael Ford, the putative 
father of J.W.F.1 Schoolcraft then filed a 
petition in juvenile court seeking custody of 
J.W.F., alleging that he was the presumed 
father because he was still legally married 
to J.W.F. *8 mother at the time of the birth. 
The juvenile court found that Schoolcraft 
was not the biological father of J.W.F. 
based upon a blood test and the fact that 
J.W.F. is partly of African ancestry while 
both appellant and Linda Schoolcraft are of 
Anglo-Saxon ancestry. The juvenile court 
ruled that because Schoolcraft was not the 
biological father of J.W.F., he did not have 
standing to seek custody and therefore dis-
missed his petition. 
This court affirmed the juvenile court's 
denial of standing but the Utah Supreme 
Court reversed, holding that Schoolcraft 
had standing to seek custody as J.W.F.'s 
stepfather. The supreme court remanded 
the matter to the juvenile court to "deter-
mine what custody arrangement would 
serve the best interests of J.W.F. and act 
accordingly." Id. at 716. On remand, the 
juvenile court held that it would be in the 
best interests of J.W.F. to be placed in the 
permanent custody of J.W.F.'s foster par-
ents in whose care he had been since the 
juvenile court ruled shortly after his birtli 
that he had been abandoned. Schoolcraft 
now appeals that ruling. 
biological father. This finding was affirmed bj 
this court and by the supreme court. The iden 
tity of J.W.F.'s biological father is therefore n< 
longer relevant to the discussion of whethe 
Schoolcraft, as J.W.F.'s legal stepfather at birth 
should now have custody. 
ADDENDUM G 
Trial Transcript, pp. 1148-49 
Jury Instructions Nos. 14-A, 14-B, 14-C 
1
 the ruling there. Thank you, Mr. Burns. 
2
 I Mr. Pendleton, your exceptions to the instructions 
as proposed. 
MR. PENDLETON: Instruction 14A I except to on 
the following grounds. The instruction instructs the jury 
that they can find the defendant guilty if he acted with a 
purpose to defraud anyone. The defendant in this case 
requested a bill of particulars which the State provided 
identifying as the victim of this offense one Nicole Packer. 
Specifically, the request for the bill asked the State to 
identify the purpose — the person whom the State contends 
the defendant sought to defraud. The State responded by 
identifying Nicole Packer as that person. Now, with this 
instruction, the State — the Court is allowing the govern-
ment to argue purpose to defraud as it may relate to Bauers, 
Bassetts, the credit union, ERA Realty, and anybody else in 
this world and Ifm not sure who that may or may not be, but 
I'm sure I'll find out during closing argument. 
I also object to the language of second numbered 
paragraph of that instruction on the grounds that the lan-
guage Mor with the knowledge that he was facilitating a 
fraud to be perpetrated by anyone.11 That would allow the 
government to argue, although there is no evidence to this 
effect, that if he facilitated a fraud being committed by 
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1 In conformity with the authority which the State has pro-
2
 vided to the Court and upon which it relies and apparently 
3
 intends to argue, that being State v. Collins, at 597 P.2d 
4
 1377, a 1979 Utah Supreme Court case. I also object on the 
5
 I grounds and for the reasons that the instruction does not 
identify the specific instrument that was identified by — 
7
 in the trial and in the evidence. It does not identify the 
B
 element that the defendant knew that he had no such author-
9
 I ity, which I think is implied as an element in the statute. 
Those are my exceptions to that instruction. 
I except — I take an exception to Instruction 
No. 14B as it relates to a definition of the term "defraud." 
We already have a proposed instruction which will define 
purpose to defraud. The definition of defraud has no 
application to the facts of this case, only gives the 
government ammunition to argue an omission of a duty which 
— or a failure — omission of a duty to disclose, which 
the government now will be able to come in and argue that 
failure to disclose facts to Bassetts or Bauers or whoever 
will satisfy the element of defraud. 
I also except — take exception to the paragraph 
defining "utter." The defendant is nowhere in this Informa-
tion charged with having uttered this instrument. 
I also take exception to Instruction No. 14C on 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
Before you may find Defendant Emer Kent Winward guilty of the 
offense of Forgery, as charged in the Information, the State must 
prove and you must find, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, 
each and every one of the following elements: 
1. That the Defendant acted knowingly and intentionally; 
2. That the Defendant acted with a purpose to defraud anyone, 
or with knowledge that he was facilitating a fraud to be 
perpetrated by anyone; 
3. That the Defendant did, without her authority, make, 
complete, execute, authenticate, issue, transfer, publish, or utter 
any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, 
execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication, or 
utterance purported to be the act of Nicole Packer; 
4. That the writing is a check with a face amount of $100 
or more; and 
5. That the events occurred on or about August 9, 1993, in 
Iron County, State of Utah. 
If the State of Utah has failed to prove any one or more of 
the previously described elements, you must fine the Defendant not 
guilty of the offense of Forgery as charged in the Information. 
If the State has proved, however, each and every one of the 
foregoing elements to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable 
doubt, then it is your duty to find the Defendant guilty of 
Forgery as charged in the Information. 
<^13 
INSTRUCTION NO. I ^ ~ Q 
In these instructions certain words and phrases are used which require definitions in order 
that you may properly understand the nature of the crimes charged and in order that you may 
properly apply the law as contained in these instructions to the facts as you may find them from 
the evidence. These definitions are as follows: 
You are instructed that a person engages in conduct "intentionally", or with "intent", with 
respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious 
objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
You are instructed that a person engages in conduct "knowingly", or with "knowledge", 
with respect to his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the 
nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts "knowingly", or with 
"knowledge", with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is 
reasonably certain to cause the result. 
You are instructed that "defraud" is defined as the making of a false representation 
concerning a presently existing material fact which the representor either knew to be false or 
made recklessly without sufficient knowledge, or the omission of a material fact when there is 
a duty to disclose, for the purpose of inducing action on the part of the other party, with actual 
justifiable reliance, resulting in damage to the party. 
You are instructed that "utter" is to put or send (as a forged check) into circulation. To 
"utter," as used in a statute against forgery, means to offer, whether accepted or not, a forged 
instrument, with the representation, by words or actions, that the same is genuine. 
You are instructed that "make" is defined as to cause to exist, or to execute in legal form. 
You are instructed that "complete" is defined as to finish, or accomplish that which one 
starts out to do. 
You are instructed that "execute" is defined as to complete, or to make, sign, perform, do, 
or to carry out according to its terms. 
You are instructed that "authenticate" is defined as to represent as genuine, or true, or 
reliable, or having the character and authority of an original. 
iHX 
You are instructed that "issue" means to send forth, or to deliver or go forth as 
authoritative or binding. 
You are instructed that "transfer" means to convey or remove from one place, or person, 
to another; or to pass or hand over from one to another. 
You are instructed that "publish" means to be declare or assert, directly or indirectly, by 
words or actions, that a forged instrument is genuine. 
You are instructed that "forge" is defined as to fabricate by false imitation, or to 
fraudulently alter a genuine instrument to another's prejudice; or to sign another person's name 
to a document, with a deceitful and fraudulent intent. 
You are instructed that "forgery" is defined as the false making or the material altering 
of a document with the intent to defraud. "Forgery" is also defined as a signature of a person 
that is made without the person's consent and without the person otherwise authorizing it. 
3M| 
INSTRUCTION NO. N~C 
You are instructed that "purpose to defraud" is simply a purpose to use a false writing as 
if it were genuine in order to gain some advantage. 
^MO 
ADDENDUM H 
Testimony of Hans Q. Chamberlain 
(Trial Transcript, pp. 1118-44) 
1 then, that because Nicole Packer had been authorized by 
2
 your wife to sign on her account, that you had authority 
3
 to therefore sign her name on a check ?' A fid \\H said, *FMQ, 
* that's not the only reason. The reason is, basically, the 
5
 [ whole relationship between us." And then talked about the 
partnership relationship, the joint venture relationship. 
7
 J He never said that attorneys licensed in Utah had the right 
B
 ' to sign other j:: ^eople's thi ngs. He never said that so it's 
9

















• Number two, Mr. Chamberlain, to the extent hefs 
going to I\NP called to testify as io what: Hans Q„ Chamberlain 
has done or hasn't done in the last 25 years or what he 
would or would not do in the future, is not relevant. It's 
immaterial. To the extent that, tie is qoing to be offered 
to advise the jury as to what the law is, it's irrelevant 
and immaterial. That's the Court's obligation. I fai ] to 
see that anything that outlined — that1s been outlined hy 
Mr. Burns is rebuttal or that it's relevant or material. 
I would object to him even being placed before this jury. 
THE COURT: Counsel, 1 see Mr. Chamberlain's role 
as that of an expert witness and, as an expert witness, 
opini ng as to what :i n, h :i s experience attorneys do or do not 
do. I can see that his testimony under Rule 401 may have a 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is the role 
of an attorney in a real estate transaction either more or 
B Y R O N RAY C H R I S T I A N S E N , JR . 
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' less probable than it would be without the testimony of an 
2
 J expert witness. 
MR. PENDLETON: Your Honor ~ 
THE COURT: Let me pick your mind a little bit. 
Where do we stand there? 
MR. BURNS: First of all, Mr. Winward testified 
that his implied authority came by virtue of his relation-
ship, not as attorney-client, but by virtue of his relation-
ship as a partner. Basically, what we're going to establish 
here if we pursue this line is, we1re going to establish a 
different standard of conduct with respect to attorneys and 
regular people and there is no difference nor has the de-
fense ever asserted that there is a difference. We have 
never claimed that just because of the fact that he is an 
attorney that he had the right to sign somebodyfs name. 
What we have claimed is that he was in a joint venture 
relationship with this girl. They were in a close family 
relationship that was almost like a family. And that given 
those circumstances, that he believed he had authority, had 
nothing to do — we never offered evidence to say that 
because he was an attorney he could do that. Now, we want 
to call somebody who has long standing in the community as 
an attorney sit before the jury and say, "I wouldnft have 
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jumpe apyt.nin<:i e.lse 
additional objections to Mr. Chamberlain's testimony? T 
— my question may have cut you off somewhat. 
MR. PENDLETON, Well, other than I hi..' tact, that, jt 
is - '"is not rebuttal, it is not relevant or material, 
and uiidu — he could only validly be called as an expert if 
we were talking about a defense or — lor instance, if we 
were talking about an offense that could only be committed 
iduciary we were talking about what duties of 
a fiduciary, i.e., an attorney licensed to practice t 
then maybe his testimony, as expert witness, would be 
jriaJ. However, 're talking about 
here - a forgery case. That can be -••• a forgery case — a 
forgery can be committed by somebody at the grocery store 
lit- iinwn dr 1 ht niitomoM le i ;. is noi.hanq 
with the fact that he's licensed to practice law or that he 
has special duties. And we have never suggested that by 
virtue of his license to practice law that he had this 
authority. We have only suggested to the jury that because 
he was in a relationship with this young lady as a co-
venturer or partner that he. had that t Lght, that implied 
authority. And I believe that it would be error to call 
him. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Counsel. The 
B Y R O N RAY C H R I S T I A N S E N . J R . 
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1 Court's analysis is as follows. I refer, first of all to 
2
 Rule 702 of the Rules of Evidence regarding specialized 
3
 knowledge because, as much as we would like to claim, 
4
 attorneys, I don't think, come in with scientific or tech-
5
 nical knowledge, but certainly specialized knowledge. If 
6
 specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
7
 I understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experi-
9
 J ence, training or education, may testify thereto in the form 
of an opinion or otherwise. Now, I see — to understand the 
evidence and the role of an attorney in this transaction, it 
is before the jury that an attorney is here. The role of an 
attorney in a transaction, I think, must be explored simply 
because of the fact that Mr. Winward is an attorney, that 
may arise there. Certainly, it would arise, I think, in the 
mind of a reasonable juror a question as to whether or not 
attorneys can do some things that other people cannot. 
Attorneys may or may not have authority. Mr. Winward, in 
discussing his authority to sign the check, indicated an 
implied rather than an express authority. And the question 
is then begged, is it implied because of his role as an 
attorney? Is it implied because of the arrangement between 
the parties in this enterprise? Evaluating the evidence 
under Rule 401, I think that it has a tendency to make the 
existence of a fact more or less probable. Thatfs something 
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the jury needs to look at. I don't se .e a pi: oblem v - J • - :' 
Your objection to Mr. Chamberlainfs testimony is overruled 
Mr. Bailiff, will you ask the members of the jury 
to come , , 
Thank you, Ladies and Gentlemen. We are now back 
In session with the jury present, as well as the defendant, 
and the State being represented by Mr. Burns. Mr. Burns, 
you may call your next witness. 
MR. BURNS: Thank you, Your Honor. The State 
would call Hans Q. Chamberlain. 
THE COURT: Mr. Chamberlain, would you come for-
**. 
Thank you, sir. Please have a seat right here. 
Go ahead, Counsel. 
HANS QUINN CHAMBERLAIN, 
having been called as a witness, being first duly sworn, 
testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION, 
BY MR. BURNS: 
o- w'ou'Jfl you state your full ii-irne, please, spelling 
your last name? 
A< My full n a m e is H a n s Q U i n n chamberlain, C-H-A-M-B-
E-R-L-A-I-N. 
Q. And where do you reside, sir? 
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A. In Cedar City, Utah. 
Q. And the nature of your employment or vocation? 
A. I'm a lawyer. 
Q. And how long have you been a lawyer? 
A. I passed the bar in 1969. Served — well, actu-
ally four months duty in the CHAD Reserve and then came to 
Cedar City and practiced in Cedar since 1970. 
Q. Would you tell the jury, please, your educational 
background? 
A. Yes. I attended Southern Utah State College back 
then, now Southern Utah University, for two years and two 
quarters. I then transferred to the University of Utah 
where I was admitted into law school after three — I went 
to a quarter at the University of Utah, admitted into law 
school after three years, and then graduated three years 
later from the University of Utah Law School. At the same 
time, I also was able to use some of my law school hours in 
the political science department at the University of Utah 
and took summer school and also received a bachelorfs degree 
from the University of Utah in 1969. So I received both my 
bachelorfs and my juris doctorate degree in 1969. 
Q. Would you tell the jury your professional affilia-
tions with the Utah Bar? 
A. Yes. I've been fairly active in Bar matters in 
addition to practicing law. I first began my involvement 
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process whereby attorneys are selected and 
then they write questions and model answers for Bar — for 
people who are going to the Bar exam. We then submit that 
5
 I model answer - another panel of attorneys who review it 
and then when the applicants take the Bar exam, we read 
their answers and grade the exams. And it consists of three 
member a MI each team for each specialized aic.u The area 
that I was assigned back then was secured transactions. 
After that, l sought and was elected to the Bar 
Commission for tl le State ',»!; Utah,, which is the. qoverninq 
body for the Utah State Bar. That occurred in, I believe, 
1982. 1 was elected a second term and then in 1989 I was 
elected to serve as president of the Utah State Bar and 
served as president for one year* Stayed on thereafter as 
an ex officio member and then 1 — my term was up, actually 
resigned early so that someone else could be appointed from 
this area to have the experience that I had. 
And then since that time I have served as a member 
~* the Board Trustees for the Law and Justice Center, 
which is the building that houses the Utah State Bar and 
serves as a nc J: I- profi t cor poratj on i n an effort tic: • provide 
pretty much legal services to the community, arbitration, 
mediation, pro bono work, those kind of things. 
Q. Okay. Mr. Chamberlain, may I ask you why you1re 
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 I here today? 
' A. Yes, Ifin here because you subpoenaed me to be 
3
 I here. 
4 Q. Thank you. Could you tell the jury your back-
ground with respect to practicing law for the last 25 years, 
the topics and types of issues youfve dealt with as a prac-
7
 I ticing lawyer? 
A. Yes. When I came down here in 1970, I just began 
private practice. After I was here six months, Robert L. 
Gardner, who was then county attorney, was appointed as the 
assistant attorney general for this area, which meant that 
he had to resign as county attorney. He resigned. A county 
commissioner at that time appointed me as county attorney. 
I then ran that fall — I was out of law school six months, 
which needless to say was a little scary, having just got 
out of law school and have a major commitment thrust upon 
me. It was extremely helpful in developing my practice and 
what I feel is my expertise. I served as county attorney 
until 1978. After serving two fulls terms, I opted not to 
run and serve a third term. I then went into private prac-
tice and have been in private practice since that time. 
While I was county attorney, I was also elected as president 
of the Statewide Association of Prosecutors, which is the 
association of all the prosecutors in the State of Utah. 
Since that time, since 1978, I — well, I should back up. 
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While I served as county attorney, I also maintained a 
private practice in addition to being the county attorney. 
:k tfien, you didn't have to be fill 1 time, so 1 maintained 
somewhat of a private practice. 
Then in 1978, I began practice with couple of 
• iei" lawyers mi Cedar City and then i in I yd formed a 
firm back then called Chamberlain, Corry, & Higbee con-
sisting of myself, Kent Corry, and Tom Higbee. That firm 
tence since 1980. 
The areas that I practice - - 1 do a lot of real 
estate work. "1 do -- we i epresei tanks and financial 
institutions in Cedar City. We represent the title com-
panies in Cedar City. 1 represent the Iron County School 
District. I do quite a bit of trial won much 
what I describe as a general practice, except : do any 
bankrupts oly complicated tax matters. We refer 
those out ? our office. 
Q. ^hank you. In some 25 approximate years of your 
experience ttorney, how many — to the best of your 
estimation, sir, how many real estate transactions have you 
been involved in, either representing someone or conducting 
the c 1 os i ini o r he i nq \\ pa r t y t n i ha» ?* ea 1 estate transac-
tion? 
A. My best guess would be well over a hundred. Have 
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in mind when you represent someone in a divorce, you1re 
acting somewhat as a counselor in determining how that 
transaction is handled with regard to whether or not the 
husband or the wife is given the home and in a sense that 
becomes a real estate transactions and I would guess I've 
done, I don't know, a hundred to two hundred divorces at 
least over that period of time. 
Q. Would that be in addition to the approximately 
one hundred real estate transactions? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And in those transactions, again to the 
best that you can recall for the jury, on approximately how 
many occasions have funds, which are the proceeds or the 
result of a real estate transaction, made payable to a third 
party, to someone else, come into your possession or have 
been available for your access? 
A. Probably — we had — where it wasn*t paid 
directly at closing at the time, the title company or some-
thing that was handled by Chamberlain and Higbee and partic-
ularly by me, I would guess about fifty. 
Q. Approximately fifty times? 
A. Yes, uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q. And on how many of those occasions, sir, did you 
sign the name of the person to whom the check was written? 
MR. PENDLETON: Objection. That's irrelevant and 
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1 immaterial how many times Mr. Chamberlain has signed a name 
2
 I or — I thought he was being qualified as an expert witness 
3 !
 and now hefs not even being asked for an opinion, 
4
 THE COURT: Sustained. Rephrase your question, 
Mr. Burns. 
MR. BURNS: Thank you. 
7
 I Q. (By Mr. Burns) Mr. Chamberlain, if proceeds 
through a check in these some fifty occasions that you've 
talked about in your experience — if the proceeds of a 
check from a real estate transaction came into your posses-
sion made payable to a third party, do you have an opinion 
as to whether or not you or a lawyer could sign that 
person's name without their knowledge or consent? 
MR. PENDLETON: Objection. 
THE WITNESS: I have an opinion. 
MR. PENDLETON: That doesn't provide a sufficient 
hypothetical to fit the facts of this case. 
THE COURT: Counsel, the objection is not to the 
answer of the question that was given. Mr. Chamberlain just 
answered that, yes, he has an opinion. Overruled. Your 
next question, Mr. Burns. 
Q. (By Mr. Burns) What is that opinion? 
MR. PENDLETON: I'll object on the basis of an 
inadequate hypothetical. 
THE COURT: Overruled again, Counsel. Mr. 
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 I Chamberlain, your answer. 
THE WITNESS: Assuming a hypothetical that you 
gave me, it would be my opinion it would be improper for an 
attorney to sign a client's name to a check and deposit it 
into any account, including the lawyer's own account. 
Q. (By Mr. Burns) Okay. Do you have an opinion as 
to whether or not proceeds from a real estate transaction 
made payable to someone else but come into your possession, 
under what circumstances could that check be deposited into 
your personal account or into your wife's account? 
A. The only circumstances that I would consider 
appropriate would be if I held a special or general power 
of attorney from the client that authorized me to do that. 
Q. Okay. And would that presume, Mr. Chamberlain, 
that the client knew about the check? 
A. Yes, yes. 
Q. Okay. Do you have an opinion as to under what 
circumstances you would receive a check made payable to a 
third party and never tell that person about the check? 
MR. PENDLETON: Objection. I think this is beyond 
the scope of his qualifications as an expert. I don't see 
the relevance, either. 
THE COURT: Overruled, Counsel. You may answer, 
Mr. Chamberlain. 
THE WITNESS: Well, I — I had that question — 
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I mean, in trying to answer your question, I looked at the 
Rules of Professional Conduct because I thought they would 
be appropriate in aiding me in trying to answer your ques-
tions and I think you have an immediate obligation to 
transfer the funds to the person they belong to and I be-
lieve thatfs consistent with Rule 1.13 of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct. 
MR. BURNS: Thank you. I have no further ques-
tions, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Cross-examination, if any, Mr. 
Pendleton? 
MR. PENDLETON: Just a moment, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Certainly. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION, 
BY MR. PENDLETON: 
Q. Mr. Chamberlain, you are here strictly for a 
limited purpose, as I understand it, to provide this jury 
with knowledge of the fact that a person by reason of the 
fact that they are licensed to practice law in the State 
of Utah does not automatically have authority to endorse 
someone else's name to a check, is that correct? 
A. I'm not sure that's the reason I'm here. I was 
subpoenaed and asked to give an opinion. If you could 
clarify your question, perhaps I could try to answer it. 
Q. The opinions that you have been provided — have 
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1
 been providing to the jury relate to whether or not a per-
2
 J son, strictly because of — by reason of the fact that they 
are an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of 
Utah, whether or not that person by virtue of only that fact 
is authorized to sign someone else's name on a check? 
A, Yes, and that's because I believe they1re held to 
7
 J a higher duty than the average person. 
Q. Now, let's talk about someone who is an attorney 
who is in — let's don't talk about attorneys. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Let's talk about partners. 
A. Partners? Okay. 
Q. Okay. Would you agree, first of all that a part-
nership or a joint venture can be created without any par-
ticular formality? 
A. Well, any written formality, yes. I think two 
people can get together and the law imposes a partnership 
arrangement. 
Q. And if two people get together and combine their 
talents, their resources, and their efforts to the accom-
plishment of a commercial goal which would produce a profit, 
generally speaking the law will imply upon those persons 
and with respect to one another they are partners or joint 
venturers, is that correct? 
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 Q. And is it true that joint venturers or partners 
2
 | stand in relationship to each other as agent and principal 
with respect to those matters that are within the scope of 
the partnership venture? 
A. Probably, if the scope of the venture is defined 
and known to all of the parties. 
Q. Okay. So, by reason of the fact that somebody 
happens to be an attorney doesn't mean that they can't be 
a partner in a transaction, is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And by reason of the fact that a person is an 
attorney doesn't mean that they cannot acquire implied 
authority by reason of that partnership status, does it? 
A. Well, I guess it depends on how you define im-
plied. I think you have to — I think both partners have 
to know of the relationship to being with and I think they 
have to have discussed the authority for any implied author-
ity to have occurred. 
Q. Somebody sends a check to Chamberlain and Higbee 
payable for — in payment of attorney's fees. Typically, 
you probably don't even see that check, do you? 
A. Well, we look at the checks as they come in. 
Q. You do? 
A. We have to make payroll like anybody else. 
Q. Okay. But your secretary generally deposits those 
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1 I checks, doesn't she? 
2
























Q. And she has a stamp that has language on it that 
indicates which account it's supposed to be deposited in? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And that stamp is affixed by her with authority? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And that stamp, basically, acts as an endorsement, 
isn't that correct? 
A. Yes, I think that's correct. 
Q. And even if Tom Higbee got a check that came in 
that was payable to Tom Higbee but it was for partnership 
business or was for services rendered by Chamberlain and 
Higbee, that check payable to Tom Higbee would be stamped 
and endorsed by the partnership in the due course and depos-
ited in the partnership account, is that correct? 
A. Yes. It would be stamped but it wouldn't be 
signed. 
Q. Okay. It would be stamped. 
A. Of course, that's because we've discussed that, 
you know, on prior occasions and said that's fine, that's 
the way we want it done. 
Q. You said you have said that to — you have dis-
cussed that with your secretary and this is how it's sup-
posed to be done? 
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A. And Tom Higbee. 
Q. Okay. Is it your testimony, then, that if you 
had never had an express conversation with Tom Higbee saying 
that he could endorse that check, that if a check came in, 
let's say, payable to Tom Higbee, okay, for Chamberlain and 
Higbee funds — funds payable to Chamberlain and Higbee. If 
you went out and you endorsed the partnership stamp on the 
back of it and put it in the partnership account — 
MR. BURNS: Well, Your Honor, I'm going to object 
at this point. I think that we've gone far afield as to 
relevance and materiality with respect ~ 
THE COURT: I think not, Counsel. Overruled. 
MR. BURNS: May I just make a brief record. We're 
talking now about stamp, I think, and — 
THE COURT: I understand that as well, but we're 
still within the area of expertise that Mr. Chamberlain has 
given us. Go ahead, Mr. Pendleton, start it up again. 
Q. (By Mr. Pendleton) If a check came into your 
office, then, payable to Tom Higbee but it was actually for 
services rendered by the partnership or by him as a partner, 
you could take your partnership stamp and stick it on the 
back of that check and put it in the partnership account 
without it being forgery, isn't that correct? 
A. Yes. Because we have — 
Q. And you could do that — 
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MR. BURNS: Your Honor, if he could answer. 
THE COURT: Let Mr. Chamberlain finish his answer, 
Mr. Pendleton. 
MR. PENDLETON: Okay. 
THE WITNESS: Yes, because we have an agreement 
that thatfs how itfs to work. 
Q. (By Mr. Pendleton) Now, suppose that you had 
never sat down — first of all, do you have a written part-
nership agreement? 
A. Of sorts, yes, uh-huh. 
Q. Does the written partnership agreement talk about 
endorsing checks of the partnership? 
A. I don't know whether it does or not. 
Q. Suppose ~ 
A. Itfs been a — I mean, it's been twelve years so 
I just don't have a specific recollection of whether it does 
or not. 
Q. Okay. Suppose two partners — two attorneys get 
together — well, let's take two auto mechanics, get to-
gether and they never have — they never sit down and say 
you have the right to endorse checks or whatever and put 
them into the Al's Mechanic Shop account or whatever, if a 
check came in payable to one of those partners, therefs no 
written agreement between them. There1s not even a verbal 
agreement between them. Therefs only a partnership rela-
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tionship. If one of those partners signed the other part-
ner's name on that check and put it in the partnership 
account without intending to defraud the other partner, 
would that be forgery? 
A. No, because I think it goes into the partnership 
account. 
Q. And suppose that it's not even in the partnership 
account. Let's suppose that it goes into an account that 
is used, which is the only account that is used by the 
partnership, even though it is not designated as a part-
nership account, if there's no intent to defraud, is it 
forgery? 
A. If it goes into the partnership account? 
Q. If it goes into the account that that partnership 
has always used, in connection with this business, even 
though that might not be designated down at the institution 
as a partnership account? 
A. Do all of the partners know of the existence of 
that check, I guess, would be my question. 
Q. Well, assume they don't. Well, let's assume that 
it's put in the partnership account and there is no intent 
to defraud, is that forgery? 
A. I don't know. I can't look into that person's 
mind to determine whether or not there's intent to defraud. 
MR. PENDLETON: Okay. That's my point. Thank 
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN, JR. I I j b fc 
CCKT.FISD SMOHTHANO REFOATIA
 ( m ) ^ . ^ Q Q 4 5 5 
1




THE COURT: Mr. Burns, anything else? 
MR. BURNS: Yes, Your Honor. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION, 
5
 | BY MR. BURNS: 
Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether or not if 
they, let's assume, a partnership — if a check were made 
payable to one of the partners in the amount of, let's say, 
$4,697.00, the other partner signs that person's name to 
the check, doesn't ever tell the other partner about it. 
There's never been authority given to sign her name, ever. 
The partner then takes that check and deposits it into an 
account, personal account, not a business account, that the 
partner who the check was made out to is not a signatory on 
that account, and the partner whose name was signed and the 
check was negotiated didn't even find out about it for one, 
two, three, three and a half months. Do you have an opinion 
as to whether or not that would be with a purpose to defraud 
or forgery? 
MR. PENDLETON: Objection. This is far beyond his 
field of expertise. 
MR. BURNS: Well, Your Honor, Mr. Pendleton gave 
him a hypothetical that I don't think was based closely in 
reality and then asked him to give his opinion as to whether 
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him a hypothetical and now, likewise, would ask him to give 
the jury his opinion as to whether or not that would be 
forgery or with purpose to defraud. 
THE COURT: Members of the jury, I'm going to 
allow Mr* Chamberlain to answer the question, but I'm going 
to instruct you that the testimony of an expert witness 
should be viewed by you as the testimony of any other wit-
ness when it comes time to make your determination in the 
jury room as to the innocence or guilt of the defendant* 
This testimony should be viewed by you in the same fashion 
as you do all the other witnesses under the instructions 
given by the Court. Your objection, Mr. Pendleton, is 
overruled. Mr. Chamberlain, can you answer the question? 
THE WITNESS: I think I can. 
THE COURT: What's your opinion, sir? 
THE WITNESS: In my opinion, that would be evi-
dence of intent to defraud. 
MR. BURNS: Thank you. That's all I have, Your 
Honor. 
MR. PENDLETON: Well, let me follow that up, then, 
since I have to deal with this. 
THE COURT: Mr. Pendleton. 
RECROSS-EXAMINATION, 
BY MR. PENDLETON: 
Q. Mr. Chamberlain, let's assume that three people 
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form a partnership or a joint venture. Then those persons 
enter into a real estate transaction which is part of the 
objective of that partnership or perhaps the sole objective 
of that partnership, Let's assume that the check that comes 
out of the title company by reason of the closing of that 
real estate transaction is payable to but one of those 
partners* Let's assume that all of the partners, including 
the one to whom it was payable, would concede that that 
check represented partnership funds and was monies that was 
available to all of the partners or belonged to all of the 
partners and not just to the one partner just because that 
personfs name was the only name on it. Letfs assume that 
this check, then, is endorsed by another one of the partners 
and put into the only account that has ever been used for 
partnership business. Let's assume that other transactions 
have come out of that account, other monies have been paid 
out of that account, in connection with the advancement of 
the partnership business. Let's assume that even though one 
of those partners is not a signator — letfs assume that the 
partner whose name is on the check is not a signatory on the 
account but let's assume that she has been given express 
authority by another one of the partners to write against 
that account and has on at least 62 occasions drawn money 
from that account. Letfs assume that before this transac-
tion ever closed that these partners had had a conversation 
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1 and they had discussed different ways of dealing with this 
2
 I — of closing this transaction and they have discussed the 
possibility of listing the property and other possibilities 
and they had determined that one of the partners was going 
to get the sum of ten thou — excuse me, one thousand dol-
lars. And let's assume that they make this agreement before 
the final figures are even known about what is going to be 
earned through that transaction and before the costs are 
even known, the costs of that transaction are even known. 
Now, let's assume that that partner who has agreed to take 
one thousand dollars for her int — as compensation for her 
services in that partnership venture, that person — the 
check is issued in her name and that the check is endorsed, 
placed in the partnership account by another one of the 
partners, and then — 
A. May I ask you a question? 
Q. Okay. 
A. At that point in time, when you say "endorsed," 
does the partner that signed the check sign his name to it 
or the other partner's name to the check? 
Q. Signs his name to it and then puts a restricted 
endorsement on that indicating which account it is going 
into. 
THE COURT: Mr. Pendleton, his or her name to it? 
MR. PENDLETON: His or her name to it. 
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 THE WITNESS: My question is, does he sign his 
2
 J name to it or does he sign the name of the person to whom 
the check is made payable? 
Q. (By Mr. Pendleton) He signs the partner1s name# 
5
 I the other partner1s name. 
6
 A. Whose name is on the check? 
7
 I Q. Yes. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Okay. 
A. I think Ifm with you so far. Quite a few assump-
tions, but I'll try to stay with you. 
Q. Quite a few facts in this case. And assume that 
the partner whose name the check was issued in then was paid 
the thousand dollars that she agreed to take as compensa-
tion, is paid right out of that same account. Now, does 
that present the jury question as to whether or not the 
person who signed that other partner's name acted with the 
intent to defraud? 
A. Does that present a jury question? 
Q. Yes. Does it present a jury question? 
A. As to whether or not — Ifm sorry. 
Q. As to whether or not the person — 
MR. BURNS: Objection as to whether or not it 
presents a jury question, Your Honor. I think he can opine 
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1
 THE COURT: Ifm going to allow Mr. Pendleton to 
2
 I place it in that framework. 
3
 ' MR. BURNS: Okay 
4
 THE COURT: Whether or not it presents a jury 
5
 j question. 
Q* (By Mr. Pendleton) Does it present a jury ques-
7
 j tion as to whether or not that person who made the endorse-
B !
 ment on behalf of the partner intended to defraud that 
9

















A. Yes, a jury question. 
Q. And if the jury, then, must decide whether or not 
they believe that the partner who made the endorsement acted 
with that intent, is that correct? 
A. Well, yes, with this caveat, I guess, and that is, 
you havenft told me whether or not — I don't think you told 
me in your assumption as to whether or not the person whose 
name was on the check said it was okay for the other person 
to sign her name to the check. 
Q. No, Ifm not talking about express consent, I'm 
talking about apparent or implied authority by virtue of 
their relationship as partners. 
A* I think the jury has to decide those relationships 
and make a decision based on the evidence that they've 
heard. 
Q. So, by telling this jury, that in your opinion 
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1 that was — that under Mr. Burns' hypothetical that that may 
2
 J be evidence of fraud, you were not telling this jury that 
3
 ' you have made any judgment about this case, is that correct? 
4






















person that makes the ultimate jury decision. 
Q. Isn't that their — 
A. That's their decision, yes. 
MR. PENDLETON: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Mr. Burns, anything else? 
MR. BURNS: Just briefly. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION, 
BY MR. BURNS: 
Q. Taking all of those assumptions that you can 
recall and add to that, now, Mr. Chamberlain, that the 
partner whose name was signed did not give authority and 
add the assumption that the partner whose name was signed 
didn't even know about the check and add that to the assump-
tion that these partners agreed to to a one-third split and 
the partner whose name was signed had no idea of the amount 
of that check, do you have an opinion as to whether or not 
that that would show purpose to defraud? 
MR. PENDLETON: Objection. This is — we are 
going so far afield here, Your Honor. 
MR. BURNS: Well, Your Honor, Mr. Pendleton, lays 
out a hypothetical — 
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THE COURT: Counsel, your objection is noted. 
Overruled. Mr. Chamberlain, you may answer. 
THE WITNESS: Ask me the question again. 
Q. (By Mr. Burns) Do you have an opinion as to 
whether or not that would, in your opinion, evidence a 
purpose to defraud? 
MR. PENDLETON: Your Honor, the rules compel me 
to note my objection and the grounds for it. Irrelevant, 
immaterial and in violation of Rule 403. 
THE COURT: And I appreciate your specificity, 
Counsel. Weighing this matter, coupled with the Courtfs 
cautionary instruction, overruled. Mr. Chamberlain, do you 
have an opinion? 
THE WITNESS: I have an opinion. 
Q. (By Mr. Burns) And that would be what, sir? 
A* My opinion, that that is strong evidence of intent 
to defraud. 
MR. BURNS: Thank you, sir. 
THE COURT: Mr. Pendleton, anything else? 
MR. PENDLETON: No further questions, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Chamber-
lain, you may step down and you are excused from the sub-
poena. Any further witnesses, Mr. Burns? 
MR. BURNS: No, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. The State rests, then, on 
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ADDENDUM I 
Defendant's Proposed Jury Instructions Nos. 4 and 5 
Trial Transcript, pp. 1155-56 
INSTRUCTION NO • 1 
You are instructed that a joint venture is an association of persons organized 
for the purpose of engaging in and carrying out a single business venture. A joint venture 
may be created without any particular formality or writing and may be inferred by the 
conduct of the parties. 
46 Am JUT 2d, Joint Ventures 
/ft r £>*% • 
// 
SQS-
INSTRUCTION NO. r 
Each member of a joint venture stands in relationship of agent as well as 
principal to the other members of the venture in matters relating to the object for which the 
joint venture was formed. 
46 Am Jur 2d, Joint Ventures §42. 
5^7 
THE COURT: With respect to your proposed instruc-
tions on the specific intent, we've covered that earlier. 
The Court feels that the — well, we may not have covered 
it on the record. The Court specifically feels that the 
charging instruction, Instruction 14A, defining knowingly 
and intentionally, the definitional instruction, and In-
struction 14B, and the Courtfs own stock instruction, In-
struction No. 13, all set forth the specific intent needed 
for this crime, which is knowing and intentional. I differ 
with the Federal Practice and I don't believe the State 
courts follow that. We may be bound by it eventually, but 
I'm not aware of any State law to support that approach. 
Instruction No. 4 and 5 on joint venture, I find 
that while you may argue joint venture and have presented 
sufficient evidence to argue joint venture, that it is 
inappropriate for the Court to instruct on that matter 
because I'm not sure that the facts and the evidence before 
the Court at this juncture support instructions on joint 
venture. 
That's the Court's rulings. Mr. Bailiff, will you 
ask the — 
MR. BURNS: Your Honor, before we do that, are 
we going to put a time limit on closing argument, something 
that — 
THE COURT: Mr. Burns, how long do you think 
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1 intent being the purpose to defraud. And under the circum-
2
 stances, I donft believe that the instruction relating to 
3
 general criminal intent, knowing and intentional or general 
4
 mens rea is adequate to instruct the jury as — on the law 
5
 J as it relates to that specific intent to defraud. And, 
therefore, I take exception to the Courtfs refusal to give 
7
 J the following instruction, "The crime charged in this case 
is a serious crime which requires proof of specific intent 
before the defendant can be convicted. Specific intent as 
the term applies means more than the general intent to 
commit the act. To establish specific intent, the prose-
cution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant 
knowingly did an act which the law forbids, purposely in-
tending to violate the law. Such intent may be determined 
from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the case." 
And I would point out that that is a form instruction from 
the Federal Bar Association here in the State of Utah. 
Those are my exceptions. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. With respect to 
your exceptions to the proposed Instruction No. 14A, the 
Court has previously ruled on this issue with respect to the 
purpose to defraud anyone as is set forth in the statute. 
The reasoning of the Court previously on the record follows 
there. 
Instruction 14B, the instruction as to defraud is 
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Defendant's Proposed Jury Instruction No. 3 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
The crime charged in this case is a serious crime which requires proof of 
specific intent before the defendant can be convicted. Specific intent, as the term implies, 
means more than the general intent to commit the act To establish specific intent the 
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly did an act 
which the law forbids purposely intending to violate the law. Such intent may be determined 
from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the case. 
ft/6T I-lit-"*-
Federal Bar Association Criminal Instruction No. 12. 
A£3 
ADDENDUM K 
State's Objection to Defendants' Motion to Disqualify 
Scott M. Burns 
SCOTT M. BURNS (#4283) 
Iron County Attorney 
97 North Main, Suite Ml 
P.O. Box 428 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-6694 
5thJiKfieialDist Court'iron County 
F I L E O 





IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EMER KENT WINWARD and 
KIMBERLEE H. WINWARD, 
Defendants. 
) STATES OBJECTION TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
) DISQUALIFY SCOTT M. BURNS 
) 
) Criminal Nos. 941500056 
941500057 
) 
Judge James L. Shumate 
COMES NOW the State of Utah, by and through Iron County Attorney Scott M. Burns, 
and respectfully objects to the Defendants' Motion to Disqualify Scott M. Burns from further 
prosecution of the above-entitled matter. 
The State's objection is made on the grounds that the Defendants have failed to set forth 
any statutory basis, ethical reason, or a legally sufficient basis upon which to disqualify the Iron 
County Attorney. The State respectfully responds to the specific allegations set forth rh the 
Defendants' Motion to Disqualify as follows, to wit: 
ALLEGATIONS 
ALLEGATION NO. 1. At the outset, Mr. Bums perjured himself in the statement of 
probable cause which he signed in order to obtain arrest warrants for the Defendant and his wife 
falsely stating that: 
\3L3L 
a. The Defendants "were the real estate agent and attorney representing the 
interests of George and Ann Bauer. . . " (Probable Cause Statement %5) 
b. "Defendant Kimberlee H. Winward became the selling agent and originally 
advised the Bauers to list the property for sale in the amount of $45,000." (Probable Cause 
Statement f 1) 
c. "Thereafter, Kimberlee H. Winward advised Mr. and Mrs. Bauer to accept 
a cash offer in the amount of $40,000 from one Nicole Packer." (Probable Cause Statement f l ) 
d. [DJuring an interview with Detective Orton on January 5,1994, Defendant 
Emer Kent Winward acknowledged . . . that his wife had full knowledge of said action (the 
alleged forgery) and consented, agreed, and assisted in that taking place." (Probable Cause 
Statement ]3) 
Each of these allegations is central to the State's theories of criminal liability. Each of 
these statements is false and unsupported by any evidence. 
Furthermore, and more disturbingly, the police report does not support any of these 
allegations which indicates that Mr. Burns made them right out of whole cloth. Most telling is 
the fact that Detective Orton's account of the January 5 interview with Kent Winward indicates 
that Mr. Winward told the investigator that the subject check was deposited into Mrs. Winward's 
account "to expedite the process in which Nicole would receive her percentage of the profit." 
The investigator's account is completely devoid of any allegation made by Kent Winward 
regarding his wife's knowledge of the process by which the subject check was endorsed or 
deposited. 
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RESPONSE NO. Ma). Detective Kelvin Orton of the Cedar City Police Department 
submitted a report to the Iron County Attorney's Office (see Exhibit "A", attached hereto and 
incorporated herein, and hereinafter referred to as "Detective Orton's report") that contained an 
interview with Nicole Packer on December 10, 1993 (relating to the sale of the George and Ann 
Marie Bauer home) which states, "Kim and Kent Winward needed Nicole Packer as a partner to 
list as the original buyer for appearances." Moreover, Detective Orton's report contains an 
interview with Mitch Schoppmann, Cedar Land and Title, on January 4, 1994, that quotes 
Schoppmann as saying, "The property located at 171 North 800 West was bought and sold in 
basically the same transaction." Mr. Schoppmann further stated that "according to Cedar Land 
and Title personnel, Kent Winward handled the paperwork concerning this real estate transaction 
including closing." 
Clearly, the prosecutor preparing a probable cause statement would be led to believe that 
Mr. and Mrs. Winward were acting on behalf of George and Ann Marie Bauer as related to the 
sale of the subject property. 
RESPONSE NO. Kb) and McY Detective Orton's report sets forth an interview with Mr. 
Tom Goodman, ERA Realty, on January 10, 1994, wherein Mr. Goodman stated "he did not 
handle the actual sale of the property and was just the listing agent. Kim Winward (also of ERA 
Realty) was the 'selling agent' and handled all negotiations with the buyer." Goodman also stated 
to Detective Orton that "all the information regarding the sale of the property would have come 
through Kim Winward." 
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In an interview with George Bauer on January 10, 1994, Mr. Bauer informed Detective 
Orton that "they originally were advised to list the property for $45,000 . . . they received an 
offer of $40,000 cash which they eventually agreed to." 
In that Mr. Goodman and Defendant Kimberlee H. Winward both worked for ERA Realty, 
and based upon Detective Orton's report that Mr. Goodman asserted "he was just the listing 
agent" and "Kim Winward was the selling agent and all of the negotiations came through her," 
a prosecutor preparing the probable cause statement would be led to believe that Defendant 
Kimberlee H. Winward (the selling agent) would have been the person to advise on the sale 
amount ($45,000) and would have been the person to advise Mr. and Mrs. Bauer to sell for 
$40,000." 
RESPONSE NO. KdV Detective Orton informed the Iron County Attorney, verbally, 
while the Iron County Attorney was preparing the probable cause statement, that Defendant Kent 
Winward stated that Defendant Kim Winward knew Defendant Kent Winward was going to sign 
Nicole Packer's name to the subject check (which is alleged to have been forged), and she further 
knew that Defendant Kent Winward was going to deposit the check into her (Defendant Kim 
Winward's checking account). The State alleges that this assertion was also based upon (and the 
Court agreed in its findings as set forth in the preliminary hearing transcript, p. 262) the fact that 
Defendant Kimberlee H. Winward made her checking account available to Defendant E. Kent 
Winward and then wrote funds out of that account, specifically the $1,160 check to Ms. Packer. 
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The State asserts, by the Defendants' failure to challenge or argue, that all other 
allegations contained in the probable cause statement were true and based upon appropriate 
evidence. Finally, the State asserts that a "probable cause statement" is made by prosecuting 
attorneys in support of a information and arrest warrant and is just that, a statement that 
"probable cause" exists to support the alleged offenses. Clearly, if the State were held to only 
setting forth completely unrefutable assertions in the probable cause statement, there would be 
no need for (a) a preliminary hearing or (b) a trial, and upon submission of the probable cause 
statement, all parties could simply move to the sentencing phase. 
ALLEGATION NO. 2. During the noon recess of the preliminary hearing, Mr. Bums 
accosted defense counsel in the halls of the courthouse and invited defense counsel to set (sic) 
outside, apparently for the purpose of some physical altercation. 
RESPONSE NO. 2. The State of Utah asserts that Iron County Attorney Scott M. Bums 
did not accost defense counsel in the halls of the courthouse and did not invite counsel outside 
for the purpose of some physical altercation. If the Court is interested in the particulars of those 
allegations, please refer to Exhibit "B", attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference. 
ALLEGATION NO. 3. When challenged regarding the inaccuracy of the probable cause 
statement and his behavior at the preliminary hearing, Mr. Bums responded with name-calling 
and more false accusations. 
RESPONSE NO. 3. Again, the State of Utah asserts that Iron County Attorney Scott M. 
Bums did not engage in any engage in any "name-calling" or "false accusations" at the 




ALLEGATION NO. 4. Mr. Burns' comments to the press have been unethical and 
inappropriate. 
RESPONSE NO 4. The State denies that Iron County Attorney Scott M. Burns has made 
any comments to the press that have been unethical and inappropriate. In fact, the Iron County 
Attorney was misquoted by a Daily Spectrum newspaper reporter, and upon reading the article, 
the Iron County Attorney responded in what would appear to be the appropriate and professional 
manner (see Exhibit "CH, attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference). 
ALLEGATION NO. 5. Mr. Burns' conduct of the prosecution of this matter evidences 
an irrational and unjustifiable animus toward the Defendants. 
RESPONSE NO. 5. The Iron County Attorney received information that certain citizens 
had made complaints that Defendants Emer Kent Winward and Kimberlee H. Winward had 
committed criminal offenses. Thereafter, Cedar City Police Detective Kelvin Orton investigated 
the case, presented Mr. Burns with a police report, and the case was screened by Detective Orton 
and the Iron County Attorney. Thereafter, a criminal information and probable cause statement 
were prepared, and the Defendants were charged with felony counts, have received all of their 
constitutional rights and protections to date, and were bound over after a preliminary hearing. 
If the foregoing is "unjustifiable animus" toward the Defendants, I suppose one could argue that 
anytime the State's prosecutor files charges against certain defendants and prosecutes the case 
pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah, there is "unjustifiable animus." In any event, the State 
of Utah denies any bias, prejudice, or ulterior motives related to the prosecution of this case. 
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Based upon the foregoing, the State of Utah asserts that the Iron County Attorney should 
not be removed from the prosecution of this case. 
DATED this _2> 3r day of May, 1994. 
SCOTT M. BURNS 
Iron County Attorney 
CERTOTCATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true, and correct copy of the within and 
foregoing STATES OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS1 MOTION TO DISQUALIFY SCOTT M. 
BURNS, by first-class mail, postage fully prepaid, on this day of May, 1994, to the 
following, to wit: 
Mr. Gary W Pendleton, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant 
150 North 200 East, Suite 202 
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On 12/18/93 at 1300 hrs I was contacted by Nicole Packer who 
advised that she had been partners in a real estate transaction 
lith Kim and Kent Winward which involved buying a property and 
>elling the same property to another buyer for a substantial 
'rofit. Kim Winward explained that the property being purchased 
las located at 171 N 800 W CDC and was presently owned by George 
.nd Ann fiarie Bauer, the property would then be sold to another 
iuyer Vicky and Dan Bassett the day the purchase from Bauer 
losed. 
Kim Winward told Packer that the transaction would not look 
thical if Kirn Winward was represented as the buyer and then sold 
;he property to another buyer for profit. Kim Winward is an 
^gent for ERA Realty representing George Bauer, therefore, Kim 
knd Kent Winward needed Nicole Packer as a partner to list as the 
rriginal bu^er for appearances. Uinward advised Packer that the 
rrofits would be split into thirds, each of them taking a equal 
•hare. 
nterview: Mitch Schoppmann 
On 1/4/94 this investigator met with Schoppmann who advised 
;he property located at 171 N 806 W was bought and then sold in 
basically the same transaction. According to Schoppmann the 
locuments indicate that Nicole Packer purchased the property for 
•40,000.00 and then sold the property the same day for $58,000.00 
;o Dan SVVicky Bassett. The money for the transaction was beintj 
supplied by Patricia Williams of Las Vegas Nevada. The buyer 
licole Packer then turned her interest over to Patricia Williams 
iaking Patricia Williams the principal holder of the property 
;rust deed. Ban & Vicky Bassett would then make payments through 
iedar Land & Title to Patricia Williams at a 13# interest fo*r the 
purchase of the property. 
According to Cedar Land & Title personnel 1, Kent Winward 
candled the paperwork concerning this real estate transactJon 
inc1ud ing c1osiny. 
As a result of this meeting it was found that Kim Winward 
vould have collected a commission check for the George Bauer & 
•licole Parker -transaction as well as a share in the profit. 
Interview: Emer Kent Winward 
On ©1/05/94 this investigator met with Mr.Winward who 
spontaneously told this investigator he had forged Nicole 
'acker's name to the check $4637.50 issued by Cedar Land & Title 
\nd deposited into his wife's account. Kent Winward states he 
endorsed Nicole's name to the check and deposited the check into 
<in,'s account to expedite the process in which Nicole would 
receive her percentage of the profit. 
Kent Winward states that the profit agreement between the 
involved parties was that Nicole Packer would receive a total of 
*>e,000.00. $1,000,00 when the deal closed and then an additional 
£1,000.00 when the Winward' s collected The down, payment frrm 
•ieky Bassett• 
Mr. Uiinu:.<fv! , *! ..,;. «=t*te*. t . \ \ »;;^o*:^ Ticker- h*,. jinned .'.im 
however, the Winward's concurred with the behavior at that time-
Mr. Winward has supplied this investigator with duplicate checks 
which he believes to be forgeries. The documents Mr. Winward 
supplied this investigator will accompany this report. 
Interview: George Bauer / Ann Marie Bauer 
On 1/10/94 this investigator contacted George Bauer and his 
wife Ann Marie Bauer in Henderson Nevada, they state the property 
located at 171 N 800 U was originally listed at $45,000.00 
through ERA Realty, the asking price was lowered to $43,000.00 
after the property had been on the market for approximately one 
(1) yearm The Bauer's state they received an offer of $40,000.00 
cash which they considered and eventually agreed to. George Bauer 
told this investigator that he did not feel comfortable with this 
transaction from the start, stating "it was as though someone was 
trying to buy low and then sell for a greater profit" this 
statement was uttered prior to this investigator informing the 
Bauer's of the investigation. 
The Bauer'*, state that the proposal was for $40,000.00 cash 
Ai'tu their information was that the money was being wired to 
Nicole Packer from her parents for the purchase? of the property. 
Mr. Bauer states there was no mention of the property being sold 
to anyone else other then Nicole Packer or that the property was 
being re-sold for an amount greater then 40,000.00 
Ann Marie Bauer reiterates that the sell of the property 
was suspicious, especially to George, however, they decided to go 
forward ijith the sell due to circumstance in their personal life. 
The Bauer's were not familiar with Kim Winward and advised 
this investigator that Tom & Milba Goodman were the listing 
agents, however, the Bauer's felt positive the Goodman's were 
not involved in the deceit that took place. 
Interview: Tom Goodman 
On 01/10/94 I contacted Tom Goodman in refevened to my 
conversation with the Bauer's. Goodman states that he did not 
handle the actual sell of the property and was just the listing 
acjerit through ERA Realty. This investigator was informed that 
Kim Winward was the selling agent and handled all the 
negotiations with the buyer. Goodman told this investigator all 
the information regarding the sell of the property would have 
came through Kim Winward. Goodman was not aware the property had 
been re-sold in the same transaction until after the fact and 
even then was \/GC/ surprised. 
Through my conversation with Goodman I found the commission 
f:.r the sell was split into third's, one part going to the 
franchise, one part to Goodman, and one part to Winward. 
Goodman'* recollection of the transaction was vague but did 
-.-,ay what information he relayed to the Bauer's would have came 
fro**. Kim Winward. 
T nterview: Garry Goodsel1 
On (31/18/94 this investigator contacted Garry Goodsell in 
.
;
 •: ;:. r d*.> to how :<r>d why the money was. issued th.ouL;! •Southern 
Goodsell researched the transaction end found that Patricia 
lilliams had sold a property located iri Fiddlers CAnyon, Cdc, 
Init *tl lot 2, Slock 5, to Berry & Teresa Gracely. When Gracely's 
• btain financing for the property a check was issued to Patricia 
lilliams in the amount of approximately $68,900.00 this check was 
ent to Southern Utah Title who would forward the check to 
lilliams. Patricia Williams endorsed the check back to Southern 
Itah Title with the following instructions, $45,000.00 be sent to 
edar Land & Title in the form of a Trust Deed in the name of 
licole Packer with Patricia Williams as the principal interest 
older. The remaining balance would be issued back to Patricia 
lilliams in the form of a check which was $23,242.72. 
To Garry Goodsell5s knowledge this was the extent of 
outhern Utah Title's involvement. 
ountain America: 
On 61/12/94 this investigator contacted Tonya, at 
n-erica Credit Union. I was advised that deposit ships 





Ovi Sl/21/94 This investigator contacted Sally Melling at 
led&r Land & Title who discovered another possible fraud and 
orgery pertaining to an earnest money sales agreement handled 
;hrough C\-*dar Land & Title and involved Kim Winward. Mrs. Melling 
recognized the writing on the legal document as Kim Winward's. 
The document shows Dan and Vicky Bassett supplying $100.00 
earnest money to ERA Realty and provides a buyer's signature, 
signed by Dan Bassett. The Seller's signature represents Nicole 
'acker, however, the signature is an obvious forgery based on the 
actual signature cf Nicole Packer. The Dan Bassett signature 
, ist's a signing date of 87/2S/93. The* Nicole Packer signature 
[Forgery) list's: a signing date of 87/26/93. The date of document 
eceipt with Da- Bassett's signature is 87/15/93. 
Contact with ERA Realty: 
Sally rielling contacted ERA Realty and talked with agent Ton. 
ioodn<€.;r., Gcoomav. advised that the or.ly transaction ERA was 
nvolved with was the Sell to Nicole Packer, the first 
transaction. The second trav;saction between Packer avid Basse! fc 
>as handled independently. 
On 01/21/94 this investigator contacted ERA Realty and 
;alked with Lori Goodsell who advised that ERA had no record of 
receiving earnest money pertaining to Packer and Bassett. 
Goodsell explains that usually the acer.t signs the earnest 
ujviey agreement adjacent to the "Brokerage" line listed as 
•Received by". In the ;.ase cf this document there is written i\\ 
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IRON COUNTY ATTORNEY 
97 North Main, Suite #1 • P.O. Box 428 • Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-6694 Telecopier: (801) 586-2737 
SCOTT M. BURNS, COUNTY ATTORNEY KYLE D. LATIMER, CHIEF DEPUTY 
May 27, 1994 
The Honorable Jan Graham 
Utah Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
RE: State v. WinwarcL Fifth District Court Criminal No. 941500056 
Attorney Gary W. Pendleton 
Dear General Graham: 
Mr. Gary W. Pendleton previously requested that you remove me from this case (see 
Exhibit "A") and I responded (see Exhibit MB"); he now makes a similar request (see Exhibit "C") 
and has also filed a Motion for Change of Judge (see Exhibit "DM). Mr. Pendleton's accusations 
were also forwarded to the Utah State Bar and have been dismissed as Mr. Pendleton refused to 
submit the same in authorized form within the required time frame. 
Mr. Pendleton is a fine lawyer and is aggressively defending his clients. I believe, 
however, that Mr. Pendleton has used questionable tactics in this case (accusing me of perjury 
in a probable cause statement and alleging I threatened him physically) and is currently seeking 
my removal as another ploy to intimidate the prosecution and move the focus away from the 
central issue, to wit: the guilt or innocence of his clients. 
Please know that it is my desire to prosecute this case through jury trial (scheduled for 
July 26 through July 29, 1994); if Mr. Pendleton's clients are acquitted, I am certain he will cease 
in his various complaints to your office and other governmental entities. 
Respectfully, 
Scott M. Burns 
Iron County Attorney 
SMB.cm 
Attachments 
pc: Gary W. Pendleton, Esq. 
»o.7 
GARY W. PENDLETON 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
150 North 200 East, Suite 202, St George, Utah 84770 
Telephone (801)626-4411 
Fax Number (801) 628-9260 
February 22,1994 
EXH/3/r "A" 
Scott M Bums 
Iron County Attorney 
97 North Main, Suite 1 
P. O. Box 428 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Re: State v. Winward 
Dear Mr. Burns: 
I believe that your conduct in this case disqualifies you from its further prosecution. I refer 
to two incidents, both of which I believe you are well aware: False statements set out in the 
affidavit in support of the issuance of the arrest warrant and, more significantly, your 
conduct in the lobby at the Cedar City Hall of Justice. 
While I can overlook some of the inaccuracies in the affidavit which you authored and 
signed, given the theory of the State's case, I cannot lightly dismiss the allegation regarding 
Mr. Winward's alleged legal representation of Mr. and Mrs. Bauer. The inclusion of this 
material in the affidavit is at least evidence of a conscious disregard for the truth. 
However, more importantly, I refer to your conduct during the noon recess on Friday, 
February 18,1994. As counsel for one who is accused of a criminal offense, I have not only 
the right but the duty to represent that client zealously within the bounds of the law and the 
cannons of ethics. I am free to do so without the prospect of being accosted in the halls of 
the courthouse by the state's attorney and invited outside, apparently for the purpose of 
some physical altercation. 
I could dismiss the incident if I were to regard you as nothing more than a bully with a law 
degree. However, you are more than that. You represent the power and authority of the 
State of Utah when you prosecute criminal cases. Accordingly, I cannot in good conscience, 
as a member of this Bar, allow the State to make such an assault upon what I view as my 
clients* constitutional right to due process of law and their right to be represented by 
counsel. 
RECEIVED FEB 2 4 199^  
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I am therefore requesting that you immediately request the assistance of the Attorney 
General's office in the prosecution of this case. Furthermore, I am sending them a copy of 
this letter, given their supervisory authority over county attorneys pursuant to U.CA. 67-5-
1(5). 
Finally, I am sending a copy of this letter to Bar Counsel for his consideration and review. 
Sincerely, 
Gaiy W. Pendleton 
GWP:cch 
cc: Kent and Kimberlee Winward 
Jan Graham, Utah Attorney General 
Stephen Trost 
I oS" 
IRON COUNTY ATTORNEY 
97 North Main, Suite #1 • P.O. Box 428 • Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-6694 Telecopier: (801) 586-2737 
SCOTT M. BURNS, COUNTY ATTORNEY KYLE D. LATIMER, CHIEF DEPUTY 
March 1, 1994 
EjCtftBrr " 5 " 
Mr. Gary W. Pendleton, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
150 North 200 East, Suite 202 
St. George, UT 84770 
RE: State of Utah vs. Emer Kent Winward and Kimberlee H. Winward 
Fifth Judicial District Court, Criminal Nos. 941500056 and 941500057 
Dear Mr. Pendleton: 
Given your highly emotional demeanor at the preliminary hearing in the above-referenced 
case, I can understand your frustration in having to accept the fact that both of your clients were 
bound over on two (2) second-degree felonies. I cannot understand your attempt to involve the 
Utah Attorney General or Bar Counsel. 
As you will recall, the Court ordered you on several occasions to "move back away" from 
the Statefs witnesses. Moreover, I, during a late afternoon break prior to closing arguments, told 
you that (a) I didn't appreciate your attempts to intimidate witnesses, (b) I couldn't believe that 
you would engage in "snickering and laughing" loudly during the State's presentation of evidence, 
and (c) your actions were embarrassing to me as a member of the Bar and that I had lost a great 
deal of respect for you. As you will also recall, your clients and their family members gathered 
around during our discussion, and I inquired as to whether or not you would like to step outside. 
I find it almost humorous that you would interpret that request as a threat to harm you physically. 
Mr. Pendleton, I believe in the judicial system and do my best to effectuate justice. As 
a county attorney, I do not "win or lose cases" and I find no joy in prosecuting a case that alleges 
a young lawyer and a young realtor committed serious felonies. That said, you must know that 
I take great offense when a lawyer attempts to intimidate or ridicule witnesses who have been 
subpoenaed to testify. Many of those witnesses (as well as other persons present during court 
that day) called me or came to my office after the hearing and described you as a "rabid dog," 
a "jerk," a "bully," and an "actor trying to take over the courtroom." 
In that I had never dealt with you in court before, I believed that you were a fine lawyer 
and a gentleman. I have since learned that your reputation for in-court sarcastic antics and 
intimidation of witnesses is well-known by prosecutors and other members of the Bar in southern 
Utah. I would only hope that in future proceedings regarding the above-referenced case, and 
\oH 
Mr. Gary W. Pendleton, Esq. 
March 1, 1994 
Page 2 
other dealings we may have together, we may treat each other with respect and act as 
professionals while representing our respective interests. 
If your letter was an attempt to open an investigation, I welcome any inquiries. If your 
letter was an attempt to have me removed from prosecuting this case, I decline. If your letter 
was an attempt to embarrass both of us by your whining, I am afraid you have succeeded. 
Sincerely, 
Scott M. Burns 
Iron County Attorney 
SMBxm 
Attachment 
pc: Jan Graham, Utah Attorney General 
Stephen Trost 
P.S. While we are addressing each other's ethics and competency, I would suggest you 
consider a letter from my good friend Loni F. DeLand that I have attached hereto. Judge Eves 
and Judge Braithwaite have instructed lawyers in the Fifth District (private and appointed) to 
consider Mr. DeLand's concerns. I hope you will take the appropriate steps to protect your 
clients' interests. 
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UTAH ASSOCIATION OF 
CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS 
ftO. BOX eiO«44 
SALT LAKE CfTr, UTAH ©4/81-6546 
January 12, 1994 
Honorable Robert T. Braithvaite 
Fifth District court 
40 Korth 100 East 
Cedar'City, UT 84720 
SUBJECT: Conflicts of Interest Claims Regarding Multiple 
Defendant Representation 
Dear Judge Braithvaite, 
It has coma to the attention of the officers of this 
organisation that a number of appointed defense attorneys in courts 
other than the Wasatch Front courts are being required to represent 
multiple defendants in oriminal prosecutions. Those defense 
counsel that have raised concerns about this practice generally 
cite the budgetary ooncerns of the various counties as being the 
primary reason for multiple defendant appointments. 
Ve are also aware that criminal defendants are becoming 
increasingly litigious in the appeal and writ processes around the 
country in raising issues of ineffective assistance of counsel 
under a variety of claims. One of the areas in which convicted 
defendants are increasingly bringing ineffective assistance claims 
is in the case of conflicts of interest arising from multiple 
representation. 
Although multiple representation is not a EfiX 2£ violation of 
Sixth Amei daent rights (Burger y. Kemp. 483 U.S. 776 (1987), the 
U.S. supreme Court has noted that a possible conflict of interest 
inheres in almost every instance, of .multiple representation, 
Cuvler v. Sullivan. .446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980)'.' Of course, multiple 
attorneys from the same law firm representing more than one 
defendant presents the same problem as one attorney doing the same 
thing. 
Hollowav v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978) first enunciated 
the "automatic reversal" remedy in multiple representation/conflict 
of interest cases where the "possibility11 of a confliot was brought 
to the attention of the court. 
cuyier also held that a defendant who makes a showing (of a 
potential conflict) n'eed n,pt deipgnstrafe prejudice to establish a 
Sixth Amendment claim. 446 U.S. at 349-350. 
The courts vill presume prejudice In cases which meet the 
Guvler standard. The general standard regarding Ineffective 
assistance of counsel, I.e., the two-prong test set forth In 
Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668 (1984), is a greater 
standard than is required in conflict claims. The Strickland court 
addressed the different and less vigorous test applied in conflict 
cases: 
In Cuyler... [ve] held that prejudice is 
presumed when counsel is burdened by an actual 
conflict of interest. In those circumstances, 
counsel breaches the duty of loyalty, perhaps 
the most basic of counsel's duties. Moreover, 
it 1B difficult to measure the precise effect 
on the' defense of representation corrupted by 
conflicting interests. Given the obligation 
of counsel to avoid conflicts of interest and 
the ability of trial courts to make an earlv 
incruiry in certain situations likely to give 
rise to conflicts.. .it is reasonable for the 
criminal justice system to maintain a fairly 
rigid rule of presumed prejudice for conflicts 
of interest. At 692. 
(Emphasis added.) 
It is no secret that the Utah Supreme Court is dissatisfied with 
the quality of appellate defense representation. Justice Hall's 
present committee respecting creation of a statewide indigent 
appellate defense association evidences the court's concern on the 
appellate level. The court's concerns are no less significant at 
the trial level. 
one of the areas that is of growing concern to our courts is 
some rural counties.' preference to letting contracts for indigent 
defense to the lowest bidder, irrespective of the quality of the 
representation. Another is this issue of multiple representation 
and its potential for burdening the appeals courts with claims. 
In the U.S. District Court there is an absolute prohibition 
against appointment of counsel.for more .then one defendant. And, 
in those rare cases where a' privately retained lawyer attempts to 
represent more than one defendant, either personally or through a 
law partner, the courts place the burden of demonstrating a lack of 
conflict (and the entry of an express, informed waiver) squarely on 
the defense counsel and the defendants. This problem is so closely 
scrutinised that neither I, nor any of my colleagues, can even 
recall an instance of multiple representation by a Utah lawyer or 
law firm in the federal distriot court in Salt Lake. 
Moreover, the appointment of counsel in the federal courts as 
well as the appointment of investigators and approval for expenses 
are all done g& parte pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act. Those 
courts recognize, unlike many of our state courts, that anytime a 
**„ i„ ••n„,.,«^  4-A n»rf"(Mr>Ate in aooointntent decisions or 
lot 
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decisions relating to appointment of investigators or other 
reasonable and necessary defense expenses there is a clear Sixth 
Amendment intrusion. 
I would also invite your attention to Rule 1.7, Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct which states, intSX alia, that no lawyer 
undertake any multiple representation without the consent of each 
client after consultation (wherein the potential for conflict is 
discussed). Whore you, as judges, make appointments at first 
appearances, for multiple defendants, there has obviously been no 
opportunity for consultation with the prospective lawyer, ergo, 
there is a per se violation of Rule 1.7. 
After discussing this issue with the executive committee, I 
would suggest that the only sure way to avoid a conflict is to 
follow the example of the federal courts, i.e., judiciously avoid 
Any. multiple appointments. 
railing adoption of the above stated policy, the second most 
prudent option would be to conduct an inquiry with each indigent 
defendant in a multiple defendant case wherein the potential for 
conflicts are discussed and each is then required to waive any such 
conflicts before the appointment can be made. 
The problem remains, however, that every possible conflict 
cannot be addressed early on and will frequently arise at a stage 
in the proceedings when plea offers (often disparate) are made 
where decisions regarding whether defendant(s) ought to testify are 
necessary or when the defense lawyer is faced with trial evidence 
which is objectionable to one defendant, but not to another. I 
would suggest therefore, that you continue to make inquiries, on 
the record, StX ESTJfca, of defendants aj& counsel concerning 
potential conflicts. 
As stated above, although the federal policy is the safest 
option, if defendants and counsel, in multiple representation 
cases, are thoroughly examined regarding conflicts and potential 
conflicts at the onset and throughout the proceedings, you stand a 
greater chance of stemming the growing tide of post conviction 
claims of ineffective asaistanoe of counsel based on conflict, 
claims. 
loo 
GARY W. PENDLETON 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
5opiSSK5^j£7t,: S~^ /C^50[II^5d St, Suite 202, St. George, Utah 84770 
ff —y\( Telephone (801)628-4411 
Fax Number (801) 628-9260 
May 17,1994 
Jan Graham 
Utah Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Re: State vs. Winward 
Iron County Criminal No. 941500056 
Dear Ms. Graham: 
Enclosed is a copy of a motion which we have filed in the above-referenced matter seeking 
the disqualification of the Iron County Attorney as prosecutor in this matter. We are 
providing you with a copy of the motion because you have supervisory authority over the 
various county attorneys pursuant U.C.A 67-5-1(5). 
We are also providing you with a courtesy copy of our statement of points and authorities 
in support of our pending motion to quash the bind over order. This pleading is provided 
in order to provide you a factual backgroimd against which you may evaluate the motion to 
disqualify Mr. Burns. 
Uo^ 
Gary W. Pendleton 
GWP:dap 
Enclosures 
pc: Scott M. Bums 
RECEIVED MAY 1 8 1994 
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GARY W. PENDLETON (2564) 
Attorney for Defendants 
150 North 200 East, Suite 202 
St George, Utah 84770 
Ph: 628-4411 
»« T \ t f 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KIMBERLEE H. WINWARD, 
Defendant. 
MOTION FOR CHANGE 
OF JUDGE 
Case No. 941500057 
Defendant, by and through her attorney, Gary W. Pendleton, hereby requests 
that another judge be appointed for the purpose of considering Defendant's Motion to 
Quash the Bind Over Order issued by the Honorable James L. Shumate. This motion is 
made on the grounds and for the reasons that Judge Shumate was the committing magistrate 
and it is unreasonable and unfair to the court and to the defendant to expect the court to 
review the soundness of its own order. 
DATED this / / day of May, 1994. W^6^ 
Gary W. Pendleiton 
Attorney for Defendants 
^ 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that on this II - day of May, 1994,1 did personally mail 
a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Motion to Scott M. Burns, Iron County 




IRON COUNTY ATTORNEY 
97 North Main, Suite #1 • P.O. Box 428 • Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-6694 Telecopier: (801) 586-2737 
SCOTT M BURNS, COUNTY ATTORNEY KYLE D. LATIMER, CHIEF DEPUTY 
February 22, 1994 
Mr. Steve Law 
DAILY SPECTRUM 
66 Harding Avenue 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
RE: State of Utah vs. Emer Kent Winward and Kimberlee H. Winward 
Dear Steve: 
As you know, I have tried to be very accessible and helpful to you over the past several 
months with respect to your duties as a journalist for the Daily Spectrum newspaper. I have 
appreciated the fact that you have always contacted me prior to quoting me in the newspaper, and 
I believe that you have always represented my statements in a fair and accurate manner. 
However, after leaving town Friday evening and not returning until late Monday evening, I was 
somewhat dismayed to read your article of February 19, 1994, entitled, "Attorney, realtor wife 
plead not guilty to fraud." 
Specifically, the article read: 
"Kent Winward faces possible disbarment if found guilty," said 
Iron County Attorney Scott Burns. "The Utah Bar Council is also 
conducting their own investigation into Winward's actions," he said. 
As you know, I did not make any comment (either in my argument to the Court or in any 
discussions with you) about Mr. Winward facing possible disbarment. Moreover, the only 
comment I made with respect to the Utah Bar conducting an investigation was by way of 
disclosure to the Court that I had been contacted by the Bar Council and informed that I had a 
duty to provide them with certain information regarding this prosecution. 
Please know that this case is difficult enough for me, as it relates to a fellow member of 
the Utah Bar, and I very much resent having statements attributed to me with respect to whether 
or not Mr. Winward faces disbarment. Please know that I have absolutely no idea what sanctions 
(if any) Mr. Winward faces, and I do not have the sufficient background or knowledge to even 
comment on that issue. Had you asked me that question, I would have simply replied, "I have 
no idea whether or not Mr. Winward will face any sanctions by the Utah Bar." 
Mr Steve Law 
February 22, 1994 
Page 2 
1 would request, after reviewing this letter, that you contact Mr. Winward's attorney, Gary 
Pendleton, and ask him whether or not a retraction or statement setting aside the quote attributed 
to me would be desirous. If he responds in the affirmative, I would request a retraction of the 
quote attributed to me and replaced by what my response would have been, "I have no idea 
whether or not Mr. Winward will face any sanctions by the Utah Bar." If Mr. Pendleton believes 
that a retraction would simply draw more attention to the case and my purported quote, then I 
would ask that you not print a retraction. 
Should you have any questions, comments, or concerns regarding this communication, 
please do not hesitate to contact my offices 
Sincerely. 
Scott M Burns 
Iron County Attorney 
SMBxm 
Attachment 
pc: Gary W. Pendleton, Esq. 
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Attorney, realtor wife plead not guilty to fraud 
By(ST»EmLAW 
StaffWriter 
CEDAR CITY — Cedar City 
lawyer Emer Kent Winward and 
his wife Kimberlee, a realtor, 
pleaded not guilty to charges of 
forgery and unlawful dealing of 
property by feduciary, each a 
second degree felony, during 
their preliminaiy hearing Friday 
at 5th District Court. 
The Winwards will be bound 
over for Jury trial that will begin 
as soon as eight jurors are 
selected and the involved parties 
have had time to prepare evi-
dence. 
Kent Winward faces possible 
disbarment if found guilty, said 
Iron County Attorney Scott 
Bums. ThQ Utah Bar Council is 
also conducting their own inves-
tigation into Winward's actions, 
he said. 
The'jcomplaint against the 
Winwards was first filed in 
December by Nicole Packer, a 
former employee of Kim's, who 
alleges she discovered Kent 
Winward had forged a check for 
$$.697.50 from the Cedar Land 
aad Title Company that was 
n^de out to her. Upon investi-
gating the case, Bums said other 
questionable acts allegedly per-
formed by the couple involving 
the same issue were discovered. 
On Aug. 9. 1993. Kim and 
Kent Winward used Packer as 
an interim signer when they pur-
chased property from George and 
Marie Bauer of Henderson, Nev., 
Burns said. The Winwards 
allegedly told George Bauer they 
had a buyer who had $40,000 
cash. They had Packer sign the 
contract as the buyer with money 
received from her father. Bums 
said. 
Packer said she did not receive 
money from her father. She said 
the money caife from Pat 
Williams, a real estate broker 
from Las Vegas, who was told 
the house. was selling for 
$45,000. Packer said she was 
used as a go-between signer so 
that the seller wouldn't know the 
house was really being sold for 
$45,000 and the buyer wouldn't 
know it was actually sold for 
$40,000. 
In reward for her services. 
Packer testified she was told she 
would receive one-third of the 
profit made from the transaction. 
Packer said she was given a 
check for $1,160. $160 of which 
was for commission on previous 
transactions. Since she received 
only $1,000, she said she fig-
ured they must have made a 
$3,000 profit on the Bauer to 
Williams transaction. 
According to Packer's testi-
mony in Friday's preliminary 
hearing, she signed documents 
with no selling price listed. 
Packer claimed she wasn't aware 
she did anything wrong in fol-
lowing Kent Winward's instruc-
tions. 
Packer said she found out sev-
eral months later the property 
was sold for $45,000 and not 
$43,000. It was then. Packer 
said, she realized Cedar Land 
and Title Company issued her a 
check for $4,697.50. Packer tes-
tified that Kim Winward 
deposited the check into her own 
account. 
Packer said she contacted an 
attorney to see if forgery charges 
could be filed. 
Bums said he learned the 
property was sold for $58,000 at 
13 percent interest to Vickl 
Bassett with the Winwards serv-
ing as purchasing agent. The 
Winwards allegedly told Williams 
they had a buyer who would pay 
$55,000 at 13 percent interest, 
and Williams agreed to the sale, 
not knowing Bassett would pay 
$58,000. 
Bassett testified that Kent 
Winward falsely told her he paid 
$3,000 as a down payment. 
Bassett. a hair and nail stylist, 
said Winward said she could 
work off the $3,000 she believed 
she owed by doing hair and nails 
for the Winwards'. Packer and 
another girl. 
All the transactions took place 
Aug. 9. 1993, and the Winwards 
also made six percent commis-
sion off each sale. Bums said. 
Only Kent and Kim Winward 
knew of all the transactions. 
Bums said. 
When the case goes to trial. 
Bums said he will attempt to 
prove theft by fiduciary (theft 
through violation of a trust) and 
forgery against the Winwards. 
Bums said he will attempt to 
prove the? Winwards violated the 
trust of their clients, George 
Bauer and Vickl Bassett. and 
that the Winwards forged 
Packer's signature on a check 
made out to her and deposited 
it into their own account. 
ADDENDUM L 
Rules 1, 9, and 19, Rules of Lawyer Discipline 
and Disability 
cases in which a formal complaint has been filed. The Advisory Committee 
considered the pros and cons at length, and in the final analysis, concluded 
that the district court model was preferable to other models in terms of econ-
omy, efficiency, public access, fairness, and familiarity. Discipline ordered by 
a district court would be appealable to the Supreme Court without prior re-
view by the Bar Commission. 
A majority of the members of the Advisory Committee favor the position 
that disciplinary counsel and the Bar's corporate counsel should be separate. 
However, there is no provision in the proposed rules that addresses the issue. 
The proposed rules were published for public comment on July 20, 1992 in 
Case No. 920334. Thereafter, the Advisory Committee met several times to 
revise the proposed rules in light of the public comments received. The pro-
posed rules were then submitted to the Supreme Court. Amendments pro-
posed by the Court have been included herein. It is anticipated that the pro-
posed rules will need further revision from time to time to refine the process 
in the interest of fairness to the Bar and the public. 
Rule 1. Purpose, authority, scope and structure of lawyer 
disciplinary and disability proceedings. 
(a) The purpose of lawyer disciplinary and disability proceedings is to en-
sure and maintain the high standard of professional conduct required of those 
who undertake the discharge of professional responsibilities as lawyers and to 
protect the public and the administration of justice from those who have 
demonstrated by their conduct that they are unable or unlikely to properly 
discharge their professional responsibilities. 
(b) Under Art. VIII, § 4 of the Constitution of Utah, the Utah Supreme 
Court has exclusive authority within the State of Utah to adopt and enforce 
rules governing the practice of law, including admission to practice law and 
the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice law. 
(c) All disciplinary proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the 
rules and proceedings described herein. Formal disciplinary and disability 
proceedings are civil in nature. These rules shall be construed so as to achieve 
substantial justice and fairness in disciplinary matters with dispatch and at 
the least expense to all concerned parties. 
(d) The interests of the public, the courts, and the legal profession all re-
quire that disciplinary proceedings at all levels be undertaken and construed 
to secure the just and speedy resolution of every complaint. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Utah Supreme Bar in Disciplinary Proceedings, 1994 Utah L 
Court Extends Judicial Immunity to the State Rey. 422. 
Rule 2. Definitions. 
As used in these rules: 
(a) "Bar" means the Utah State Bar; 
(b) "Board of Commissioners" means the Board of Commissioners of 
the Utah State Bar; 
(c) "Committee" means the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the 
Utah State Bar; 
(d) "Complainant" means the person who files an informal complaint; 
(e) "Disciplinary counsel" means counsel appointed by the Board of 
Commissioners of the Utah State Bar, and Other counsel employed to 
assist appointed counsel; 
(f) "Formal complaint" means a complaint filed in the district court 
alleging misconduct by a lawyer or seeking the transfer of a lawyer to 
disability status; 
(g) 'Informal complaint" means any written, notarized allegation of 
misconduct by or incapacity of a lawyer; 
(h) "Office" means the Office of Attorney Discipline; 
(i) "Respondent" means a lawyer subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction 
of the Utah Supreme Court against whom an informal or formal com-
plaint has been filed; 
(j) "Supreme Court" means the Utah Supreme Court. 
Rule 3. Ethics and discipline committee. 
(a) Composition. The Committee shall be appointed by the Supreme 
Court. The Committee shall consist of four public members, and 18 members 
of the Bar who have demonstrated a high standard of professional conduct. All 
appointments following the initial appointments shall be for a term of three 
years. For the initial appointments, six members of the Bar shall be appointed 
for one year, six for two years and six for three years, and one public member 
shall be appointed for one year, one for two years and two for three years. The 
Supreme Court shall designate one lawyer member as chair and one lawyer 
member as vice chair. The initial appointment of the chair shall be for one 
year, and the initial appointment of the vice chair shall be for three years. 
Committee members shall not serve more than two consecutive terms. 
(b) Committee chair. The Committee chair shall supervise the Committee 
and screening panels. The chair's responsibility shall be to maintain an ade-
quate check on the work of the screening panels to ensure that matters move 
forward expeditiously, to determine that screening panels have a uniform 
base for the judgments rendered, and to provide the screening panels with 
information concerning ethics and judicial decisions necessary to their activi-
ties. The chair shall make recommendations to the Supreme Court concerning 
appointments to the screening panels and reports concerning the activities of 
the screening panels and the overall work of the Committee. 
(c) Vice chair. The vice chair shall act in the event of the chair's absence or 
resignation. The chair may call upon the vice chair to assist in any of the 
chair's duties. 
(d) Screening panels, quorums. The Committee shall be divided into four 
screening panels of four members of the Bar and one public member. The 
Supreme Court shall name a chair from each screening panel, who shall 
preside over that screening panel. In the absence of the screening panel chair, 
a vice* chair designated by the screening panel chair shall preside. Each 
screening panel is empowered to carry out any and all functions of the Com-
mittee under these rules. Three members of a screening panel shall constitute 
a quorum. The concurrence of a majority of those members present and voting 
at any proceeding shall be required for a screening panel determination. Each 
screening panel shall meet as is necessary to effectively and promptly carry 
out its duties. The entire Committee may be convened at such other times, on 
the call of the chair, as necessary to effectively and promptly carry out its 
duties. ' 
(e) Responsibilities. The screening panels may, and as to all informal 
complaints referred by disciplinary counsel, which shall be randomly as-
signed, shall, review, investigate, and hear all informal complaints charging 
unethical and/or unprofessional conduct against members of the Bar. After 
such review, investigation, hearing and analysis, the screening panels shall 
determine the action to be taken on any informal complaint which, based 
upon the facts of the particular case, is most consistent with the public inter-
est and the standard of conduct required of a member of the legal profession. 
(0 Subpoena. Any party or the screening panel may petition the district 
court for an order allowing discovery prior to the filing of a formal complaint, 
pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(g) Committee and screening panel secretary. Disciplinary counsel 
shall be the secretary to the Committee and is charged with the responsibility 
of the administrative affairs of the Committee, the handling of the screening 
panel calendars, giving notice to screening panel members and members of 
Rule 6. Jurisdiction. 
(a) Lawyers admitted to practice. The persons subject to the disciplinary 
jurisdiction of the Court and the Office include any lawyer admitted to prac-
tice law in this state, any formerly admitted lawyer with respect to acts 
committed while admitted to practice in this state or with respect to acts 
subsequent thereto which amount to the practice of law or constitute a viola-
tion of any rule promulgated by the Supreme Court, any lawyer specially 
admitted by a court of this state for a particular proceeding, and any lawyer 
not admitted in this state who practices law or who renders or offers to render 
any legal services in this state. 
(b) Incumbent judges. Incumbent judges are subject to the jurisdiction of 
the Office only for conduct that occurred prior to the taking of office. 
(c) Former judges. A former judge who has resumed the status of a lawyer 
is subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court not only for conduct as a 
lawyer but also for misconduct that occurred while the lawyer was a judge and 
would have been grounds for lawyer discipline, provided that the misconduct 
was not the subject of a judicial disciplinary proceeding as to which there has 
been a final determination by the Supreme Court. Misconduct by a judge that 
is not finally adjudicated before the judge leaves office falls within the juris-
diction of the Office. 
Rule 7. Roster of lawyers. 
Disciplinary counsel shall maintain or have ready access to current infor-
mation relating to members of the Bar including: 
(a) full name; 
(b) date of birth; 
(c) current law office and home addresses and telephone numbers; 
(d) date of admission in the state; 
(e) date of any transfer to or from inactive status; 
(f) all specialties in which certified; 
(g) other jurisdictions in which the lawyer is admitted and date of 
admission; and 
(h) nature, date, and place of any discipline imposed and any reinstate-
ments. 
Rule 8. Periodic assessment of lawyers. 
Every lawyer admitted to practice in this state shall pay to the Bar on or 
before July 1 of each year an annual license fee for each fiscal year to be fixed 
by the Board of Commissioners from time to time and approved by the Su-
preme Court. The fee shall be sufficient to pay the costs of disciplinary admin-
istration and enforcement under these rules. 
Rule 9. Grounds for discipline. 
It shall be a ground for discipline for a lawyer to: 
(a) violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or any other rules of this 
jurisdiction regarding professional conduct of lawyers; 
(b) willfully violate a valid order of a court or a screening panel impos-
ing discipline; or 
(c) be publicly disciplined in another jurisdiction. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES A.L.R. — Negligence, inattention, or profes-
sional incompetence of attorney in handling 
client's affairs in personal injury or property 
damage actions as ground for disciplinary ac-
tion — modern cases, 68 A.L.R.4th 694. 
Negligence, inattention, or professional in-
competence of attorney in handling client's af-
fairs in criminal matters as ground for disci-
plinary action — modern cases, 69 A.L.R4th 
410. 
Negligence, inattention, or professional in-
competence of attorney in handling client's af-
fairs in bankruptcy matters as ground for disci-
plinary action — modern cases, 70 A.LJL4th 
786. 
Bringing of frivolous civil claim or action as 
ground for discipline of attorney, 86 A.L.R4th Misconduct involving intoxication as ground 
544. for disciplinary action against attorney, 1 
Soliciting client to commit illegal or immoral A.L.R5th 874. 
act as ground for discipline of attorney, 86 
A.L.R.4th 667. 
Rule 10. Prosecution and appeals. 
(a) Informal complaint of unprofessional conduct. 
(1) Filing. A disciplinary proceeding may be initiated against any 
member of the Bar by any person, disciplinary counsel or the Committee, 
by filing with the Bar, in writing, an informal complaint in ordinary, 
plain and concise language setting forth the acts or omissions claimed to 
constitute unprofessional conduct. Upon filing, an informal complaint 
shall be processed in accordance with these rules. 
(2) Form of informal complaint. The informal complaint need not be 
in any particular form or style and may be by letter or other informal 
writing, although a form may be provided by the Office to standardize the 
informal complaint format. It is unnecessary that the informal complaint 
recite disciplinary rules, ethical canons or a prayer requesting specific 
disciplinary action. The informal complaint shall be signed by the com-
plainant and shall set forth the complainant's address, and may list the 
names and addresses of other witnesses. The informal complaint shall be 
notarized. The substance of the informal complaint shall prevail over the 
form. 
(3) Initial investigation. Upon the filing of an informal complaint, 
disciplinary counsel shall conduct a preliminary investigation to ascer-
tain whether the informal complaint is sufficiently clear as to its allega-
tions. If it is not, disciplinary counsel shall seek additional facts from the 
complainant, which facts shall also be submitted in writing and signed by 
the complainant. 
(4) Disciplinary counsel. Upon completion of the preliminary investi-
gation, disciplinary counsel shall determine whether the informal com-
plaint can be resolved in the public interest, the respondent's interest and 
the complainant's interest. Disciplinary counsel and/or the screening 
panel may use their efforts to resolve the informal complaint. If the infor-
mal complaint cannot be so resolved or if it sets forth facts which, by their 
very nature, should be brought before the screening panel, or if good 
cause otherwise exists to bring the matter before the screening panel, 
disciplinary counsel shall cause to be served a Notice of Informal Com-
plaint by regular mail upon the respondent at the address reflected in the 
records of the Bar. The notice shall have attached a true copy of the 
signed informal complaint against the respondent and shall identify with 
particularity the possible violation(s) of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
raised by the informal complaint as preliminarily determined by disci-
plinary counsel. 
(5) Answer to informal complaint Within 20 days after service of 
the Notice of Informal Complaint on the respondent, the respondent shall 
file with disciplinary counsel a written and signed answer setting forth in 
full an explanation of the facts surrounding the informal complaint, to-
gether with all defenses and responses to the claims of possible miscon-
duct. For good cause shown, disciplinary counsel may extend the time for 
the filing of an answer by the respondent not to exceed an additional 30 
days. Upon the answer having been filed or in the event that the respon-
dent fails to respond, disciplinary counsel shall refer the case to a screen-
ing panel for investigation, consideration and determination. Disciplin-
ary counsel shall forward a copy of the answer to the complainant. 
(6) Non-meritorious informal complaint. An informal complaint 
which, upon consideration of all factors, is determined by disciplinary 
and in that event the motion shall be heard and determined as expeditiously 
as the ends of justice require. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AJJR.—Validity and construction of proce- pending investigation of, and action upoa, (ttt-
dnres to temporarily suspend attorney from ciplinary charges, 80 A.L.R.4th 136. 
practice, or place attorney on inactive status, 
Rule 19. Lawyers convicted of a crime. 
(a) Transmittal of judgment of conviction. The court in which a lawyer 
is convicted of a crime which reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trust-
worthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects shall, within 30 days after 
the conviction, transmit a certified copy of the judgment of conviction to disci-
plinary counsel. 
(b) Motion for interim suspension. Upon being advised that a lawyer has 
been convicted of a crime which reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, 
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, disciplinary counsel 
shall determine whether the crime warrants interim suspension. Upon a de-
termination that the crime warrants interim suspension, disciplinary counsel 
shall file a formal complaint, accompanied by the certified copy of the judg-
ment of conviction, and concurrently file a motion for immediate interim 
suspension. The respondent may assert any jurisdictional deficiency which 
establishes that the interim suspension may not properly be ordered, such as 
that the crime does not reflect adversely on the respondent's honesty, trust-
worthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, or that the respondent is 
not the individual convicted. If an order for interim suspension is not ob-
tained, the formal complaint shall be dismissed and disciplinary counsel shall 
process the matter like any other information coming to the attention of the 
Office. 
(c) Imposition. The district court shall place a respondent on interim sus-
pension upon proof that the respondent has been convicted of a crime which 
reflects adversely on the respondent's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a 
lawyer in other respects, regardless of the pendency of any appeal. 
(d) Dissolution of interim suspension. Interim suspension may be dis-
solved as provided in Rule 18(d). 
(e) Conviction as conclusive evidence. Except as provided in paragraph 
(b), a certified copy of a judgment of conviction constitutes conclusive evidence 
that the respondent committed the crime. 
(f) Automatic reinstatement from interim suspension upon reversal 
of conviction. If a respondent suspended solely under the provisions of para-
graph (c) demonstrates that the underlying conviction has been reversed or 
vacated, the order for interim suspension shall be vacated and the respondent 
placed on active status. The vacating of the interim suspension shall not 
automatically terminate any disciplinary proceeding then pending against 
the respondent, the disposition of which shall be determined on the basis of 
the available evidence other than conviction. 
(g) Notice to clients and o thers of interim suspension. An interim sus-
pension under this rule shall constitute a suspension of the respondent for the 
purpose of Rule 26. 
Advisory Committee Note. — The phrase respects" refers to Rule of Professional Conduct 
"reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty* 8.4(b). 
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other 
Rule 20. Discipline by consent. 
(a) Prior to riling of formal complaint A respondent against whom an 
informal complaint has been filed may, prior to the filing of a formal com-
plaint, tender a proposal for discipline by consent, including a conditional 
admission to the informal complaint or portions thereof in exchange for a 
disciplinary sanction in the form of an admonition, or supervised or unsuper-
vised probation, and final disposition of the informal complaint. The proposal 
shall be submitted to disciplinary counsel who shall forward the proposal to 
the chair of the screening panel to which the case is assigned with a recom-
mendation in favor of or opposed to the proposal, and a statement of the basis 
for such recommendation. The screening panel chair shall either approve or 
reject the proposal. If the proposal is approved, the screening panel chair shall 
forward the proposal to the Committee chair for approval or rejection. If the 
proposal is approved by the Committee chair, the sanction shall be imposed as 
provided in this rule. If the proposal is rejected by the screening panel chair or 
the Committee chair, the proposal and admission shall be withdrawn and 
cannot be used against the respondent in subsequent proceedings. 
(b) After tiling of formal complaint A respondent against whom a for-
mal complaint has been filed may tender a conditional admission to the for-
mal complaint or to a particular count thereof in exchange for a stated form of 
discipline and final disposition of the formal complaint. The proposal shall be 
submitted to disciplinary counsel, who shall then forward the proposal to the 
district court with a recommendation in favor of or opposed to the proposal 
and a statement of the basis for such recommendation. The district court shall 
either approve or reject the proposal. If the district court approves the pro-
posal and the stated form of discipline includes public discipline, it shall enter 
the appropriate disciplinary order as provided in paragraph (e). If the district 
court rejects the proposal, the proposal and admission shall be withdrawn and 
cannot be used against the respondent in subsequent proceedings. 
(c) Order of discipline by consent The final order of discipline by con-
sent shall be predicated upon: 
(1) the informal complaint and any Notice of Informal Complaint if no 
formal complaint has been filed; 
(2) the formal complaint, if filed; 
(3) the approved proposal for discipline by consent; and 
(4) an affidavit of consent by the respondent to be disciplined. 
(d) Affidavit of consent A respondent whose proposal for discipline by 
consent has been approved as provided in this rule, shall submit an affidavit 
to the Committee chair or the district court as appropriate, consenting to the 
imposition of the approved disciplinary sanction and affirming that: 
(1) the consent is freely and voluntarily entered; 
(2) the respondent is not acting under coercion or duress; 
(3) the respondent is fully aware of the implications of submitting the 
consent; 
(4) the respondent is aware that there is presently pending an investi-
gation into, or proceeding involving, allegations that there exist grounds 
for discipline, the nature of which shall be specifically set forth; 
(5) the respondent acknowledges that the material facts so alleged are 
true; and 
(6) the respondent submits consent because the respondent knows that 
if an informal or formal complaint were predicated upon the matters 
under investigation were filed, or the pending formal charges were prose-
cuted, the respondent could not successfully defend against the charges 
upon which the discipline is based. 
(e) Imposition of discipline. If the discipline by consent is an admonition 
or unsupervised probation, the Committee chair shall enter the order and 
impose the sanction as provided in these rules. In all other cases, the chair 
